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SIMSADUS : LONDON 



THE AMERICAN NAVY IN EUROPE 



BY 



JOHN LANGDON LEIGHTON 

Formerly Ensign U. S. N. R. F. 




NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

1920 






Copyright, 1920 

BY 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 



©CI.A572372 



TO MY MOTHER 

AS A MARK, NOT A MEASURE, 
OF THE LOVE OF A DEVOTED SON. 



FOREWORD 

HOW unfit and how unworthy a choice have I 
made of myself to undertake a work of this 
mixture, mine own reason though exceeding weak, 
hath sufficiently resolved me." Thus wrote Sir Wal- 
ter Raleigh in the preface to his History of the 
World. By profession I am not an author nor a 
Naval Officer, and yet I have undertaken to write a 
brief narrative of the American Navy in Europe dur- 
ing the Great War. Would that the talents of Sir 
Walter were at my command — ^but I shall mention 
him no further lest by drawing him into the matter 
I flatter myself. I can but thank him for the apt 
way in which he has expressed my sentiments. In 
these days of limitless rumors, twice-told tales of 
glory, startling revelations, hitherto undisclosed facts, 
and much misinformation, I hope this work will find 
a place. It is not official, and as sanction has not 
been sought, it is published without it. 

One morning in March, 191 8, I found myself a 
member of the Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims' 
Staff in London. The work in which I then joined 
and continued during the remainder of the War, and 
for several months thereafter, was so totally ab- 



vi FOREWORD 

sorblng in its interests that, upon my return to this 
country, I put what I had witnessed into writing. 
Were my powers of expression not so limited, I know 
the reader would be as easily absorbed in learning 
why and how great things were done as I was in 
watching their development from day to day. If you 
are in quest of the Romance of the War, I recommend 
to you the voluminous literature that has been written 
thereon. In my own experience, the romance of the 
War began on April i6, 1917, the day on which I 
left Harvard University, and donned the uniform of a 
sea-man; it ceased the following morning when I was 
aroused from pleasant slumbers at 5 A. M. to wash 
the deck. 

Those of us who joined the ranks of the Navy in 
this War found ourselves playing a new role in the 
comedy or drama of life. We left a universe of free- 
dom and entered a world in which hours for smoking, 
shore leave, uniforms to be worn, and the adjustment 
of our lives were prescribed by autocratic law and 
regulations. We chafed under our restrictions and 
blamed those who enforced them in their tyranni- 
cal attitude. We did not realize that In an Officer's 
orders, or the manner in which we were addressed, 
there was nothing of the personal; these men were 
but enforcing that splendid institution, the code of 
discipline. But as I now look back and see before 



FOREWORD vii 

me the characters of those Officers with whom I 
came in contact, I doubt whether any finer or more 
manly group of men exists. They were educated and 
trained to know the true meaning of duty, responsi- 
bility, and devotion ; they were brisk in their manner, 
quick to act, severe In their judgments, and, at 
heart, human. 

A word in explanation of my title is pertinent. 
"Simsadus: London" was the cable address of the 
American Navy in Europe, or. In other words Ad- 
miral Sims' Headquarters in London. The word 
" Simsadus " dissected, means — " Sims — ^Admiral — 
U. S." 

JOHN LANGDON LEIGHTON. 
Monadnock Farms, 

Monadnock, New Hampshire. 
September, 19 19 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I. The Situation in April, 1917 3 

II. Admiral Sims in London 9 

III. The Establishment of Bases 23 

Queenstown 24 

Brest 36 

Gibraltar 43 

IV. Progress 48 

V. Further Developments — The Grand Fleet. ... 59 

Bantry Bay 64 

VI. The Northern Mine Barrage 66 

VII. Other Activities — Chasers at Corfu 76 

Chasers at Plymouth 82 

Submarines at Bantry Bay 
Army Coal Trade, Azores 
Naval Aviation — Murmansk, Russia 
The Naval Gun Batteries 



84 



VIII. Submarines off the American Coast 94 

IX. A Discussion of Submarines and Their Methods 98 

X. The Distraction of Submarines 124 

XL Why American Troopships were not Sunk 134 

XII. The End of the Submarine Campaign 141 

XIII. The Man on the Bridge (in Homage) 150 

Appendix 159 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING 
PAGE 

Frontispiece 

Convoy Approaching Its Haven of Safety .... 20 

The U.S.S. Duncan and the H.M.S. Wizard ... 30 
Crew of the U .58 Surrendering to the U.S.S. Fanning and 

Nicholson 31 

A Convoy Entering Brest 38 

The H.M.S. Mauretania and U.S.S. Leviathan ... 39 

American Destroyer Escorting a Convoy .... 40 

German Submarine Interned at Santandu, Spain ... 41 

The U.S.S. Shaw in Rough Weather and After Collision . 50 

Troop Convoy Entering Brest 51 

The " Tonnage Curve " 60 

The 6th Battle Squadron 61 

A Floating Aerodrome 66 

The American Mine Laying Squadron 67 

A " Fleet " of Mines 70 

A Few of the Mines, Northern Mine Barrage ... 76 

U.S. Submarine Chasers in Their Cove 77 

The Harbor at Ponta del Gada 84 

U.S. Naval Railway 14-inch Gun at Sommesous . . 92 
The " Tracks " of Three Submarines off the American 

Coast -93 

Chart, showing Position of Enemy Submarines . . .104 

Movements of Submarines (Double Page Map) 

The Highest Development of Submarine Construction . 105 

German Submarine Base at Bruges no 

Two Methods of Sinking Merchant Tonnage . . ■ . in 
A Submarine as Seen from an Aeroplane . . . .118 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



FAaNG 
PAGE 



Depth-Charge Launching Device 128 

The U.S.S. Covington, Torpedoed July 4, 1918 . . . 136 

Map Showing Areas of American Operation . . . 144 
Chart Illustrating " Unity of Command " . . . .145 

Allied Vessels Sunk by Submarines 146 

Group on the U.S.S. New York; Surrender of the German 

Fleet 147 

Admiral William Snowden Sims 152 

Loading the " V " Gun 153 



SIMSADUS : LONDON 



THE GENERAL SUBMARINE SITUATION IN 
APRIL, 1917. 

PERHAPS some of us will recall that in the first 
week in May, 19 17, we were informed by an 
official statement of the British Admiralty, that dur- 
ing the previous month of April 875,000 tons of 
Allied and neutral shipping had been sent to the bot- 
tom of the sea by German submarines. This In- 
formation was not given to the British people, for it 
would have been a more staggering blow to them 
than any other "war truth" yet disclosed. It might 
have stunned us likewise, had we not at that time 
been the possessors of optimistic hopes and rallying 
hearts In an adventure which seemed necessarily 
successful by our mere participation In it. To a cer- 
tain extent our point of view turned out to be correct, 
but at that time it was far from justified. 

The submarine situation in April, 19 17, was briefly 
this. Germany had constructed 213 submarines; she 
had lost 55, leaving her a total of 158 underwater 
craft, with which in April she sank 875,000 tons of 
shipping. She was building an average of six or seven 
per month, while her losses averaged but three or four. 
The total tonnage of the world before the War was 
about 32,000,000 tons, of which by the end of April 
over 7,500,000 tons had already been sunk. Losses 

3 



4 SIMSADUS 

at the rate of 1,000,000 tons per month, which Ger- 
many had promised she would sink, and which she 
virtually did in April, meant that in the course of a 
few months, the Allies would be in a state of star- 
vation. It was a simple problem of arithmetic to 
calculate the conclusion of the War in Germany's 
favor. 

England, the greatest shipbuilding nation of the 
world, was not meeting the losses by new construc- 
tion. Her shipyards were burdened with repair 
work on vessels injured by submarine attacks, and 
very much overcrowded in the construction of new 
Naval craft; and the continuous demand for men in 
the Army caused a chronic shortage of labor. It was 
a bad position in which Great Britain, against 
whom the brunt of the submarine campaign was 
directed, found herself, and a disheartening one 
when one considers that the construction of a ship 
takes many months and its destruction by a sub- 
marine but a few moments. The United States was 
launching a tremendous shipbuilding programme 
which looked promising on paper, but many realized 
that a non-shipbuilding nation, however great in 
wealth, man-power, and resources, could not be con- 
verted into a great shipbuilding nation in less than 
two or three years. And the critical period of the 
War was to come in four or five months! In view of 
all this, the leaders of Great Britain in May, 19 17, 
looked upon the failure of the Allies through the 
success of German submarines as a possible reality. 
What then was to save the cause of the Allies ? The 



THE SUBMARINE SITUATION IN APRIL, 1917 5 

checking of the submarine successes, one may an- 
swer; but how was this to be done, and how was the 
submarine menace being met at that time ? 

At a rough estimate the British Navy was han- 
dling about 80% of the War against the submarine 
in all areas of submarine operations, such as the North 
Sea, the English Channel, all waters west of Eng- 
land and Ireland, and the West Coast of France; also 
in the Mediterranean, where the submarine campaign 
was pressed with the same virulence as marked its 
operations in Atlantic waters. England had at this 
time about 200 destroyers in commission, of which 
100 were on duty with the Grand Fleet in the North 
Sea. As long as the German Fleet kept up its threat 
of fight, the British Grand Fleet had to remain intact. 
Another fifty destroyers were in service in the Eng- 
lish Channel, across which every British Tommy, 
his " Bully Beef," and his ammunition had to pass to 
get to France. A few more were employed in the 
Mediterranean. This left but a meagre two dozen 
to patrol all waters West of the United Kingdom, 
the Irish Sea, and to the South and North of Ireland, 
etc. The duties of all British destroyers were greater 
than they could really shoulder, and many of them, 
after three years of War, were in urgent need of ex- 
tensive repairs. These two dozen which were sta- 
tioned at Milford Haven, Plymouth, and Holyhead 
were responsible for the efficacious patrol of all the 
waters West of the British Isles. Their patrol sys- 
tem was briefly this. The waters were theoretically 
marked off into large squares or areas, and to each 



6 SIMSADUS 

area a destroyer was assigned; with so few destroyers 
the squares were of course very large; and yet they 
were supposed to patrol their square incessantly to 
keep the Submarines down, and, If possible, to attack 
them. This put the destroyer in a position of little 
value, for as the submarine could see the destroyer long 
before the destroyer could see the submarine, and as 
submarines were looking for merchant ships, not for 
destroyers, the submarine could very easily avoid 
the anti-submarine vessels. The system worked out 
disastrously and therefore was discarded and a new 
plan adopted. All Incoming ships were now directed 
to come into the Western British Ports, along any 
one of four or five different and designated lanes, 
which the destroyers were to keep as free from sub- 
marines as possible. An Incoming or outgoing ship, 
while passing along one of these lanes, would be 
picked up by a destroyer and escorted for some dis- 
tance, and then left alone until she was picked up 
again. This system was an attempt at a Convoy 
system, but was successful only in that while one 
escorted ship arrived safely at its port, probably 
another two or three were unescorted, and therefore 
open to attack. It worked out better than its prede- 
cessor, but there still was very much to be desired. 
The Naval Authorities knew that a Convoy system 
would be better, for it had been used In the English 
Channel since 1914, and not a British Tommy had 
lost his life in crossing.* The Convoy system was a 

* The Convoy system was a procedure in which several merchant 
ships would be assembled together, and then proceed under the protec- 



THE SUBMARINE SITUATION IN APRIL, 1917 7 

logical remedy to the Submarine menace, IF — there 
were a sufficient number of destroyers to serve as 
escorts. 

It is true that the Admiralty had pressed and was 
pressing into service every available self-propelled 
vessel. These vessels, which were trawlers, fishing 
boats, and ferry boats, did noble work, and as Kip- 
ling has put it: 

In Lowestoft a boat was laid, 

Mark well what I do say! 
And she was built for the herring trade. 

But she has gone a-rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', 

The Lord knows where! 

They gave her Government coal to burn. 
And a Q. F. gun at bow and stern. 
And sent her out a-rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', 
The Lord knows where! 

Her skipper was mate of a bucko ship 
Which always killed one man per trip. 
So he is used to rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', 
The Lord knows where! 

Her mate was skipper of a chapel in Wales, 
And so he fights in topper and tails — 
Religi-ous tho' rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', 
The Lord knows where! 

Her engineer is fifty-eight. 

So he's prepared to meet his fate. 

Which ain't unlikely rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', 

The Lord knows where! 

tion of destroyers towards their destination. The principle of the 
Convoy dates back to the age of Merchant Caravans in the Far East. 



8 SIMSADUS 

Her leading-stoker's seventeen, 
So he don't know what the Judgments mean, 
Unless he cops 'em rovin', a-rovin', a-rovin', 
The Lord knows where! 

Her cook was chef in the Lost Dogs' Home, 

Mark well what I do say! 
And I'm sorry for Fritz when they all come 

A-rovIn', a-rovin', a-roarin' and a-rovin', 

Round the North Sea rovin', 

The Lord knows where! 

But as the Submarine war continued and the fair 
weather and long summer nights were approaching, 
the submarines moved further out into deep waters 
where trawlers and paddle steamers could not ven- 
ture. Just how seriously the demand for anti-sub- 
marine vessels was, at this time, has never been ap- 
preciated, for the arrival of the American Destroy- 
ers in European waters added the desired number 
and changed the whole aspect of the situation. With 
the coming of these vessels In April, and more in 
May and June, new hopes came to those who knew 
that the sword of Damocles, disguised as a Submar- 
ine, had been hanging over the heads of France, 
Italy, Great Britain, and America. 



II 

ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON. 

DURING the latter part of March, 191 7, Rear 
Admiral Sims was ordered from the U. S. Naval 
War College In Newport, R. I., of which he was 
President, to Washington. After conferences and 
instructions from Secretary Daniels, he and his 
Aid, Commander J. V. B. Babcock, prior to America's 
Declaration of War, proceeded to London in civiliart 
clothes aboard the steamship "New York." They 
arrived in Liverpool on April loth, and were met hy 
a special train and Rear Admiral Hope, R. N., the 
Envoy of the British Admiralty. Admiral Sims had 
been sent to Europe to confer with the British 
Naval Authorities as to the best manner in which 
the American Navy might throw its weight into 
the anti-submarine struggle and to command such 
American vessels as might be sent to Europe. As an 
American Naval Officer of high rank, he was well 
received in London, but there were also other reasons 
for the extremely warm reception extended to him. 
Admiral Sims was no mere acquaintance to the 
British Navy, for he had served in many stations 
in Europe, and as Attache in some of the great 
capitals, during which appointments he had made 
many friends in the Royal Navy. The higher 
Officers of the British Navy looked upon him as 



lo SIMSADUS 

America's greatest Naval Officer, and they all were 
familiar with the story of his statement to a gather- 
ing of British Naval Officers in 19 lo, in which he 
said that if the British Navy ever needed the sup- 
port of the American Navy, that support would be 
extended. For this remark he had been censured 
by President Taft; but the censure had been for- 
gotten, and the remark had lived. Here was the 
same American Officer, who years before had ex- 
pressed an appreciation of Great Britain, and made 
a prophecy that the U. S. Navy would support the 
British Navy in time of trouble. The prophecy had 
come true and its author was to be the leader of the 
American forces, at the time when the fate of Eng- 
land and the world were in the balance. 

A few words here about Admiral Sims are pertinent. 
His career as a Naval Officer had been brilliant and 
he became a marked man on three different occa- 
sions. In 1905 he had set his heart so firmly upon the 
necessity of an improvement in the gunnery of the 
American Navy that, when his plans were refused 
by the Navy Department, he took the matter up with 
President Roosevelt himself, who immediately saw 
the value of Lieutenant-Commander Sims' schemes, 
and had the whole gunnery system of the U. S. Navy 
altered. He became a marked man again in 1909, 
when, with the rank of Commander, he was ordered 
to serve as the Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. 
"Minnesota." This was the first time In the his- 
tory of the American Navy that an Officer below 
the rank of Captain had commanded a first class 



ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON ii 

battleship. And then in 1910 he made his famous 
speech to the British Naval Officers. For these 
reasons, Admiral Sims was the American Naval 
Officer most widely known to the British Navy. 
He was the most welcome. 

His mission was to discuss with the British Naval 
Authorities the plans by which the efforts of the 
American Navy would be of the greatest value 
against the submarines or U-boats. Upon his ar- 
rival in London, he had long and pertinent confer- 
ences with the leaders of the Government, with the 
Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers, and 
the Lords of the Admiralty. In these conferences 
he requested that no information be withheld from 
him, regardless of how secret or pessimistic that in- 
formation might be. The results were interesting. 
Having made himself thoroughly familiar with 
existing conditions, he wrote home to the Secretary 
of the Navy, emphasizing two points. First, he 
pointed out that the Allies were in a fair way to suc- 
cumb to Germany's sea policy unless the United 
States could furnish merchant "bottoms" in the near 
future, and Military and Naval aid immediately. 
The second point of interest was the policy which he 
then and there laid down, and from which he never 
deviated, for the American Navy in Europe; namely, 
that in order to be of the greatest use, the American 
Warships which were to come to European waters, 
should operate as a part of the British Forces, and 
their employment and disposition supplement the 
weaker spots of the British Naval Organization. In 



12 SIMSADUS 

this way he sacrificed fame for himself; for how- 
splendid It would have been to be the gallant "Sea 
Admiral" of the American Navy, such as Beatty 
was In the British Navy. Instead he saw that 
to have the U. S. Navy in Europe as a distinct 
and separate organization would only lead to de- 
lays and complications; he saw that the policy al- 
ready mentioned, In which the two Navies could 
become merged into one, would be better. Thus he 
took his place as the first great Allied Chief to ap- 
preciate the value of unity of command. 

He immediately established himself in London that 
his headquarters might eventually function as an in- 
tegral part of the British Admiralty. The scope of 
the Naval War was wide, demanding that efforts be 
concentrated and not scattered. Naturally, London 
offered facilities of easy contact with all theatres 
of operation, particularly as regards communica- 
tion. He realized that his communication sj^'stem 
v/ould be a vital factor In the efiicient management 
of the U. S. Naval Forces, because of the great dis- 
tance which would separate him from his bases 
and from Washington. In May he requested the 
services of a young Lieutenant-Commander of the 
regular Navy named Blakeslee, who came over from 
Washington In August, and this officer with a vision 
of the potential activities of the Forces to come under 
the Admiral's command, established probably the 
finest communication system of any Allied belliger- 
ent organization in the War.* By means of this 

*The news of Lt. Commander Blakeslee's death in March, 1919 in 



ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 13 

system, members of Admiral Sims' staff could com- 
municate in code with any of the bases, later estab- 
lished, whether at Murmansk, in Russia, or at the 
Island of Corfu In the Mediterranean, with only a 
few hours Intervening between cables sent and an- 
swers received. 

However, before Admiral Sims became worried 
over the efficient management of his forces, he de- 
voted all his energy and experience and resources 
towards the development of their future opera- 
tions, i. e., what were they to do? where were they 
to do it? and how should they do it? In adopting the 
policy that the United States Navy should supple- 
ment the weaker spots of the Royal Navy, he had 
made one reservation, that American vessels should 
primarily be engaged in anti-submarine warfare and 
that any portions of the British Navy not employed 
in fighting submarines, even though employed In the 
Naval situation as a whole, would have to wait to 
be strengthened by American vessels, until the 
critical stage had passed. He took this stand be- 
cause he believed that the anti-submarine forces 
needed help more critically than other units. He 
believed that the American people would prefer to 
have their forces in Europe primarily fighting sub- 
marines because the submarine war had been the 
cause of America's entry Into the struggle. This 
stand was readily understood, appreciated, and ac- 

Parls was keenly felt by all who knew him, and realized what a great 
service he had rendered. In December, 1918, he was ordered to Paris 
and there established the Communication system used by the Ameri- 
can delegates at the Peace Conference. 



^ 



14 SIMSADUS 

cepted by the Admiralty. In order properly to 
understand the future developments and ultimate 
activities of our forces, a closer view of the exist- 
ing conditions and suggested remedies is interesting. 

The tactics in fighting the submarine at the time 
of America's entry into the War have already been 
discussed, and I have shown that the presence of de- 
stroyers on patrol duty, here and there, was really 
of little value. They could hardly expect to find 
submarines resting quietly on the surface, and cer- 
tainly could not locate them when submerged. If 
a destroyer happened to pick up a ship and es- 
cort her some distance, some good was being done, 
but while one was being escorted safely, probably 
another two were being sunk a few miles away. 
Thus the time and effort spent in escorting one ship 
were all out of proportion to the value of one ship, as 
long as others were being destroyed in great numbers. 
What was wanted was a system in which time, 
effort, and energy could be used to the best advan- 
tage; in other words, concentration of the material 
and resources at hand. Many suggestions for the 
improvement of conditions were made, and the 
suggestions were all of value. In the discussion 
which follows, however, it must be borne in mind 
that, with the lack of sufficient numbers of anti- 
submarine vessels, and destroyers in particular, the 
sinkings could not feasably be lessened. 

The first of the many methods suggested was the 
arming of merchant ships. This was looked upon 
far more favorably in this country than in England, 



ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 15 

where experience had shown that the presence of a 
gun on a Merchant Ship in no way protected it from 
being sunk. What it did do was to force the sub- 
marine to use a torpedo in sinking a ship. This meant 
that a submarine could destroy no greater number of 
ships than the number of torpedoes it could carry, 
and of course, such a doctrine carried with it a cer- 
tain amount of virtue, but as a means of protecting 
ships from being sunk it was not successful. 

Another method suggested was the use of mines 
and nets. This was not a new idea; it involved rather 
the development of a principle already in use, for 
mines and nets have been used in all recent wars* to 
hamper the movements of enemy ships. As subma- 
rines operated on the high seas, and miles of open 
water could not be promiscuously sown with floating 
mines, their use had been restricted to such areas as 
the Dover Straits, the Eastern end of the North Sea, 
along the entrances to harbors, and such like. These 
fields proved effective to a certain extent, but many 
obstacles presented themselves. In the first place, 
wind and storm, ebb and flow, eventually would dis- 
rupt the mine field so much that it would often be- 
come just as much of a danger to Allied ships as 
to the enemy. Also a majority of U-boats were 
equipped with a mine and net-cutting device, which 
consisted of a sharp saw tooth instrument along the 
bows, aft of which, and along the whole length of the 
vessel, a strong steel wire above the periscope was 

* In 1777 a chain was laid across the Hudson River south of West 
Point, to prevent the British vessels from going up the River. 



i6 SIMSADUS 

stretched. A submarine running into a net would, 
by means of the saw tooth, cut one strand of the net 
open, and by means of the steel wire overhead, force 
its way through the gap. A submarine Commander 
knowing of nets or a mine field, could bring his ves- 
sel to the surface or submerge to a great depth, and 
pass over or under safely. According to theory, the 
use of mines or nets would seem such an easy and suc- 
cessful method of checking submarine operations, but 
according to results, this was far from the case. 

The U. S. Navy Department had since the begin- 
ning of the War, fostered a great plan for closing up 
the North Sea, and upon America's entry, the Depart- 
ment suggested the scheme to the Admiralty through 
Admiral Sims. This mine field was to reach from 
Scotland to Norway, and was to prevent the egress 
of submarines into the high seas by way of the North 
of Scotland. The plan was good, very good and pos- 
sible, and was eventually adopted, but in May, 19 17, 
there were several excellent reasons for objecting to 
its construction at that time. When a mine field is 
laid, the mine-laying ships have to be protected from 
enemy assault, and after the field is laid, a constant 
watch has to be kept to prevent the enemy from raid- 
ing it and tearing it to bits with drags and towed 
nets. Now a mine barrage, laid across the North Sea 
would have called for a long and constant patrol, 
which, unless the ships were capital ships — I mean 
battleships, cruisers, or battle cruisers — ^would have 
been no match for a heavy squadron of enemy ves- 
sels. He could have concentrated an attack on any 



ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 17 

one spot along a comparatively long and weak line of 
resistance, and have done the damage before the 
patrol vessels, whose assistance against a heavy 
squadron would have been of little use anyway, could 
appear upon the scene. A mine field, when once de- 
stroyed, if only in a small spot, is of no value until re- 
paired. On the other hand, if the British were to 
employ capital ships as a protection to the mine field, 
these ships would have been open to torpedo attack. 
It will be seen, then, that the laying of a mine field 
across the North Sea at that time, would have only 
made further demands upon the British naval ves- 
sels, of which there was already an acute shortage. 
But the chief objection raised, and Admiral Sims was 
right when he raised it, was based on the fact that the 
Allies did not have the mines with which to do It, 
and their construction would have taken months, at 
a time when the critical period of the submarine war 
was at hand! To have pinned great faith on this 
scheme at that time would have been folly. 

The riddance of the submarine menace by mine 
fields was temporarily discarded, for after all is said 
and done, and in this peculiar and critical situation, 
mine fields were remedies of only a palliative sort 
and of secondary importance. Admiral Sims and the 
Admiralty authorities agreed on this point abso- 
lutely, and took their stand firmly that the subma- 
rine to be defeated had to be fought Immediately 
where its strength lay. 

The most promising suggestion offered was that of 
the Convoy System. It was by no means a new sug- 



1 8 SIMSADUS 

gestlon, for as said, the British Navy had used It dur- 
ing the two preceding years In escorting troop and 
supply ships to and from France. The Admiralty 
had considered putting a similar system into opera- 
tion In the waters West of England, but realized that 
this could not be done with the lack of destroyers. 
The Convoy would only be an improvement, IF — 
there were a sufficient number of destroyers available 
for escort duty. If there were not, it would be far 
worse, for the available destroyers could handle but 
a small percentage of the total merchant traffic, 
thereby laying a very large proportion open to at- 
tack. If the submarines had gained the Information 
that the few available destroyers were escorting 
convoys, and no longer on patrol, a very free and 
open policy of still greater danger to the Allied ships 
would have followed. The mere fact that an occa- 
sional destroyer was out on patrol, tended to make 
the submarine exert a little caution at least; If these 
occasional patrols had been withdrawn, nothing 
would have remained to hamper their ravages. 
With the arrival of the American destroyers In April, 
and more to come In May and June, a portion of the 
desired number of destroyers were added to the anti- 
submarine forces, and more detailed plans were 
drawn up for the formation of a Convoy System. 

In drawing up these plans the Officers of the Mer- 
chant Marine Service had to be consulted, and many 
of these old time sea-going men were summoned to 
London to confer with the Admiralty authorities. 
Practically all of them declared themselves opposed 



ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 19 

to such a scheme. It must not be thought that In so 
doing their intentions were anything but of the best, 
for the desire for preservation of his ship is second 
nature to the Merchant Marine Officer; and all of 
them heartily wished to contribute to the cause by 
the prevention of tonnage losses. Their objections 
were based on sincere argument, but in these they 
underestimated their own genius. They were all of 
the opinion that in convoys, where great ships would 
be huddled together in close formation, the losses 
through accidents would be too great. They de- 
plored their own abilities, and that of their ships, 
to keep in formation and not be a nuisance to each 
other. None of them had ever had the training of 
station keeping, as had the Naval Officer, and so they 
believed that efficient station keeping would be be- 
yond their powers; they would far rather have run 
the risks of submarines themselves, protecting their 
ships by various antics or zigzags, and other manoeu- 
vres of their own invention. Admiral Sims and a few 
British Officers stepped Into the breach of opinion 
thus formed, and declared that the Merchant Cap- 
tain had underrated his abilities, and said that from 
what they had seen of the Merchant Marine, the 
average Captain was very nearly as efficient in han- 
dling his ship as the average Naval Officer. In this 
way a compromise was reached, and It was agreed to 
give the Convoy System a tryout. This was done, 
and British destroyers at a later date proceeded out 
to sea some 150 miles, where they met some Incom- 
ing ships from Gibraltar and escorted these back to 



20 SIMSADUS 

Milford Haven. At the conclusion of this experi- 
ment the Naval Officers, whose destroyers had es- 
corted the Merchant ships, claimed that the station- 
keeping qualities of the Merchantmen was good, and 
with a little more practice, might be rendered ex- 
cellent. That settled the question, and definite plans 
for the establishment of the Convoy System were be- 
gun. 

The values of the scheme were many. In the 
first place, the submarines had been attacking and 
sinking Merchant ships without incurring any dan- 
ger to themselves. If the ship thus attacked was 
not armed, the submarine could attack it by gun 
fire, or stop it, and then by sending members of its 
crew aboard the captive vessel, scuttle it or blow a 
hole in its bottom. In convoys, where large numbers 
of ships could be herded together and protected by a 
few destroyers, this procedure would not be possible; 
the submarine would have a fight for every ship 
sunk. Furthermore, up to this time, submarines had 
roamed the open seas attacking Merchant vessels, 
and avoiding destroyers and other anti-submarine 
craft; but in the Convoy System, in which the mer- 
chant ships and destroyers would proceed together, 
the submarines could not attack the ships without 
encountering protectors. The best locality in which 
to shoot a fox is near a hen yard; just so, the Mer- 
chant ship was the submarine's prey, and in order to 
get the opportunity of attacking submarines, a few 
destroyers merely had to hang around, and the sub- 
marine would reveal itself sooner or later. This form 



ADMIRAL SIMS IN LONDON 21 

of combating the submarine was really an offensive 
campaign against it, and that is what we wanted. 

One of the cardinal principles of military strategy 
has always been that of concentration against the 
enemy. The Convoy System would supply this con- 
centration perfectly. Before its adoption the anti- 
submarine eifo rt had been scattered; a destroyer 
here and a destroyer there, and ships open to at- 
tack all over the place. The enemy, that is, the 
German submarines, had the concentration on his 
side in this state of affairs, while the Allied anti-sub- 
marine efforts were at sixes and sevens. The Con- 
voy System turned the tables; for with its adop- 
tion large numbers of ships protected by destroyers 
on all sides, would proceed together. In other 
words, the efforts of the destroyers were concen- 
trated in their defence of shippingj while the efforts 
of the submarines, with fewer ships alone on the 
high seas, would have to be more varied and scat- 
tered. The introduction of this scheme then, was 
nothing more than a recognition and application of 
an old-time military principle. 

There was one more point of great strength In 
this new system. It has already been pointed out 
bow rr'nch AJ-nual Sims appreciated the necessity 
at this time of doing something, and of doing it 
quickly if the U-boat campaign was to be defeated; 
and how for that reason mining or net operations 
had been shelved, to be considered at a later date. 
In fact all sorts of inventions and plans for unsink- 
able ships, and for the destruction of submarines were 



22 SIMSADUS 

being received by the Admiralty and by the Navy 
Department, and some of these were excellent in 
principle. But it was not wise to take these too 
seriously for the present, because of the time neces- 
sary for their institution. The situation called for a 
remedy, the necessary component parts of which 
were already in the hands of the authorities and 
available for immediate use; that is, what the ad- 
vent of the American destroyers afforded — the nec- 
essary number of destroyers for convoy — and with 
their arrival the system could be immediately 
established. 



Ill 

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES. 

IT has already been said that from June to Sep- 
tember, 19 17, would be the critical period of the 
Submarine War; there was also a critical area, and 
this was In the waters between the Southwestern 
coast of Ireland and Cape FInlsterre, or Brest, 
France. All ships from the United States, Canada, 
South America, the Mediterranean, and Africa, had 
to pass through this area to get Into the Southern 
and Western ports of England, such as Southhamp- 
ton, Plymouth, Cardiff, Holyhead, or Liverpool. A 
considerable portion of shipping from the United 
States and Canada, was directed to pass to the 
North of Ireland, to Glasgow and Liverpool, thereby 
avoiding the necessity of steaming into this "neck of 
a bottle'* formed by the Coast lines of England and 
France. But this did not seriously relieve the con- 
gestion of traffic; in fact, the congestion could not be 
relieved. In order to escort safely the hundreds 
of vessels which passed through this critical area 
South of Ireland, escorts to the convoys had to be 
provided. This meant that any location suitable 
for a base on the South coast of Ireland, would be 
very desirable, and Queenstown was the first local- 
ity chosen as an American Naval base. It formed 
a halfway point between the Western ports of Eng- 

23 



24 SIMSADUS 

land, and the rendezvous * at sea between which 
the convoys would be escorted. The next base to 
be decided ujpon was Brest, the location of which 
afforded many of the same advantages as those of 
Queenstown; both were located at the approach to 
the chief European ports. 

QUEENSTOWN 

The first flotilla of American destroyers ordered to 
Europe was sent directly to Queenstown. This de- 
tachment, consisting of six vessels under Commander 
Taussig, U. S. N., steamed into Queenstown harbor 
at noon on April 26, 1917. The British Naval person- 
nel at Queenstown knew that these vessels were 
coming, and were expecting them some time during 
the day, but hardly expected that they would arrive 
at noon, the hour which Taussig had designated by 
wireless, because of the delays and uncertainties in- 
volved in a trip across the Atlantic. But surely 
enough they did, and at a few minutes before noon, 
-smoke was seen on the Western horizon, and then 
one, two, three, four, five, six little specks came up 
out of the ocean. Two mine sweepers were imme- 
diately sent out a few miles to sweep a channel clear 
for them, for who knew but that a German subma- 
rine might have laid mines at the entrance to the har- 
bor during the previous night. Great were the 

* The rendezvous at sea was the position at which destroyers would 
meet a group of merchant vessels from North and South America: 
this position was generally some 200 or 300 miles west of the British 
Isles and France. 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 25 

cheers from all at the base, for these vessels were 
coming to help In the War against the submarine at a 
time when the need for destroyers was very great. 
As they steamed up the harbor, few, perhaps, real- 
ized what the advent of these American vessels 
really meant. It meant that America and England, 
sister nations, had at last joined hands against 
their common enemy. In memory of this day, It 
will be for the welfare of America to forget what her 
children are taught in school books about English 
tyranny; and It will be for the welfare of Great 
Britain to remember that, though separated by 
three thousand miles of water, she has a friend who 
helped her in a great struggle. These thoughts, 
shared as they are to-day by many Anglo-Saxons, 
were beautifully expressed to Admiral Sims before 
his departure from England in a picture given to him. 
The picture Is entitled, "The Return of the May- 
flower"; in the foreground Is the "Mayflower," as 
that vessel probably appeared — behind It a full- 
fledged squadron of American destroyers as they 
appeared that morning entering Queenstown harbor. 
Previous to the arrival of the American destroy- 
ers. Admiral Sims had decided to commence his 
policy of supplementing the weaker portions of the 
British Navy by handing the operating command 
of these vessels over to Vice-Admlral Sir Lewis 
Bayly, R. N., the Commander in Chief of the South- 
west coast of Ireland. In this way. Admiral Sims 
showed himself not only the first great Allied Chief 
to propose unity of command, but also the first to 



26 SIMSADUS 

put such doctrines Into eflfect. He was still to have 
administrative command over these vessels, but as 
far as operations were concerned, they were to 
serve with the British forces under Admiral Bayly. 
In order to Insure harmony between these forces of 
two different nations, Vice-Admiral Bayly appointed 
Captain J. R. P. Pringle, U. S. N., who was 
Admiral Sims' Chief of Staff at Queenstown, as 
his first assistant. Vice-Admiral Bayly sent these 
vessels as they steamed up the harbor, the heart- 
iest welcome and congratulations upon their arrival 
In European waters; In concluding this message, 
he informed Commander Taussig that all facilities 
at his base were at the disposal of the American 
vessels, and asked what repair work was necessary 
and how long before the American flotilla would be 
ready for duty. Commander Taussig's reply was 
prompt, and read, ''As soon as we refuel, Sir.'* 
Such an answer, after a hard trip across the Atlantic, 
from a destroyer's officer, whose vessels were never 
Intended to cross the ocean except In emergencies, 
gave the American vessels a wonderful place — a 
very extraordinary place In fact — in the esteem of 
the authorities of the Royal Navy. The tale of 
Commander Taussig's reply soon spread broad- 
cast, and as late as February, 19 19, It was still being 
told at the English dinner table as a remarkable 
accomplishment. That is what it was, and it Im- 
mediately convinced the Officers of the English 
Navy that the types of vessels and men aboard 
the American vessels were of the very highest 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 27 

order. Whatever the accomplishments of the Amer- 
ican Navy had been in the past, all these were 
temporarily eclipsed by this incident. The Ameri- 
can crews were allowed four days' rest before com- 
mencing their new tasks as a belligerent Allied Navy. 

The American destroyers, in that another twenty- 
five or thirty would soon join them at Queenstown, 
were confronted with the problem of enlarging the 
scope of the facilities and requirements necessary at 
a Naval base. Queenstown had been used as a base 
by the British, but the present and future influx of 
twenty or thirty more vessels, made vast expansion 
necessary. Admiral Sims had already laid down the 
law that all vessels at U. S. Naval bases in Euro- 
pean waters should be self-maintaining, which meant 
in the case of Queenstown, that many store-houses, 
barracks, hospitals, recreation rooms, and repair facil- 
ities had to be provided. Work was commenced al- 
most immediately on the construction of such build- 
ings, and the growth of the base was rapid. In 
undertakings of this sort, as was the case wherever 
the British Naval Authorities were encountered, the 
members of the Royal Navy left no stone upturned 
in offering every assistance possible, a courtesy which 
will always be remembered by those who served at 
Queenstown. 

The most important facility necessary at Queens- 
town was an organization capable of executing rapid 
and extensive repairs. Destroyers always have 
needed, and always will need, a great deal of watch- 
ing and repairing. The English dock yards were al- 



28 SIMSADUS 

ready so overcrowded that any repair work which 
could be done at the base would save time and 
trouble, for, besides not being a burden to the dock 
yards, the efficient up-keep of a vessel would be of 
value In keeping that vessel In the running. To serve 
this purpose two Mother ships, the U. S. S. "Dixie" 
and the U. S. S. "Melville," * to be used as store and 
repair ships, were sent to Queenstown. The record 
which these two ships established in keeping the de- 
stroyers in good repair, probably contributed more to 
the efficient up-keep of the destroyers than any one 
thing. Whenever a destroyer returned to port after 
several days at sea with Convoys, she would send a 
message to the "Melville" stating what repairs 
would be necessar}^, and by the time that the de- 
stroyer had made fast to her buoy, a working party 
from the "Melville" would be ready to commence 
work at once. The greater portion of repair work 
was done by the crew of the "Melville" rather 
than by those of the destroyers, for the duty at 
sea was so arduous that all time In port was needed 
for rest. There was no task short of a lost propeller 
or a severely injured turbine that the men from 
the "Melville " could not handle. In the general 
scheme of operations it was planned that each de- 
stroyer should have four days' duty at sea and two 
days in port, which meant that each vessel would be 
on duty 67% of the time; statistics of operations 
show that the average time at sea for all destroyers 
was about 66%. This splendid record was largely 
* Admiral Sims' Flagship in Europe. 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 29 

the result of the efficient and excellent work per- 
formed by the repair ships and their crews. 

But before the Americans felt themselves fully es- 
tablished, they joined in the work of the British. 
VIce-Admlral Bayly, R. N., who was a veritable horse 
for work, and Captain J. R. P. Pringle, U. S. N., 
Admiral Sims' Chief of Staff at Queenstown, rightly 
believed that, as long as there was a War In prog- 
ress, the Idleness of any vessel was a military crime. 
When any occasion arose In which a destroyer was 
ready for duty but was awaiting the approach of a 
convoy or a similar assignment of duty, that vessel 
was not allowed to stay Idle, but was immediately 
sent out on patrol duty of some sort. The actual 
escort of a convoy was an arduous task. Four or 
five or more destroyers would leave Queenstown 
and proceed Westward to pick up a convoy about 
200 miles West of Ireland. They would then es- 
cort this convoy to Liverpool or some other port, 
and then turn around and escort an outward-bound 
convoy to a point some 200 miles West of Ireland. 
Here they would pick up another incoming convoy 
and take it to a Western English port, or, if chey 
were lucky, be relieved by another detachment of 
destroyers as they passed near Queenstown. A 
slow convoy would necessitate many inconceivable 
forms of antics and exercises in the execution of 
proper vigilance. A fast convoy would call for the 
same vigilance, but would be a great deal more 
severe on the destroyers and their personnel than 
a slow one. A few hours with a 20-knot convoy, 



30 SIMSADUS 

which meant that the destroyers must maintain a 
speed of 23 knots at least, or the experience of two 
or three days of heavy storms, Imposed as severe a 
strain upon the human body and nerve power as 
has been experienced In this War. The strain upon 
the ships themselves was often far greater than 
their designers expected them to weather. 

If the reader desires to learn of the Romance of 
convoy duty, I can only refer him to some of the ex- 
cellent books of Lieutenant Freeman, R. N. on that 
subject, or, better still, let the reader himself In- 
quire into the thoughts of the seaman who was or- 
dered aloft at two A. M. to the lookout nest on the 
forward mast of a destroyer, which was rolling forty- 
five degrees on a dark and stormy night, and making 
twenty knots ; or ask the young regular or reserve of- 
ficer what thoughts went through his mind, when he 
was aroused from lifeless slumbers to go on watch for 
four hours as officer of the deck of his destroyer, 
awakened by a touch from the quartermaster and 
these cheering words: "11.45, Sir, and Mr. Smith 
says it Is cold and wet. Sir;" and whatever there was 
of a romantic or human side in this War, will be 
found. 

A brief statistical resume shows that during the 
ten and a half months of 19 18 the Queenstown de- 
stroyers * escorted 39% of all the traffic passing in and 

* In May, 1918, there were 33 American destroyers at Queenstown. 
Twelve of these the following month were transferred to Brest. As 
new destroyers came over they were sent to Queenstown, and a cor- 
responding number already at Queenstown were ordered to Brest. 
In Sept., 1918, 36 chasers arrived at Queenstown: they carried out 




r//, /,•/-,-.•,.,„/ ,'.V UudcrzvooJ 




The U. S. S. Duncan and the 11. Al. S. Wizard. Notice 
the difference in construction. A dispute once arose 
between Admiral Sims and some British officers as to 
the relative merits of English and American destroy- 
ers. An English officer said that the British destroy- 
ers were better because they were more manly and 
sturdy, and that though American vessels were the 
more graceful, they looked effeminate. Admiral Sims 
replied : "The female is the more deadly of the 
species." 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 31 

out by way of the South coast of Ireland. In July 
and August alone they escorted a total of 2,340,000 
tons without a single casualty to any convoy; In 
other words, they escorted about one-sixth of the 
shipping afloat on the high seas of the world, with- 
out a single loss. 

The experiences of the American destroyers at 
Queenstown calling for the greatest Interest are those 
of the sinking of a submarine by the U. S. S. "Fan- 
ning" and "Nicholson" on November 17, 1917, and 
the loss of the U. S. S. "Jacob Jones" on November 
5th of the same year. The "Fanning" and "Nichol- 
son" were escorting a convoy, when a submarine was 
sighted. They ran towards It at full speed and 
dropped depth charges over the spot beneath which it 
had submerged, and then circled around the vicin- 
ity while the submarine rose to the surface only to 
submerge again In a moment. Once more they 
dropped depth charges, one of which injured the 
elevation apparatus, corresponding to a rudder 
of the submarine. The submarine sank to a great 
depth, after which a Commanding officer blew 
his tanks, bringing the vessel to the surface. The 
"Fanning" immediately opened fire, and a moment 
later the crew came up on deck through the con- 
ning tower and surrendered. This was the first 
"prize" of the American Navy in Europe, and, as will 
be remembered, the news was heralded with enthusi- 
asm in this country. The submarine was the U-58. 

some excellent operations, but their activities were cut short by the 
Armistice. 



32 SIMSADUS 

On November 5, 19 17, the U. S. S. "Jacob Jones," 
one of our newest and best destroyers, was steaming 
alone not far from the Scilly Islands. Late in the 
afternoon she was struck by a torpedo from an enemy 
submarine and sank in a few minutes, a little over 
half of her crew being saved. The wireless of the 
"Jacob Jones" was put out of commission by the 
explosion, but later the Commander-in-Chief on 
the South coast of Ireland, Admiral Bayly, received 
a wireless announcing that the "Jacob Jones" had 
sunk at a certain time, in a given latitude, and that 
the survivors were in the boats and on rafts; help 
was requested. This was a curious situation, and 
there is no doubt in the minds of the officers stationed 
at Queenstown but that wireless was sent by the 
German submarine. 

Among the requisites of a Naval Base are rec- 
reation centres. There are no greater believers 
In the value of suitable rest and recreation for crews 
than Admiral Sims and his associates, who were de- 
termined that the Queenstown Forces should enjoy 
their moments ashore, and saw to it that they did. 
A "Men's Club," in which almost nightly little 
amateur theatricals, dances, or "movies" were given 
by the crews of the vessels in port, was the centre of 
these attractions. The necessity for this sort of 
thing was more clearly realized after a few unfor- 
tunate disturbances between the sailors and the 
Irish at Cork. The Southern Irishman did not seem 
an easy person with whom to get along, and no 
doubt the apparent prosperity of the American 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 33 

sailors rubbed him a bit the wrong way. This, 
coupled with the attitude of many of the Irish to- 
wards the War, probably established the grounds 
for bad feeling. In other words these affairs re- 
sulted from a misunderstanding between the sailors 
and the Irishmen, the latter of whom are suffer- 
ing because the force which comtrols them — and 
this force is not the British government — does not 
offer them the benefits of education, at least in 
our American sense. Their reoccurrence was pre- 
vented when all shore leave to Cork was denied the 
American sailors, and from then on, the "Men's 
Club" and other recreation centres were of great 
value. 

The leaders of the various Armies and Navies in 
this War were concerned over the matter of coopera- 
tion, the success or failure of which rested on their 
shoulders. However, the attainment of understand- 
ing between the rank and file of the different forces 
was also to be considered, and this was a delicate 
problem to handle. In looking over the unwritten 
history of Queenstown and in talks with American 
Officers and men who served there, the impression 
is gathered immediately that the best of feeling 
existed between the personnel of the American and 
British Navies. This unity of sentiment and effort 
began with Admiral Bayly and Admiral Sims and 
was disseminated right down through the Officers of 
lesser rank and the enlisted men. A good example 
of it is seen In the fact that when British and Ameri- 
can destroyers were at sea together, either a British 



34 SIMSADUS 

or an American would be the senior officer present; 
sometimes an American Officer would command the 
unit and at other times a British Officer. But in 
spite of the efforts of the Officers, arguments, re- 
lieved by brawls, arose between the enlisted men. 
This was really only natural, for an Englishman is 
a "Limy" * and an American is a "Yank" and there 
is enough of a difference to keep time from hanging 
too heavy. From my own experience as a "gob" in 
England, I know that these occasional disturbances 
were not the result of any deep feeling. The Eng- 
lishman is a very conservative person, who too often 
gives the impression that he is holding aloof; the 
American, on the other hand, is very frank and 
talkative and apparently wishes to shake hands 
with the world when he is out of his own country. 
When this indifference of the Englishman, which 
was often taken for conceit, came into contact 
with the enthusiasm of his cousin from over the 
water, who often was vivacious in relating "how we 
do things in America," action followed. Thus one 
hears the statement that the Americans fought with 
the British more than with the Frenchman, an ex- 
planation of which is simple. The American is differ- 
ent from both the Britisher and the Frenchman; he 
cannot argue with the Frenchman but he can argue 
with the Englishmen; and an argument was usually 
the training camp for a good old fashioned fight. 

* For some unknown reason, the British during this War, and in 
the past, have been called " Limies," which is short for " Lime- 
juicers." I do not know what the origin of the term is, but it might 
well be reversed now. 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 35 

In order to show how little gaps of sentiment aris- 
ing from these disturbances were bridged over, I 
mention here a periodical of satire and humor which 
would occasionally appear for sale at the Base. This 
little paper went a long way towards keeping down 
the differences which arose as a result of the conflict- 
ing nationalities and from allowing the men to take 
such matters too seriously. As an illustration of Its 
contents, I am giving a resume of one of the articles; 
it may not be correct in detail, but the ideas ex- 
pressed in it are to the point. 

The article recorded the preliminary proceedings 
of an imaginary board of Investigation held to In- 
quire Into the complaints of a British destroyer 
Officer, that the Commanding Officer of an American 
destroyer had "messed" fifteen minutes earlier on 
his vessel than the British Officer on his. The 
chairman of the board was purported as being Cap- 
tain Pringle, the American Chief of StaflF. The in- 
vestigation opened with each officer explaining his 
case; in a few minutes the argument became heated; 
and the conflicting use of American and British 
slang was prominent. Captain Pringle arose and 
requested that the English Officers speak In the Eng- 
lish language; this remark immediately called an 
Englishman to his feet, who claimed that the Eng- 
lish language originated in England; this statement 
in turn produced another argument as to who knew 
the most about the English language, the Americans 
or the Englishmen. This continued for some min- 
utes, until a British Officer told an American to close 



36 SIMSADUS 

his "blinking trap." Captain Prlngle immediately 
jumped to his feet and said the meeting should pro- 
ceed no further until the meaning of the term 
"blinking trap" had been explained. Dictionaries, 
naval regulations, convoy orders, almanacks, and 
similar stores of information were all consulted, but 
no enlightenment was offered upon the term "blink- 
ing trap.'' After an hour of thi? important research 
work, Captain Pringle said he was going to have 
some lunch, whereupon a Britisher objected, saying 
that such discourtesy, as that exhibited by Captain 
Pringle, was unprecedented in the history of his — 
the British Officer's — family. The meeting ad- 
journed by Captain Pringle expressing himself 
strongly in doubt as to whether the British Officer 
ever had a family. 

But other than occasional brawls, the general feel- 
ing between the crews of the vessels of the two na- 
tions was excellent, and I have no hesitancy In say- 
ing that I know that those Americans and Britishers 
who took pains to learn the other fellow's point of 
view came out of this war — and certainly home from 
Queenstown — ^with admiration for the people, the 
ideals and accomplishments of the other fellow's 
nation. 

BREST 

During the early part of the nineteenth century 
and in the preceding century, Brest had been a sea- 
port and Naval centre of great Importance; in the 
first three years of this war it had played but a small 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 37 

part. In June, 1917, a Fleet of American yachts, 
transformed Into warships, left this country, and, 
stopping at the Bermudas and Azores, arrived at 
Brest at the end of the month. These ships were 
dispatched to Europe In answer to Admiral Sims' 
urgent call for anti-submarine craft, a fuller dis- 
cussion of which follows later. They were to a 
large extent manned by young Naval reserve volun- 
teers, most of whose sea experiences had been limited 
to the bathing beach; nevertheless they were the 
first American war vessels to reach the coast of 
France. Their crews were an eager and very en- 
thusiastic aggregation, many of them college men; 
one of the vessels, the U. S. S. "Harvard," was al- 
most completely manned by undergraduates of Har- 
vard — the classes of 1918 and 1919. It seems cu- 
rious, that after the American Navy had been train- 
ing some 80,000 men for years and years, with the 
advent of War, the Navy Department should have 
sent the recruits of the Reserve Force among the 
first to Europe. Perhaps the Department realized 
how excellent their services would be In spite of 
their lack of training, and the least that can be said 
of them Is that their services were excellent, for no 
crew of greater "land lubbers" ever set sail — still 
less to go to War — aboard any ship; and yet no 
crews ever acquitted themselves more creditably. 

The yachts commenced their duties shortly after 
their arrival. At Queenstown there already was a 
Naval base; at Brest there was a French Naval 
base, but as France was not a first-class Naval 



38 SIMSADUS 

power, many of those facilities and necessities 
which go to make up an efficient base, were lacking. 
This was partly the result of the decadence of Brest 
as a Naval port of first Importance, and partly due 
to the fact that In 19 14, at the outbreak of the War, 
Great Britain had Informed France that she her- 
self would try to handle whatever Naval situations 
might arise. This left France free to devote her 
entire energy to the development of her Army, and 
relieved her of the necessity of expanding her Navy, 
the greater part of which, because of the easy pro- 
tection of the French Coasts by the British Navy, 
had been transferred to the Mediterranean. Thus, 
when the American yachts arrived at Brest, they 
found their new home lacking the design of the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard. For three months the yachts, 
under Captain Fletcher, U. S. N., were the only Amer- 
ican Warships at Brest, during which time the work 
of preparing the base to serve as a port of debarka- 
tion for American troops and supplies and as a home 
for American warships In the future was carried on. 
The yachts were employed In convoy duty; the larger 
and faster ones, such as the *'Noma," were used in 
deep-sea escorts, while the others were dispatched up 
and down the coast from Brest to Bordeaux and in- 
termediate ports. During this period of evolution, 
for that is what it was, the U. S. S. "Alcedo" was 
torpedoed and sunk; its loss was the first serious 
casualty to the American Navy In Europe. 

Admiral Sims always realized that the Western 
coast of France would eventually be the chief 




U. S. S. Leviathan 




The H. M. S. Mauretania and U. S. S. Leviathan, two transports 
which carried eight or nine thousand troops to France per trip. 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 39 

area of activity of the American Navy; therefore as 
more destroyers came over, they were ordered to 
Brest. Later as the influx of American troops 
and supplies grew he designated Lorient, St. Nazaire, 
Rochefort, and Bordeaux as bases, and assigned ves- 
sels to them. In October 1917, he ordered Rear- 
Admiral Wilson, who had been in command of the 
U. S. Naval Forces at Gibraltar, to Brest and ap- 
pointed him Commander of our Naval Forces in 
France. Admiral Wilson was in command of his Forces 
from both an operative and administrative point of 
view: in both he was directly responsible to Admiral 
Sims In London. 

When Brest first began to function as a real base, 
the duty of the yachts, as has already been men- 
tioned, was that of escorting coastal convoys. As 
the influx of American troops grew, it became very 
evident that anti-submarine vessels with a greater 
cruising radius and higher speed were needed. The 
remark was once made that these yachts were fast 
enough on a downhill stretch, but not on the level. 
They could handle the coastal convoys up and down 
the coast but could not escort them 200 miles out 
in the Atlantic; until the Fall of 1917 the British 
destroyers at Plymouth and the American de- 
stroyers at Queenstown had shouldered this duty. 
As the volume of traffic increased It became too 
much for them; consequently the additional de- 
stroyers were stationed at Brest. After their arrival 
two sorts of convoy duty were adopted: the deep-sea 
convoy duty and the coastal convoys. In the for- 



40 SIMSADUS 

mer, the destroyers would proceed to sea, pick up an 
incoming convoy, escort it to the coast, and there 
be met by the yachts and gun boats, which in turn 
would escort the various vessels to their port of 
destination. After January, 1918, the base and its 
duties grew rapidly, and we find that during the 
months of 19 18 these Forces escorted 91% of all the 
convoys in and out of France, or about 1,700,000 
tons per month. In November, 191 8, 78 vessels and 
12,000 men were stationed at Brest.* 

The Forces at Brest made their "first kill" on 
May 21, 1919. The "Christabel," a former yacht, 
was escorting the Merchant ship "Deanse," when a 
periscope was sighted between the yacht and the 
ship. The "ChristabeP' stood in towards the es- 
timated position of the submarine, dropped a depth 
charge; and a few minutes later another. After the 
second one had exploded, a third explosion, under 
water, followed. The second depth charge had 
injured the submarine, which was of the mine- 
laying type, and this had caused the third explo- 
sion. This boat was the UC-s6. The following 
morning it put into Santander, on the North coast 
of Spain, and because of injuries received, was forced 
to intern. 

On August 8, 1918, the U. S. S. "Tucker," one of 
our best destroyers, sighted a submarine while 150 
miles Southwest of Brest. The submarine was first 

* These figures include the crews of those ships and the men 
stationed along the Western coast of France, at Lorient, St. Nazaire, 
Rochefort, and Bordeaux, and at the Naval Aviation bases. 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 41 

seen when it suddenly came to the surface within 
200 yards of the "Tucker." The "Tucker" immedi- 
ately opened fire with her forward gun, and at full 
speed, ran towards it to attack it with depth charges. 
The submarine immediately submerged. The de- 
stroyer then passed over to the spot where the sub- 
marine had submerged, dropped several depth charges, 
and described a circle in order to pass over the 
same spot again. While the "Tucker" was thus 
manoeuvering, the submarine came to the surface 
again and the "Tucker" opened fire, one of the 
shells apparently hitting it. Again, the submarine 
submerged and the "Tucker" passed over the spot 
dropping depth charges. A few moments later the 
bow of the submarine appeared above the waves, at an 
angle which indicated that all was not well on board, 
and then slowly sank. The Commanding Officer, in 
handing in his report of this encounter, felt convinced 
that a submarine had been destroyed. In consulting 
the charts of submarine movements, which I shall fully 
discuss later, it would appear that there was no sub- 
marine within 100 miles of the locality in which the 
attack took place. It remains unknown to this day 
whether this submarine was sunk or not, for no fur- 
ther evidences of her operations were noted, and no 
previous evidence of her presence had been observed.* 

* It is difficult to say there was no submarine present, for all hands 
claimed to have seen it. On the other hand, every submarine in ex- 
istence could be accounted for, and this one seen by the " Tucker " 
was not included in current intelligence. The matter is still unsolved, 
and probably will remain so, though official credit for its destruction 
was given to the " Tucker." 



42 SIMSADUS 

Keen rivalry soon grew up between the Queens- 
town and the Brest destroyers, and It was expressed 
in many ways. The chief "bone" of contention was 
as to which base was doing the hardest work, that is, 
handling the greatest volume of traffic in propor- 
tion to the number of destroyers available. Statis- 
tics show that the Queenstown boats had a little the 
better of the argument. The Queenstown Officer used 
to tell, and will tell to-day, the tale that whenever 
his ship put into Brest, most of the Brest destroyers 
were in the harbor; on the other hand, the Brest offi- 
cers will tell that the Queenstown vessels were al- 
ways going to Liverpool so that the officers and 
crew could get a couple of days' leave to London. 
This rivalry, of course, was a splendid thing and it 
made for esprit de corps, a necessity to all great un- 
dertakings. And that is what these operations were. 
The figures I have quoted, showing the volume of 
traffic escorted, do not really convey the right im- 
pression as to the amount of work accomplished and 
the hardships endured. Life on a destroyer, at best, 
is not pleasant, and if we consider that all of these 
destroyers were out in all sorts of weather for four 
days out of every six, a better idea of the service 
they rendered will be gained. 

The manner in which Admiral Wilson cooperated 
with the French was most commendable. Capt. 
R. H. Jackson, U. S. N., was ordered to Paris where 
he was given a position in the French Ministry of 
Marine. Brest, with its historic background and 
picturesque surroundings, as the chief city of quaint 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 43 

old Brittany, was the subject of much interest, and 
later many literary efforts of our men. The geniality 
of the French aristocrat, or peasant, will undoubt- 
edly always be remembered by those who learned to 
know and appreciate the pleasures and comforts 
of the '*old world" civilization. 

GIBRALTAR 

It has already been said that Queenstown and 
Brest were chosen as suitable locations for American 
Naval bases because they were situated at the gate- 
way to the British Isles and France; there was one 
other gateway to European waters, and that was 
Gibraltar. Here Admiral Sims established a third 
base. On August 18, 1918, theU. S. S. "Birmingham," 
a scout cruiser and the flag ship of the patrol force 
of the U. S. Atlantic fleet, steamed Into Gibraltar. 
On August 20, Admiral Sims sent Admiral Wilson, * 
whose flag the "Birmingham" was flying, a cable in- 
structing him to cooperate in every way with the 
British Forces at Gibraltar. Admiral Wilson showed 
his comprehension of this policy by dispatching 
the U. S. S. "Sacramento" as escort to an English 
convoy on August 22. On the other hand, Rear- 
Admiral Grant, R. N., showed his willingness to 
help the United States Naval Forces by offering 
them the use of their supplies of all kinds : food, fuel, 
coal, and repair facilities. Thus began the activities 
of the United States Navy in the Mediterranean in 
August, 1917. 

* Ordered to command Forces at Brest in October, 191 7. 



44 SIMSADUS 

The duties of the American vessels varied greatly, 
mainly because of the variety of the types of vessels. 
These consisted of cruisers, destroyers, gunboats, 
coastguard cutters, and yachts converted into war- 
ships. The larger vessels, cruisers, destroyers and 
coastguard cutters, were continually on duty at sea 
with convoys between Gibraltar and England, or 
between many points in the Mediterranean. They 
also escorted large merchant convoys bound to and 
from the United States or South American ports. In 
this duty, It was not unusual for a vessel to be absent 
at sea for ten days or two weeks and then to return 
to port, only to be dispatched again in three or four 
days on similar duty. The smaller craft, that is, 
gunboats and yachts, came in for their share of hard 
work, by serving as escorts to many local Mediter- 
ranean convoys and to those bound for the Azores. 
Their task was perhaps more difficult than that of the 
larger vessels, Jn that they were less seaworthy, while 
the yachts were never designed to serve as war ves- 
sels. Patrol duty formed no small part of their cur- 
riculum, as a constant watch at the mouth of the 
Mediterranean was always kept. Their work was 
at all times satisfactory and they fulfilled the de- 
mands made upon them, a result rendered possible 
only by their efficient upkeep. 

The volume of work actually done by the Ameri- 
can vessels at Gibraltar is shown by a few figures. 
During July and August, 19 18, for instance, the av- 
erage time at sea for all the vessels was 57%. This 
means roughly that each ship was at sea six days out 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 45 

of ten; of the four days in port, at least two, or per- 
haps three, were essential for repairs, refueling, taking 
on provisions, etc. During these two months they 
steamed 170,000 miles, or six times around the world, 
and were at sea about 17,000 hours. They furnished 
25% of the escorts for local Mediterranean convoys, 
and over 75% of the escorts for the ocean and deep- 
sea convoys. 

In the offensive war against the submarine, they 
played their part and suffered their losses. The 
action of the U. S. S. "Lydonia," a yacht which 
had assumed a belligerent aspect, stands out con- 
spicuously. On May 11, while she was proceeding 
as an escort, along with British warships, to a con- 
voy of merchant vessels in the Mediterranean, a 
submarine was sighted. It appeared that the sub- 
marine was manoeuvering to get into position to 
fire a torpedo, but by the skilful cooperation of H. M. 
S. "Basilisk" and the U. S. S. "Lydonia," a network 
of depth charges was laid around the submarine. The 
submarine was not seen again; three months later 
it was discovered she had been sunk. 

The loss of the U. S. S. "Tampa," a former coast- 
guard vessel, is one of the greatest tragedies and 
mysteries of the sea In the history of the War. On 
September 26, she was proceeding with an English 
convoy from Gibraltar to Mllford Haven. When in 
sight of the English coast, she detached herself from 
the convoy and stood in towards the coast. She was 
sighted from some of the shore stations for a few mo- 
ments; a slight mist then descended and hid her 



46 SIMSADUS 

from view. A loud explosion was heard, and the 
"Tampa" was never seen again. American de- 
stroyers searched the area for two days In the hope 
of finding some survivors, but the only traces found 
were the floating body of an American sailor and 
some wreckage marked "Tampa."* 

The incident which perhaps stands out above all 
other experiences of the United States Navy In 
European Waters Is that of the U. S. S. "Senaca," 
another coastguard ship based at Gibraltar. On 
September i6, 19 1 8, she was proceeding from Eng- 
land to Gibraltar with a convoy when the British 
ship "Wellington" was struck by a torpedo. The 
"Senaca," under Lieutenant-Commander Wheeler, 
dropped enough depth charges in the direction 
whence the torpedo came to prevent the submarine 
from attempting more damage. Shortly after the 
"Wellington" was torpedoed, her merchant crew 
deserted her and came alongside the "Senaca" In 
their boats. The master of the "Wellington" told 
Commander Wheeler that with the help of about 
thirty men, he thought the "Wellington" could be 
kept afloat until she reached port. Ten of the 
"Wellington's" crew volunteered to go back to try 
to save the ship; about 35 refused. Lieutenant 
Brown of the "Senaca" asked permission to go with 

* The cause of the destruction of the " Tampa " is unknown. There 
was no evidence to show that a submarine was the cause of the disaster, 
for no submarine was in the vicinity. It is possible that she struck a 
floating mine, but more probable, that an internal explosion took place. 
That something had gone wrong on board can be surmised by the man- 
ner in which she detached herself from the convoy without orders to 
<io so. 



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES 47 

the Master of the "Wellington" and picked 16 of the 
crew to help him. The "Senaca," in the meantime, 
was ordered to proceed with the remainder of the 
convoy and so left her seventeen volunteers to be of 
what service they could. It seemed that they would 
be able to keep the "Wellington" afloat, but a heavy 
wind and sea made their task impossible. An S. O. 
S. call was sent out and answered by the U. S. S. 
"Warrington," a destroyer based at Brest. The 
"Warrington" came to the rescue at full speed and 
arrived at the scene a few minutes before the "Well- 
ington" sank. In the heavy seas and the unusually 
dark night the task of rescuing the men was difficult. 
Eight of the "Senaca's" crew and Lt. Brown were 
rescued, but ten went down with the ship they had 
volunteered to save. 

The cooperation which existed between the Ameri- 
cans and British was not so noticeable among the 
French and Italians. Later It was established, but 
for several months Convoys were escorted by the 
vessels of two or three nations, and the misunder- 
standings which thereby arose were sometimes dis- 
astrous and occasionally humorous. I remember that 
the captain of one of our vessels who apparently had a 
grudge against somebody once sent in a report like this 

"A * destroyer then got excited and opened fire 

in various directions. The first shot missed my bows 
by a few feet, the second one carried away a stack 

of a * destroyer; the third sank a cargo ship loaded 

with rum. I think greater cooperation is necessary." 

* Nationality of the destroyer here omitted for obvious reasons. 



IV 

PROGRESS 

AF'TER the American Naval Bases at Queens- 
town, Brest, and Gibraltar had been established, 
each one of which was located along a gateway to 
Allied European ports, it may be said that the 
American Navy was effectively participating in the 
War. It must be remembered that the establish- 
ment of Queenstown as a base and the full growth of 
Brest as a base were separated by six months' time; 
thus one must not become confused and think that the 
matter already dealt with has been discussed in mere 
chronological order. 

By August and September, 19 17, the convoy had 
been introduced and put into operation. What an 
enormous piece of work this entailed and what mi- 
nute detail the execution of such a system required is 
too long a story to deal with here. Its effective 
organization was the result of the wholehearted co- 
operation between the different shipping organiza- 
tions and the British and American Navies, the 
American end of which was 'so ably organized by 
Commander Babcock, U. S. N., and later handled by 
Captain Byron A. Long, U. S. N. at Admiral Sims' 
headquarters. It is sufficient to say that in order to 
make the convoy system practical and successful, 
every Allied ship afloat had to be provided with co- 

48 



PROGRESS 49 

pious instructions and convoy orders, many codes, 
and a great volume of other information such as 
sailing orders, shipping routes, etc. 

The actual working of a convoy is an interesting 
study. Twenty or thirty ships would meet together 
off the American coast and proceed Eastward un- 
der the escort of a cruiser.* When about 200 miles 
from the Coasts of Ireland or France, at a given date, 
hour, or position, these ships would be met by a va- 
riable number of destroyers, and ensemble the great 
procession Eastward would continue. A zigzag 
course was usually commenced at dawn and contin- 
ued throughout the day unless foggy or stormy. 
It was not usually employed at night because 
the darkness made its use unnecessary, though 
such ships as the "Leviathan," *'Aquitania," "Olym- 
pic," whose enormous hulls above the water were 
visible even at night, usually continued their zigzag 
at all times. The virtue of a zigzag course lay in the 
fact that a submarine would experience great diffi- 
culty in determining the course and speed of a ship 
or convoy whose course was irregular. A torpedo, 
to be accurate, practically had to be fired from a 
distance of under 1000 yards; when a ship or con- 
voy was steering a zigzag course it was very diffi- 
cult for the submarine to estimate the ships' prob- 
able position a few moments later. An interest- 
ing example of the effectiveness of the zigzag is seen 

* A cruiser was dispatched with the convoys as a protective unit 
against enemy commerce raiders; against a submarine they were not 
capable of assuming an oflFensive r61e, such as destroyers. 



50 SIMSADUS 

in the case of the "Olympic," on May 12, 1918. The 
"Olympic," loaded with American troops, was pro- 
ceeding Eastward, about 150 miles off Brest, es- 
corted by American destroyers. An enemy sub- 
marine, the U-103, at dawn saw her approaching and 
manoeuvered to get into position to fire a torpedo. 
The submarine attempted to estimate the course and 
speed of the "Olympic," which was steering a zig- 
zag course, and submerged to approach closer to her 
prey. A few moments later the Commanding 
Officer and the crew of the submarine were surprised 
by a terrific crash against the hull of their vessel; 
water began to pour in. One of the "Olympic's " pro- 
pellers had crashed through the hull. The tanks of 
the submarine were blown,* thereby bringing it to 
the surface, and the entire crew called for help as 
they deserted the sinking boat. The survivors were 
rescued by the U. S. S. "Davis." The calculations 
of the Commanding Officer of the submarine had 
been upset by the "Olympic's" vicious zigzag and 
speed, and he paid for his mistake by the loss of his 
vessel. 

To return to the study of the convoy. Imagine 
thirty great ships all huddled together changing their 
courses every few minutes, and then imagine what 
havoc might be wrought if one ship made a mistake. 
Mistakes were made and havoc was wrought, but as 
time went on, the mistakes grew less, but were al- 
ways to be guarded against.f In the meantime, de- 

* " Tanks blown " means buoyancy tanks emptied of water. 
fOn October 9, 1918, the U. S. S. "Shaw," a Queenstown destroyer. 




© Undcizvood & Underwood 




The U. S. S. Shaw in rough weather, and the same 

ship after her collision with the Aquitania in 

October, 1918. 




y, z 












0^ ^- 






PROGRESS 51 

stroyers would proceed at a speed slightly greater 
than that of the convoy in order to search the area 
through which the convoy was passing. Two destroy- 
ers, three or four miles ahead of the main body of the 
convoy, would steam back and forth across the path of 
the approaching vessels, eagerly searching for any signs 
of a lurking enemy. A destroyer on each flank would 
run in towards the convoy and then out a mile or so 
from it and then perhaps fall back a bit to cover the 
port or starboard quarter, or, unless there were another 
destroyer covering the rear, fall behind the convoy and 
protect it from a submarine which might be following 
the procession. Suddenly one destroyer might see 
some disturbance in the water. Up would go the 
submarine warning signal, the convoy would turn 
sharply to left or right, as ordered, and the destroyers 
would drop depth charges and hang around for an 

was proceeding towards Southampton accompanying the H. M. S. 
"Aquitania," which was carrying American troops; both vessels were 
maintaining a speed of 23 knots. The "Shaw" was about 250 yards 
away from the big vessel and running parallel to her when her rudder 
" jammed " and she turned towards the " Aquitania." Her Command- 
ing Officer appreciated the situation in a moment and realized that if 
he reversed his engines and tried to stop his vessel the sharp bows of 
the "Shaw" would pierce the hull of the "Aquitania" and perhaps 
sink it, and that if he continued in the course forced upon him by the 
jamming of his rudder, the "Aquitania" would ram him as he crossed 
her bows. Not wishing to sink six thousand troops, he took the latter 
course and allowed the "Aquitania" to run into him. In this collision 
the "Aquitania" practically cut the "Shaw" in half, and several of the 
crew and officers were drowned. For this action Commander Wil- 
liam Glassford of the "Shaw"was very highly commended by Admiral 
Sims and the British Admiralty; for though he wrecked his own vessel, 
he did it in such a way that six thusand lives were made safe, at the 
risk of his own. 



52 SIMSADUS 

hour or so to see if the submarine might reappear. 
When a ship was torpedoed in a convoy, under no 
circumstances were the other ships of the convoy 
allowed to stop and offer assistance; to do so would 
only invite further mischief from the submarine. The 
one or two destroyers would offer all the assist- 
ance necessary, while the convoy fled from the loca- 
tion of the disaster. Also, when a submarine was 
sighted, the merchant ships or troop transports un- 
der escort of destroyers were never allowed to take 
part in the attack upon the submarine. The de- 
stroyers were the offensive and defensive weapons 
of a convoy, while a transport's or merchant ship's 
guns were for protection only in an attack in which 
no escorts were present. On one occasion, the "Le- 
viathan," May 31, 1918, when off Brest, sighted 
what her officers believed to be a submarine, and 
this great ship, with her eight six-inch guns, imme- 
diately opened fire, thereby rendering the protec- 
tion which the destroyers afforded absolutely use- 
less. In this case, the officers of the destroyers 
from Brest recognized the disturbance as a well- 
known tide-rip and hence were not really hampered; 
but, if a submarine had been the cause of the dis- 
turbance in the water, the *' Leviathan" would have 
been open to attack. How could the destroyers 
have dropped depth charges over the disturbance in 
the water if the "Leviathan" was firing at that 
spot .? 

The convoy system during these first few months 
of trial proved successful, that is, its introduction re- 



PROGRESS 53 

duced the sinkings by more than 50%; but very 
nearly 400,000 tons per month were still being de- 
stroyed. These losses outweighed by far the new 
construction. As long as this condition existed, the 
Allies were on the losing end of the game; and further 
efforts were necessary to improve matters. It was 
realized that this would be a very long and hard 
task and that the results from any improvements 
would not happen overnight. There were two ways 
of improving the situation; first, by centralizing the 
control of the management and routing and ship- 
ping, and secondly, by increasing the number of 
anti-submarine vessels. 

Soon after the introduction of the convoy system, 
the necessity of cooperation and speed in the han- 
dling of shipping became very apparent. If twenty 
ships were to sail from Hampton Roads, it was of 
vital importance to have everyone of those ships 
ready to sail on time, and thereby avoid delay. The 
time in which an average cargo ship made a "turn- 
around," that is, left one port, crossed the ocean, dis- 
charged her cargo, returned, and was ready to leave 
again, was about two months. This meant that such 
a ship could make six round trips a year, barring 
time lost in repairs. If the time for loading and un- 
loading, and the trips at sea, could all be reduced so 
as to make it possible for the ship to make a "turn- 
around" in six weeks, twelve weeks a year, or three 
months, would be saved; and twelve weeks saved 
would mean two extra trips a year, or an increase 
of 33% in the cargo ship carrying capacity of the 



54 SIMSADUS 

Allies. Of course to liven things up in this way was 
a very difficult task, but any effort in that direction 
would be of value. The Naval Overseas Transporta- 
tion Serv^ice In this country eventually did splendid 
work along this line; but there was no such organiza- 
tion as that in July, 1917. There was no central ship- 
ping base and no efficient means of preventing loss 
of time and cargo space. 

One very flagrant case of this was that of the S. S. 
"Celtic," which left this country with supplies for 
Queenstown. No word was sent to Admiral Sims 
that this ship was bound for Europe until she was 
almost there, and accordingly no provision for her 
safe escort into Queenstown had been made; but be- 
cause of her valuable cargo of food, it was necessary 
that she have an escort of destroyers, even if those 
destroyers had already been assigned to the escort of 
other vessels. When the ''Celtic" arrived at Queens- 
town it was found that she had on board a cold stor- 
age cargo, which at that time was not particularly 
needed and for which adequate storage space had not 
been provided. Storage houses were being erected, 
and if the "Celtic" had arrived two or three weeks 
later, her cargo could have been unloaded at Queens- 
town, but as it was, only a small part was removed. 
The vessel was then ordered to Brest to discharge as 
much of her cargo there as was wanted, and then re- 
turned to Queenstown to await the completion of store- 
houses. This meant that the ship had to be escorted 
to Brest and back again, when the destroyers might 
have been otherwise employed in escorting ships whose 



PROGRESS 55 

cargoes were more urgently needed than that of the 
*' Celtic." 

This is just one of the many cases in which lack of 
centralization caused trouble, delay, and even un- 
necessary losses at sea. In this case, if those in 
charge of the Navy Department had sent word 
earlier that she was coming, time and effort would 
have been saved; but better still, if they had gone a 
little deeper into the matter and made a practice of 
paying more attention to Admiral Sims' advice and 
requests they would have found out that it would 
be better to send the "Celtic" to Europe with a cargo 
for which there was a more immediate need. As it 
was, they sent over a ship whose cargo was not 
needed and whose unheralded arrival in Europe 
resulted in the assignment of destroyers to her 
as a protection, when these destroyers might have 
been protecting other ships. What was needed was 
some sort of a central shipping office from which 
all shipping and cargoes could be routed and from 
which the authorities in Europe could learn a little 
in advance what ships and cargoes were to be 
expected. 

The final solution of the matter was a Naval Over- 
seas Transportation Service, the shipping Board, and 
the British Admiralty, all of which eventually came 
to an understanding and thereafter worked in uni- 
son. Their work aided the convoy system and pre- 
vented ships from wandering along the coasts of 
Europe looking for a harbor in which to discharge 
their cargoes. 



56 SIMSADUS 

The second manner in which the convoy system 
could be improved was by increasing the number of 
anti-submarine craft in European waters. The British 
were turning out five or six new destroyers monthly; 
the Navy Department had placed orders for four 
hundred new destroyers, but of course these would 
not be finished for many months. Other destroyers, 
still on this side of the Atlantic, were being sent over 
every month, and by August about thirty-five of 
them were operating in Europe. But more were 
wanted, for half of the ships leaving and entering 
British ports did so unescorted. In July, Admiral 
Sims urgently recommended that every available 
ship capable of maintaining a speed of fourteen or 
fifteen knots and of weathering the seas be sent to 
Europe. He rightly believed that the submarine 
sinkings would decrease in proportion to the number 
of anti-submarine vessels employed in Europe. 

There were many patrol boats operating along the 
Eastern American coast, very few of which were 
necessary and many of which could be of far greater 
:use in European waters. No submarines were 
^operating in American waters, but a great many 
nvere operating in European waters. There was 
little likelihood that submarines would be sent to the 
American coasts until their mission in Europe had 
failed, for the time consumed in transit to and from 
America — a submarine can only make 120 miles a 
day on a long cruise — could be more profitably 
spent in English waters. Also, the sending of 
submarines to American waters, where shipping 



PROGRESS ' 57 

was very scattered, would be less productive from 
the submarines point of view, than keeping them 
around England, where the shipping was very con- 
gested. Admiral Sims maintained that the critical 
area of the submarine war was the location in which 
the submarine had to be fought and the area In which 
It would either fail or succeed. In June and July It 
was not failing; In fact It was still succeeding, be- 
cause the Allies did not have a sufficient number of 
anti-submarine craft with which to combat It. 

Of course, If the majority of the patrol boats on 
the Eastern American coast were sent to Europe 
the coast would be unprotected while America was 
in a state of war, and to this condition of affairs the 
American people might have objected. But at that 
time, as no submarine had been sent to the American 
coast and as there was not much likelihood of one 
being sent over for at least several months, the hun- 
dreds of patrol vessels on our coasts were really 
doing no good at all. 

This request from Admiral Sims In Europe was 
met by plans for the construction of more chasers 
and the conversion of more yachts Into war vessels; 
some of which were being sent over. These all 
helped out and all played an Important role, locally. 
But, Admiral Sims' requests and recommendations 
not always met with approval in the Navy Depart- 
ment, and many more should have been dispatched 
than were. The chasers and destroyers were of the 
most value; the destroyers were ordered to Brest, 
Queenstown, and Gibraltar, and the chasers to the 



58 SIMSADUS 

Island of Corfu In the Mediterranean and to Plym- 
outh, England. The destroyers took up their work 
with their colleagues which had arrived before them, 
while the chasers became Involved In a new form of 
anti-submarine tactics. 



FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 

BY the Fall of 19 17 the critical period of the sub- 
marine War was passing. In April it had ap- 
peared that the Germans, by sinking a million tons 
per month, might win the War; in fact if Germany 
had continued to sink this amount of tonnage, vic- 
tory would have been hers; but the sinkings rapidly 
decreased after the introduction of the Convoy sys- 
tem, which was made possible by the addition of the 
American destroyers to the existing anti-submarine 
forces. By November the sinkings amounted to 
only 30% of their total In April. The situation was 
in hand, and the submarine campaign had been 
sufficiently checked to relieve the Naval Authorities 
of that keen worry which they had experienced in 
the Spring, and called only for a vigorous pursuit 
of the then existing policies and activities to wipe 
the submarine off the slate of War as a cause for 
Allied defeat. Attention now turned toward strength- 
ening the Allied Naval situation as a whole. 

In discussing this problem. It must be remem- 
bered that though little has been said about the Ger- 
man Fleet, its restriction from the High Seas was of 
primary Importance. Thus, there were two phases 
to the Naval War; the submarine campaign and the 
blockade of the German Fleet, which was bottled 

S9 



6o SIMSADUS 

up at Kiel and other German ports. If the subma- 
rine war could be held in check, or the sinkings still 
further reduced, and the German Fleet kept in its 
place of hiding, eventual victory for the Allies 
would be assured. 

It had been recognized for some time that though 
the presence of American dreadnoughts in the 
North Sea would be of material help to the British 
Grand Fleet, they would need supplies; and accord- 
ingly the discussion of their coming to Europe had 
been postponed until the critical phase of the sub- 
marine had passed and the shortage of shipping had 
become less acute. While the submarine war had 
seemed so critical, it had been felt that the British 
Navy could guard the German High Fleet, as it had 
done in the past; however, with the dwindling of the 
seriousness of the U-boat campaign, it was possible 
to strengthen the British Fleet with American dread- 
naughts without making the demands on shipping 
excessive. In October, 19 17, Admiral Sims informed 
the Navy Department to this effect.* In selecting 
these dreadnaughts it was necessary to send over 
only those which used coal as fuel, for oil burners 
would have demanded the service of tank steamers, 
at a time when gasoline was already scarce enough 
in England and France. Five of the latest and largest 
American coal-burning vessels, under the command 
of Rear-Admiral Rodman, U. S. N., were ordered to 

* He had in July requested the services of four dreadnaughts to be 
stationed on the western coast of England or Ireland, as protective 
units against German commerce raiders. The request was not ap- 
proved by the Department. 



191^ 



1918 




This curve, known as the "Tonnage Curve," shows the progressive 
success of the convoy system. Its success, during the first few 
months of its institution, was marked, and thereafter slow but 
steady. Thus this apparently insignificant curve tells the history of 
Allied Victory and German defeat, in a very comprehensible man- 
ner. It was the author's pleasure to keep this chart up to date 
each month. 



FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 6i 

Europe by the Navy Department in November, 19 17, 
and on December sixth joined the British Grand 
Fleet as the 6th Battle Squadron under Admiral 
Beatty in the North Sea. The British Grand Fleet 
had been on duty in the North Sea since the out- 
break of the War. It had been a fortunate coinci- 
dence that in July, 19 14, the entire Fleet had been 
assembled for its annual manoeuvres ; since that time it 
had remained intact in the North Sea. Incidentally, 
Germany often claimed that this was proof of Eng- 
land's desire for War. Occasionally, scouting ves- 
sels of the two nations had encountered each other 
and short, running fights had ensued; the only com- 
bat of any importance had been the Battle of Jut- 
land, which took place on June ist, 19 16. 

On that day the British Grand Fleet was at sea in 
one of those sweeping cruises periodically under- 
taken for practice, manoeuvering, and general exer- 
cise of the various units. In the afternoon, when 
about 100 miles from Heligoland, a portion of the 
British Fleet met squadrons of the enemy and an all 
night fight ensued. The meeting of the two fleets 
was proven to be purely accidental, for neither fleet 
knew that the enemy was abroad. After the battle, 
in which the losses in capital ships were nearly equally 
divided, but in which Germany's losses in smaller 
vessels was far greater than those of the British, both 
fleets claimed the laurels of the conqueror. Germany, 
according to her custom, did a good deal more shout- 
ing than England after this encounter, for whereas 
the British authorities had hoped that the engage- 



62 SIMSADUS 

ment would prove decisive In their favor, It did not; 
they had to content themselves with learning later 
that the German Fleet had retired to Its base, never 
to attempt another exodus. 

Before and after the Battle of Jutland, the duties 
and policies of the British Grand Fleet had always 
been one of "watchful waiting." It was very careful 
watching, but very dull waiting. In the words of 
an old English tar, who had apparently spent most 
of his life in the British Navy, "Floatin' around that 
bllnkin' Nor' Sea, waltin' till those bloddy 'uns get 
grit h 'enough to fight, and yet always 'oping that 
they will fight some dl, 'tis'nt the kind of life for an 
h 'ambitious or warlike chap the likes of me." Am- 
bition or no ambition, life was pretty dull In that 
fleet. Day In and day out, flotillas of destroyers and 
squadrons of cruisers would wander forth, hoping for 
a chance of action with the enemy. Day in and day 
out, the tremendous battle cruisers and dreadnaughts 
would lie at anchor, ready to proceed to sea at two 
hours' notice. "Alonotonous and boring" describes 
it best; but "^watchful waiting" was necessary. 
While the British Fleet, whose location was usually 
about Scapa Flow, stood in readiness to smash a 
German exodus, England commanded the surface 
of the sea. Whether she had command of what 
went on beneath the sea a few months before was 
another matter, but the command of the surface 
of the sea, which meant no German ships on the 
high seas of the world, was of vital importance if 
the Allies were to win the War. 



FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 63 

At last It seemed that the men of the Fleet were to 
be rewarded. During the first few days in Novem- 
ber, 19 1 8, the Admiralty Intelligence Service gained 
the Information that the German High Seas Fleet had 
been ordered to sea. Excitement in all Naval and 
Official circles was rampant. After four years of 
waiting, "Der Tag" had come! Squadrons of de- 
stroyers and crusiers were immediately dispatched 
to meet the enemy. For days these vessels searched, 
in hopes and in vain, for no enemy ship was seen. 
Finally the Armistice was signed, and the victorious 
units were recalled — victorious without having fired 
a shell. "Der Tag" had come and gone! 

Two weeks later the German Fleet surrendered. 
The entire British Fleet In battle formation went 
out to meet it and between the lines of the combined 
American and British Squadrons, the Germans 
were escorted back to Scapa Flow. A very promi- 
nent British Naval official, now retired, expressed 
the opinion that the surrender of the German Fleet 
without a shot was a disgrace to the Naval Profes- 
sion. "In no previous case In history," he said, 
"has a Naval Command surrendered in cold blood, 
without even putting up a bluff at a fight. An act 
of cowardice such as this, degrades the Naval Pro- 
fession." 

The American Squadron formed only one-eighth 
of the forty-seven first-line dreadnaughts assembled 
in the British Grand Fleet. This is a comparatively 
small proportion, but these five vessels were of 
great material and moral help to the British Navy. 



64 SIMSADUS 

Their arrival in the long dark winter months was a 
source of cheer to our Allies, the English, and, to a 
certain extent, a novelty; and anything that was 
novel was welcomed in Scapa Flow. In looking 
over the records, one cannot help but be impressed 
with the commendations received from the British 
Admiralty for the efficient up-keep of our vessels. 
During the year that they were in the North Sea 
they were the source of very little trouble to the 
British Dock Yards. 

BANTRY BAY 

Admiral Sims stationed another three U. S. dread- 
naughts at Berehaven in Bantry Bay, the most 
Southern point of Ireland. These vessels were or- 
dered to Europe in August, 19 18, under Rear-Ad- 
miral Rogers, U. S. N., to be used in the pursuit 
of an enemy raiding vessel should one escape the 
North Sea patrol. In 191 5 and 19 16, two enemy 
raiders had escaped, the "Seeadler" and the "Wolf," 
and had done a great deal of damage to shipping. 
The "Wolf," during her cruise, in which she covered 
the greater part of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, 
destroyed over 100,000 tons of shipping, and then 
managed to get back into Germany. In the Summer 
of 1918, It was thought probable that with the com- 
ing of the long and dark winter months, another 
attempt to send raiders out would be made. A ship 
with no lights and a little luck, could sneak past the 
North Sea patrol during the long hours of darkness, 
regardless of how efficient that patrol might be. 



FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 65 

Let the reader try to find another person moving 
about a pitch black room, and he will appreciate 
the Impossibility of preventing the egress of a 
raider In the North Sea. For this reason, It was good 
strategy to have fast ships with a powerful arma- 
ment stationed at a point, such as Berehaven, from 
which the high seas and broad Atlantic are very ac- 
cessible. A raider In escaping would naturally, after 
passing the North of Scotland, turn South, and pro- 
ceed Eastward between Iceland and the British 
Isles; Berehaven, therefore, was the logical situation 
for these dreadnaughts. It may be thought that 
cruisers would have been more serviceable In the 
pursuit of raiders, and probably In hunting down 
a merchant ship converted Into a raider they would 
have been; but, In that raiders had escaped before, 
It was believed not unlikely that In the coming 
winter enemy battle cruisers or other heavily armed 
vessels might undertake to play the role of raiders. 
The armament of such vessels would be as powerful 
or more powerful than that of cruisers, and therefore 
dreadnaughts with their big guns would be of greater 
service in hunting them down. Unfortunately the 
armistice cut short the possibility of these ships 
being of use. 



vr 

THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 

IT will be recalled that in May, 19 17, when the 
situation had looked so bad, the use of mines on 
a large scale was not considered wise because such 
mines did not exist and their construction would 
have taken too long to warrant their adoption as 
the primary method of fighting submarines at a 
time when anti-submarine methods had to be put 
into effect immediately. In November, 19 17, the 
submarine War had assumed the aspect of a thorn 
in the side of the Allied Naval position rather than 
as a cause for defeat. The sinkings were steadily 
getting less and were soon to be replaced by new 
construction. However, these losses, and the efforts 
necessary to prevent greater losses, were becoming 
more and more expensive to the Allies in man- 
power and resources. Much time, many men, and 
enormous expenditures could be saved, if the sub- 
marine was checked still further. But how could 
this be done.^ Every available self-propelling ship 
in England was already employed in fighting it. 
Similar vessels were being sent over from America 
in as great numbers as the Navy Department deemed 
practical. What new tactics would be of further 
avail .^ The Naval Authorities came to the conclu- 
sion that -the end desired could be obtained by 

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THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE G-j 

bottling up the submarines In the North Sea; this to 
be accompHshed by laying a barrage of mines across 
from Scotland to Norway. 

The history of mine laying in the War up to this 
time had been interesting. When the submarine 
campaign began, many a man in drawing-room or 
bar-room could tell the Naval Authorities that the 
way to remove the submarine from the ocean was by 
bottling them up with mines laid in front of their 
ports of exit. This was good sense, for the prover- 
bial school-boy has always laid tacks in front of the 
instructor's door when the prank-playing youths 
wished to hamper his exit. But perhaps many a 
master, on discovering the tacks, has taken a broom 
and swept them all aside. Now this was practically 
the same experience with the Allies In attempting to 
bottle up the German submarines in their own ports. 
An English mine-layer would sneak fairly close to a 
German submarine base and, under cover of dark- 
ness, lay mines along the route of exit. One German 
submarine might come to grief on these mines, but 
thereafter all entrances to all submarines bases 
would be swept by mine-sweepers daily. The same is 
true about the German submarines laying mines off 
British ports. The submarines would lay mines 
during the night off some harbor and the following 
morning they would all be swept up by British 
sweepers. Mine fields, to be successful, must be 
laid in regions where the enemy is not free to sweep 
them up. Attempts to bottle up submarines in their 
own harbors proved useless. 



68 SIMSADUS 

New locations for mines were then sought. As we 
look at the map of Great Britain, we immediately 
see that the Dover Straits afford excellent natural 
advantages for the laying of a mine-field. Mines 
had been laid early in the War to prevent an exodus 
of German raiders through this short route to the 
high seas; mines and nets, it was decided, would 
also be instrumental in keeping submarines out of 
the English Channel, across which every British 
Tommy had to travel to get to France. In this 
operation, nature favored the Germans, for it was 
soon discovered that no anchor or cable, however 
great, could withstand for any length of time the 
swift current through the Straits. Cables and an- 
chors might hold for a short time, but with the 
swift tides changing direction every six hours, one or 
the other, or both, eventually would let go. In the 
meantime submarines continued to use the Dover 
Straits almost at will. A submarine would get home 
through the Straits after a cruise, and her Command- 
ing Officer would immediately tell his fellow officers 
just how he did it, thereby allowing others to pass 
through in the same way. Finally under the com- 
mand of Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keys, R. N., in the 
first half of 191 8, a movable barrage was laid across 
the Straits. This barrage, or rather the locations of 
series of mine fields, could be occasionally changed, 
thereby eliminating the possibility of German sub- 
marine commanders discovering the leaky passages 
(which will occur in all mine fields). Some of these 
mines were laid in strings and connected by wires; 



THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 69 

when a submarine was known to be trying to pass 
through the field, the mines would be exploded from 
the shore by an electric current. By August, 191 8, 
the Dover Straits were practically closed to German 
submarines, thereby forcing them to proceed to 
their respective theatres of operations via the North 
of Scotland. 

There were many British mine areas other than 
those of the Dover Straits. The entrances to prac- 
tically all the ports of England were very thickly 
sown with mines, to prevent submarines interfer- 
ing with departing and entering ships. The Chan- 
nel in particular was thickly sown. I had the 
unpleasant experience to be on board the U. S. S. 
*'Piqua," a yacht based at Brest, when that vessel 
broke down along the edge of an enormous mine 
field a few miles East of Plymouth. The heavy 
wind blew us into the thick of it, and we were 
immediately informed by the shouts of the men on 
trawlers that we were in danger, a fact which we 
already knew too well. Incidentally, I remember 
trying to determine whereabouts on the ship I 
would be in least danger should we come to grief. 
I came to no conclusions, for before I had found 
such a place, we were safely out on the other side. 

Mine-fields of this kind accounted for many sub- 
marines during the course of the War. They were, 
of course, not removable by the Germans, as they 
were in waters controlled by the British, just as 
the German mine-fields in the Skagerrak, North of 
Denmark, were unremovable by the British. The 



70 SIMSADUS 

enemy usually discovered the location of the Brit- 
ish fields, but this did not help him much, for a sub- 
marine commander, once cognizant of a mine-field 
in the vicinity, was sure to be very careful. Other 
mine-fields were sown in the North Sea in large 
quantities, but these, though they did prove effec- 
tive, did not prevent submarines from passing out 
into the high sea. And this Is what the Naval Au- 
thorities finally decided the barrage from Scotland to 
Norway would accomplish. 

All the mines used up to this time had been of the 
"contact'* type, which means that the mine ex- 
ploded when struck by a ship. On the outside of the 
mine there were four or five pins about eight Inches 
long; when one of these was struck, as by the side of 
a ship, it was driven Into the interior, the mine 
exploded. There were other types of "contact" 
mines, the detonating apparatus of which was of the 
same principle but differently carried out, in that in 
the place of pins, a bar on the top of the mine, would 
cause the explosion. Mines of this type would not be 
really satisfactory in the proposed scheme, for too 
many would have to be laid. There were also those 
types which could be exploded from the shore by 
electricity, but these also would not answer the 
purpose In such a broad area. What was wanted 
was a mine whose effective radius, or radius of dan- 
ger, would be comparatively large. 

When America declared War on Germany, many 
inventions to be used against the submarine began 
to pour Into the Navy Department. Among these 







■I ^ "rt §■■ 



THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 71 

was the handiwork of one Mr. Ralph C. Brown, of 
Winchester, Mass.; his invention was exactly the 
sort of mine which was wanted for this Northern 
Mine Barrage. The principle was this: Attached 
to the mine were four or five very fine wires about 
50 yards long; these wires were light enough and had 
sufficient buoyancy to keep them from sinking and 
so remained extended beneath the water, stretch- 
ing with the current or in all directions at the same 
depth at which the mine was placed. Any large 
steel object, such as a ship, coming in contact with 
these wires, through the agency of an electric bat- 
tery In the mine, would set an electric current 
in motion, which would explode the mine. Too 
much credit can never be given Mr. Brown for this 
invention, for it made the Northern Mine Barrage 
possible. 

When the idea of laying a barrage of mines from 
Scotland to Norway was taken up seriously in Novem- 
ber, 19 17, it was opposed in various circles, for some 
regarded it not unlike a Jules Verne yarn. It was also 
argued that it would entail terrific expense and that 
perhaps the "game would not be worth the candle," 
or that it would be almost impossible; Admiral 
Beatty, himself, opposed it on the grounds that it 
might hamper the operations of the Grand Fleet. 
But Admiral Sims and those who believed in it, by 
sticking to their point and showing the possibilities 
of the scheme and its potential results, won out, and 
plans for laying the largest field of mines of which 
man has ever dreamed were begun. In the develop- 



72 SIMSADUS 

ment of the plans, a discussion arose over the ex- 
act location of the barrage. Practically all agreed 
that It should be laid between the most Northern- 
point of Scotland and the Norwegian Coast, but 
many were In favor of leaving an open passage 
of 30 miles near the Scottish Coast. Admiral Sims 
opposed this strongly, for he argued that there 
would be no object In spending millions of pounds or 
dollars In the construction of a mine-field 240 miles 
long, and then in that mine-field leaving an opening 
of thirty miles, when it had been found almost impos- 
sible to close an opening twenty-one miles long, such as 
the Dover Straits. He said that if patrol vessels with 
the help of mines could not shut the Dover Straits 
to enemy submarines, certainly patrol vessels with- 
out the help of mines, could not close this thirty 
mile gap. This point became a matter of great 
discussion, but Admiral Sims forcibly held to his ideas 
and won. The barrage was made complete, save for 
an opening a mile wide, near the Scotch coast. 

It may be recalled that in February, 1918, Rear- 
Admlral Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance In 
the Navy Department, refused to state before a 
Congressional Committee the cause for millions 
of dollars worth of expenditures, on the grounds that 
such information was of too secret a nature. Ad- 
miral Earle was referring to the expenditures on the 
construction of the mines for the Northern Mine 
Barrage. The mines were constructed in this coun- 
try for the simple reason that, with the extreme 
shortage of labor in England, America could turn 



THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 73 

them out much faster. Over icx),ooo were made and 
shipped to Scotland, where they were dumped along 
the rocky shores of Inverness and Invergordon, two 
little towns on the Western coast of Scotland, 
which were to become the United States Naval 
Mine Force Bases in the North Sea. Eleven old 
coastwise vessels in this country were converted 
into the latest types of mine-laying vessels, and 
sent to Europe; upon their arrival in the North Sea, 
they were placed under the command of Rear- 
Admiral Strauss, U. S. N. 

Great interest was manifested in all Naval circles 
concerning this barrage. Would it bottle up the 
submarine, and if it did, would it make the sub- 
marine warfare a thing of the past for the remainder 
of this war.^ This question was never answered, for 
the Armistice cut short the mine-laying operations 
before any definite conclusions could be reached but 
it was productive of good results, as is shown by the 
final count of submarines sunk and injured in their 
endeavors to pass its mesh. Six were destroyed in 
it, perhaps more, and another seventeen were turned 
back because injured. 

One phase of this great operation, which must 'not 
be forgotten, is the size of the task and the hero- 
ism of the men who laid the barrage and of those 
who swept it up. The American and British mine- 
laying vessels used to proceed to sea in these mine- 
laying excursions under cover of one or two squad- 
rons of the Grand Fleet as a protection against 
enemy assault. The various parts of the mines were 



74 SIMSADUS 

assembled at the base and when placed on board 
the mine-laying vessels were ready for deposit in 
the sea. The actual laying of a string of 5000 mines 
only require a few hours. Operations were com- 
menced on June 8, 1918, and thereafter fourteen ex- 
cursions had taken place, the last occurring on Oc- 
tober 25. The total number of mines laid up to 
November ist, was a little over 70,000 of which 
56,000 or 80% had been laid by our Forces, and the 
remainder by the British. 

As to the heroism of the men who laid this bar- 
rage, too much cannot be said. Commander Bab- 
cock, U. S. N., Admiral Sims* Aide, used to say, 
''Those fellows up there in Scotland are living on 
the edge of eternity," and the statement was true, 
for if anything had ever exploded one of these mines, 
^nd there were thousands of them scattered along 
the shore, probably the whole Northern end of 
Scotland would have been destroyed; the explosion 
at Halifax in the Winter of 19 18 would not have 
been in the same category at all. Or if one mine 
inside a ship had exploded, and each ship carried 
seven or eight hundred of them, the vessel would 
probably have disappeared in fifteen seconds. How- 
ever, the human mind becomes accustomed to fear 
very rapidly and calloused to all thoughts of dan- 
ger. One officer said that when the task of laying 
this barrage commenced, an unnecessary cough 
from any of the Navy personnel was almost a 
court-martial offence, but that after a few months, 
the striking of a match on the side of one of these 



THE NORTHERN MINE BARRAGE 75 

mines was an everyday occurrence. No loss of 
life occurred in this operation through premature 
explosions; one ship which was carrying mines from 
America to Scotland, the "Lakemoor," was detroyed. 
The degree of success* of this barrage will always 
be open to argument, for it cannot be said that the 
barrage entirely closed the North Sea as an exit for 
German submarines to the Atlantic, because in all 
mine fields, and particularly one of this size, holes 
and leaky passages will always occur; but It can be 
said that the moral and material results of the few 
months' trial gave every promise of success. It was 
a powerful weapon In the hands of the Allies, not 
as the chief means of defeating the submarine, but 
as an instrument to that end. 

* It proved sufficiently successful in the eyes of the authorities to 
warrant the construction of a similar barrage between Sicily and the 
coast of Africa, plans for which were being made at the time of the 
Armistice. 



VIT 

OTHER ACTIVITIES 

LITTLE has been said so far about the submar- 
ine in the Mediterranean, where the U-boat 
campaign was carried on just as persistently as in 
the Atlantic and North Sea. The submarine bases 
in the Mediterranean were at Pola and Cattaro, on 
the Eastern shores of the Adriatic; both German and 
Austrian submarines were based here. The Ger- 
man boats were usually brought into the Mediter- 
ranean by way of the Atlantic and the Straits of 
Gibraltar, but in a few cases submarines had been 
dismantled at a German North Sea base, and trans- 
ported by rail through Germany and Austria. The 
submarines in their operations were favored by the 
physiography of the Mediterranean, which, because 
of its limited size presented many different areas in 
which traffic was congested. The ^gean Sea, the 
waters between the South Coast of Spain and Africa, 
East of Gibraltar, and between Cap Bon — the 
Southwestern point of Sicily — and Tunis, are exam- 
ples of such areas. Trade routes were well es- 
tablished and difficult to alter without lengthening 
considerably the voyages of the convoys. But though 
these facts favored the enemy, the Allies had one 
great advantage on their side. Every submarine, 
to gain access to or from the Mediterranean, had to 

76 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 77 

pass through the narrow Straits of Otranto, be- 
tween the heel of Italy and the Island of Corfu. 
These Straits were very narrow, and presented the 
same anti-submarine tactical opportunities as the 
Dover Straits. 

The anti-submarine campaign in 19 17 In the Med- 
iterranean was being handled by the Navies of four 
nations; England, France, Italy, and Japan. The 
arrival of the U. S. ships at Gibraltar Introduced a 
fifth combatant. The American vessels worked in 
unison with the British vessels at Gibraltar, but 
other than this there was little cooperation. The 
Allied Naval Council eventually placed the British 
Admiral at Malta In command of all operations, 
after much effort and success had been lost through 
the lack of unity of command. As soon as coopera- 
tion was thus established, earnest attempts were 
made to close the Otranto Straits to submarines. 
Heretofore, Naval vessels of France and Italy and 
Great Britain had been stationed on the Italian 
coast, working along the barrage of nets and mines. 
After the establishment of unity of command, all 
nations were asked to send more ships to the Straits; 
England immediately sent down one hundred drift- 
ers, vessels equipped with listening devices,* but not 
capable of rapid manoeuvering, and France sent a 
few destroyers; Italy claimed that her smaller vessels 
were needed with her Fleet. The French and Brit- 
ish vessels did excellent work, but the need of high- 
powered small ships, equipped with listening gear,* was 

* A development of the principle of the old submarine Bell, which at 



78 SIMSADUS 

keenly felt. Admiral Sims was one of the first to ap- 
preciate this, and so made arrangements to send the 
first detachment of submarine chasers, to arrive from 
America, to the Straits of Otranto. Thirty-nine of 
these little vessels under the command of Captain 
C. P. Nelson, U. S. N., along with their Mother ship, 
arrived at the Island of Corfu In the Straits of Ot- 
ranto, In May, 19 18. 

The submarine chaser was a very vicious-looking 
little war vessel for its size. Forward, there was 
mounted a three-inch gun, and aft, the necessary and 
elaborate paraphernalia for launching depth charges; 
a small pilot house stood just forward of amid- 
ships, and behind this the mast, at the top of which 
was a look-out's nest; a wireless was also rigged from 
the mast. With the help of three high-powered gaso- 
line engines, the chaser had more speed at its dis- 
posal than it could often use. It was manned by 
two officers and twenty-two men. 

As the Island of Corfu had never been occupied as 
a Naval base before, the Americans were confronted 
with the task of converting a barren and uncivilized 
cove Into a modern Naval base. This work was ac- 
complished by the 1 000 officers and men of the crews 
in a remarkably short time. Shacks for Staff offices, 
repair ships, barracks, and a hospital, all had to be 
erected, but before the end of June the job was 
completed, and the Forces were ready for opera- 
tions. 

one time was used on all ships; a U-boat running submerged could be 
heard with these instruments. 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 79 

The tactical employment of the submarine chaser 
was hunting submarines In limited areas, with hy- 
drophones and listening devices, and by means of 
these ascertaining the submarine's course, speed, 
and position. When It was definitely located. It was 
attacked with depth charges according to certain 
doctrines. The mere method of hunting presented 
many difficulties. Listening for a submarine, a new 
development In Naval tactics, required a trained ear 
on the part of the listener; he had to be able to dis- 
tinguish the peculiar sound of a "submarine beat"* 
from that of surface craft, and learn how to ascer- 
tain Its speed, course, etc. Moreover, one chaser 
alone could not accurately fix the position of a sub- 
marine; to do this It was necessary to have cross- 
bearings from other chasers. Accordingly, the train- 
ing of the personnel In their particular duties, was 
one of the first tasks to be accomplished. It can 
easily be seen that close cooperation between the 
various chasers or units was imperative; they had to 
learn to listen together and to report or communi- 
cate the results of their listening to each other and 
thereby establish the information to govern their at- 
tack. While chasers were hunting. It was also neces- 
sary that their listeners should not be hampered by 
other craft in the vicinity, and hence listening periods 
of five minutes every hour were established, during 
which, all vessels in the vicinity stopped their engines 
to give the chasers a chance to listen for the enemy. 
In order to prevent the submarine from learning the 

* The noise of the submarine engine and propeller turning over. 



8o SIMSADUS 

time set for these periods, during which its engines 
could be stopped, and between which they could be 
run, these periods were different every day. As long 
as the submarine was ignorant of the exact five min- 
utes of the hour designated for listening, it would 
continue to run, and be the only noise heard, and 
hence traceable by the chasers. In fact the per- 
sonnel of the sub-chasers had a great deal to learn, 
but they took to their work enthusiastically and 
soon attained great efficiency. 

The first "hunt" at the Island of Corfu took place 
in the latter part of June, 191 8, and from then until 
the Armistice, at least three units, usually four or five 
(three vessels in a unit) were out hunting day and 
night. A hunt ordinarily lasted from four to six days, 
during which time the chances of at least hearing a 
submarine, or of perhaps getting one, were always 
good. These chasers carried out more than 32 "hunts" 
and had some very favorable results. In other words, 
from the middle of June until hostilities ceased, by 
means of the smallest war craft in modern use oper- 
ating 4000 miles from their home waters, these 
chasers maintained a constant and tireless watch at 
the mouth of the Adriatic, by which all enemy sub- 
marines sought access to the Mediterranean. They 
were rewarded in their work; one submarine was 
"sunk," while others were probably shaken up or 
sufficiently damaged to make the submarine com- 
manders abhor the passage in and out of the Ad- 
riatic. 

The most spectacular operation of the chasers was 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 8f 

the attack on Durazzo * in which British and Ital- 
ian warships and American chasers took part. The 
purpose of the attack was to destroy the enemy prop- 
erty at Durazzo and thereby make the place untenable 
as an Austrian base. At noon on October 2nd, 191 8, 
the sub-chasers got under way to join the Brit- 
ish and Italian Forces, whence they proceeded en- 
semble to the point of attack. The eleven chasers, 
under command of Captain C. P. Nelson, U. S. N., 
were to act as fringes to the main attacking party. 
On nearing the enemy's coast, all ships came under 
the fire of the coastal batteries, and several of the 
big vessels were hit; but the chasers, by means of 
skilful zigzagging and by keeping first inside, and 
then beyond the range of the enemy's guns, escaped 
without casualties. While this was enough excite- 
ment for any of the young crews, none of whom had 
ever been under fire before, a submarine with its 
periscope showing, added the choice bit. Chaser No. 
215 opened fire at once, and by good shooting forced 
the submarine to submerge. Chasers No. 215 and 
No. 128 then joined in the attack, dropped their 
depth charges right above the spot where the U- 
boat was seen to submerge. A moment later, sub- 
chaser No. 129 sighted another submarine contem- 
plating malice. This U-boat submerged at once, 
but then reappeared a short distance away from 
sub-chaser No. 129, which ran towards it. She 
dropped two depth charges in a position right over 
the submarine, but without success, for a few mo- 

* On the Eastern coast of the Adriatic 



82 SIMSADUS 

ments later the periscope reappeared and then sub- 
merged slowly. Chaser No. 129 again ran straight for 
it and when directly over it, let go one depth charge 
and then two more. 

In the meantime the engagement continued. The 
encounters with the submarines were over, and there 
was more work to be done. At the entrance to the 
harbor, Chaser No. 130 sighted two floating mines, 
one of which she destroyed by gun-fire; the other 
she approached just ahead of English destroyers 
which were following her at thirty knots, causing 
them to sheer off to the right and pass out of harm's 
way. 

The success of the engagement is well known. All 
the enemy boats in the harbor were either sunk or 
crippled, and the base rendered useless for Naval 
or military purposes to the enemy. 

AT PLYMOUTH 

Soon after the arrival of the chasers at Corfu, an- 
other detachment arrived at Plymouth. Their work 
was to be the same as that of the Corfu chasers, the 
actual detail of which has already been described. 
In this new form of anti-submarine warfare, in which 
submarines were hunted by means of listening gear, 
a great deal of experiment and development was 
necessary. The principle behind it was based on the 
fact that beneath the water, noises are audible in 
the form of vibrations; thus with an electric appara- 
tus, not unlike the principle of the wireless, the noise 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 83 

or vibration of a submarine's propeller against the 
water can be heard; and by means of another sensi- 
tive instrument, a direction finder, which would show 
the direction whence the noise came, the submarine 
could be followed, located, and attacked with depth 
charges. 

Admiral Sims in June ordered Captain Leigh, U. 
S. N., from his headquarters in London to Plymouth 
to help in the vast experimental work on listening 
devices which the British were carrying on. There 
were several different forms of these devices, none of 
which were perfectly satisfactory, but one of which 
it was hoped could be developed to a state of reliance. 
This work was carried on all during the Spring and 
Summer of 191 8, and though In this time the effi- 
ciency and the reliability of listening devices were 
improved, there was still much to be desired. Cap- 
tain Leigh's services were of great value In this 
work. In July two American destroyers, the U. S. S. 
"Aylwyn" and the U. S. S. "Parker" were ordered 
to Plymouth and Queenstown, to serve as the flag- 
ships of the units when hunting. Commander Cotten, 
U. S. N., was in charge of the operations. 

As to the work of the chasers at Plymouth, a few 
items of Interest show what fine work they really 
accomplished. In the course of their attacks they 
damaged three submarines, one of which was the 
famous U-53, which, it will be remembered, In the 
Summer of 1916 put into Newport; when it pro- 
ceeded to sea again, it sank several Englis.h vessels a 
few miles off our coast. But the offensive strength 



84 SIMSADUS 

of these hunting units was not their only tactical 
value; they also had protective strength, for the 
mere presence of vessels equipped with listening gear 
tended to keep the submarines away. Submarines 
were also equipped with listening gear, and though 
they could hear and follow the movements of sur- 
face vessels, they preferred not to become too famil- 
iar with such units. Plymouth and its vicinity 
were favorite areas for submarines, for five sub- 
marines per month would usually visit this region. 
In May, before the chasers began to operate, there 
were sixty-five sightings of, sinkings by, and attacks by, 
submarines within lOO miles of Plymouth. In July, 
after they had been operating for two months, there 
were only forty-five sightings of, sinkings by, and at- 
tacks by, submarines within the same distance of 
Plymouth. This shows that the presence of these 
hunting units in certain areas tended to keep the sub- 
marines away. As the months went by, submarine 
activity in the Channel became less and less. 

OTHER ACTIVITIES 

It will be remembered that Admiral Sims had 
given help to the Allied Navies in two ways: first, 
by fighting the submarine, and then by strength- 
ening the Allied Naval position as a whole. In 
the execution of the former he had placed Ameri- 
can destroyers at Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar, 
and submarine chasers at Corfu and Plymouth; he 
also was having the American Mine Forces lay 80% 
of the Northern mine barrage. In the execution of 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 85 

the latter he despatched dreadnaughts to the Brit- 
ish Grand Fleet in the North Sea, and stationed 
three more at Bantry Bay as a protection against 
raiders. There were other ways in which he directed 
the activities of our Forces in Europe to the great- 
est advantage; he established a base at the Azores 
and placed submarines at Bantry Bay. In the 
Spring of 1918 he dispatched a cruiser to Murmansk, 
Russia; during the summer he operated seventy-four 
cargo carriers which carried coal from Cardiff to 
France for the Army, and finally, he developed a series 
of Naval Aviation bases in France, England, Ireland, 
and Italy. 

In the Fall of 191 7, four submarines and a few 
yachts and mine sweepers were ordered to the Azore 
Islands under Rear-Admiral Dunn, U. S. N., and a 
base was established at Ponta del Gada. The Azore 
Islands, situated as they are almost in the centre of 
the Atlantic Ocean, offered a most desirable local- 
ity for an Allied Naval base. Ships, in transit from 
America to Europe, in need of more fuel or minor 
repairs could put in to Ponta del Gada and there re- 
ceive whatever attention was necessary. The Azores 
are among the scattered possessions of Portugal, 
and though Portugal had joined in the War on the 
side of the Allies, up to the time of our participa- 
tion, no attempts had been made to establish a base 
there. It was not probable, but possible, that if the 
Allies did not have a base at the Azores, the Germans 
would want one there for raiders; it was further- 
more possible that Germany's large cruiser sub- 



86 SIMSADUS 

marines might attempt to use the Islands as a rest- 
ing place. To prevent this, Admiral Sims ordered 
four American submarines of the K-type and some 
yachts and mine-sweepers to Ponta del Gada. Their ^ 
duty was chiefly that of patrol, which often became 
very irksome for only one submarine would visit 
this region each month and then only for a few days. 
A great deal of the shipping bound from America to 
Gibraltar, or vice-versa, in passing the Azores oc- 
casionally would ask for an escort, which of course 
was always provided. The chief value of this base, 
however, was as an aid to Allied shipping rather 
than as a means of fighting the submarine; many 
American destroyers, the submarine chasers, yachts, 
mine-sweepers, and sea-going tugs, which came to 
Europe, found the facilities extended to the Azores 
of great value. 

In the Spring of 191 8, Admiral Sims ordered the 
U. S. S. "Olympia,'* an old cruiser and veteran of 
Spanish War days, to Murmansk, Russia. Mur- 
mansk is situated on the Archangel Coast, facing 
the White Sea. This vessel was to help the various 
British vessels in that region in their patrol of the 
White Sea, through which all Allied shipping des- 
tined to aid the anti-Bolshevik Forces had to pass. 
Upon the arrival of the "Olympia," her Command- 
ing Officer, Captain McCully U. S. N., in company 
w^ith the British, took over the control of two or 
three Russian destroyers, which were lying there 
idle, and of no use to anybody. Guard duty was 
the *'01ympia's" chief task though on one or two 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 87 

occasions her crew was sent ashore to quiet or pre- 
vent local Bolshevik risings. 

In the Fall of 1917 seven American submarines 
were ordered to Europe and stationed at Bantry 
Bay, Ireland. British submarines had been used 
against German submarines and their services had 
been of great value. Admiral Sims saw that a 
flotilla of American submarines would be of value 
at Bantry Bay, the Southwestern point of Ireland, 
past which, German submarines Inward or outward 
bound by way of the North of Scotland to the 
coast of France, had to pass. In order to prevent 
Allied ships attacking Allied submarines, systems of 
recognition signals were established, by means of 
which, the Allied submarine could Immediately 
make Its nationality known. The destroyers were 
kept informed of the patrol areas of these sub- 
marines, and whenever a submarine was sighted 
in such an area, the destroyer's Officer was careful 
before he attacked. On one occasion, two American 
destroyers attacked, and very badly damaged, the 
British submarine L-2, though no loss of life occurred. 

The most interesting encounter with the enemy 
experienced by these American boats, was the case 
of the U. S. AL-4 on July 10, 191 8. The AL-4, 
under Lt. Commander Forster, was patrolling the 
waters off Bantry Bay, when a submarine was 
sighted ahead and a little to the left. The AL-4 
submerged, proceeded towards the enemy submar- 
ine, and while thus engaged, heard, by means of 
listening devices, another German submarine to 



88 SIMSADUS 

starboard. Lieutenant Commander Forster turned 
his periscope towards the origin of the sound of the 
second submarine, but could see nothing: a moment 
later a loud explosion took place where the first 
submarine had been sighted. Nothing more was 
seen or heard. For a month or so after this in- 
cident, nothing could be learned of the cause of the 
explosion; later it was discovered that the sec- 
ond German submarine had fired a torpedo at the 
AL-4, and this, missing its mark, had continued on 
its course, striking the first German submarine and 
sinking it. This is one of the few occasions in the 
whole submarine war in which two German sub- 
marines were seen together, and on this occasion 
the presence of these two was accidental, for one 
was bound south and the other north. It was not 
their custom to operate in pairs. 
, The task of our submarines was very difficult, 
particularly so, because of their age; but they stuck 
to their tasks despite machinery troubles, and forced 
the German submarines, when passing the South- 
western point of Ireland, to keep a good distance out 
to sea, away from congested areas. 

Another seat of United States Naval operations in 
Europe was Cardiff, Wales. In January, 19 18, Com- 
mander J. N. Jeffers, U. S. N., was detached from the 
U. S. S. "Leviathan," of which he was Executive 
Officer, and ordered to Cardiff, a sea coast town in 
the coal mine region of Wales. His mission was to 
organize a Naval base from which coal could be 
transported to France. Many British vessels were 



OTHER ACTIVTIES 89 

based at Cardiff, but as the demands for coal grew, 
occasioned by the Influx of the American Army, 
more vessels were needed. Admiral Sims answered 
General Pershing's request for more coal by estab- 
lishing this base at Cardiff, and cargo ships con- 
structed In America were sent there and employed In 
what was known as the Army Coal Trade. The 
Officers and men of these vessels were all of the 
Naval Reserve Force. In September, 19 18, though 
Commander Jeffers had been made a Captain, the 
duties and work of the base had expanded so greatly 
that it was necessary to place an Admiral in com- 
mand; Rear-Admlral Andrews, U. S. N., was selected 
for this position. At the time of the Armistice, 74 
vessels were in service at Cardiff and were employed 
regularly in carrying coal to Havre, Cherbourg, Brest, 
and the Western French Ports. 

An American Naval Aviation Unit was the first 
American Aviation Unit to land In Europe. The 
principal United States Naval Aviation Bases later 
established were at Kllllngholme, England; Wexford, 
Lough Foyle, and Queenstown, Ireland; and Dun- 
kirk and Brest, France. There were also many other 
Stations along the West Coast of France, but these 
were generally smaller, and many of them were fly- 
ing schools.* The two most Interesting bases to 
study were those of Kllllngholme and Dunkirk. 

Kllllngholme, on the East coast of England, a few 

* Captain H. I. Cone was in command of our Naval Aviation 
Units in Europe; Lieutenant Commander Atley Edwards was Ad- 
miral Sims Aid for Aviation. I have but touched lightly upon Naval 
Aviation, because I had very little contact with it. 



90 SIMSADUS 

miles from Hull, was the largest of any of our Sta- 
tions. Its work was wholly that of aerial patrol in the 
North Sea, in seaplanes and blimps. Aerial escort 
duties formed no small part in helping the han- 
dling of convoys within 25 miles of land, for a sub- 
marine beneath the water could be seen by an aero- 
plane long before any destroyers would know of its 
presence. On one occasion, on August 10, 19 18, 
Ensign Schieffelin, while reconnoitering above the 
waters to be traversed by a convoy, sighted a dark 
object beneath the surface of the sea. He signalled 
to destroyers and then dropped bombs very close to 
the submarine. The destroyers came up and, 
though they could not see it, attacked it and in- 
jured it. Eight hours later, this injured submarine, 
which found manoeuvering extremely difficult, was 
attacked again by destroyers and sunk. This is one 
of the many illustrations in which the aeroplane or 
sea plane has been of infinite value in convoy duty. 
The value of the aerial escort lay in detecting the 
submarine's presence rather than as a weapon by 
which it might be sunk. It is interesting to note 
that the American Naval Aviators at Killingholme 
cooperated as one organization with the British. 

At Dunkirk, France, there were located the head- 
quarters of what was known as the Northern Bomb- 
ing Squadron. This unit was composed of Ameri- 
can Naval Aviators who were detailed as a unit of 
the Royal Air Force at the Front. Their work 
was hampered in one way or another by the non- 
delivery of planes, or such similar incidents, but 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 91 

Captain Hanrahan, U. S. N., who was in command 
of the unit, realizing this fact, lost no time In ex- 
tending the services of his young aviators to the 
Royal Air Force. As a part of that greatest Air 
Force in the War they carried out some excellent 
bombing expeditions into the enemy's territory. In 
September, 1918, the Northern Bombing Squadron, 
upon the receipt of a sufficient number of machines, 
began to operate as a distinct unit. By this time 
the British Army was forcing the German retreat 
through Flanders and bombing expeditions lost much 
of their strategical value; but, on the night of October 
I, the squadron bombed Zeebru gge and Ostend, as the 
Germans were evacuating these towns. Unfortu- 
nately, the work of the Northern Bombing Squadron, 
as in the case of the mine barrage and the chasers at 
Queenstown, Ireland, was cut short by the Armistice 
before operations were really developed on a large 
scale. In fact the Armistice upset a great many 
plans and spoiled many enterprises. 

THE NAVAL GUN BATTERIES 

In December, 19 17, the Navy Department in- 
formed the British War Office that the Naval Bureau 
of Ordnance could supply fourteen-lnch guns for use in 
the British Army. The War Office, in that it had guns 
of a large calibre in use behind the British front, de- 
clined the offer and said that they could be used more 
profitably in some other sector. The Department 
then offered them to General Pershing. He immedi- 
ately accepted them and asked that they be prepared 



92 SIMSADUS 

and shipped to France at the earliest possible mo- 
ment. These guns were to be mounted on railway 
trucks, and each gun was to be a self-sustaining unit, 
consisting of eight cars and a locomotive. The guns 
had been made for the American battle cruisers, but 
as construction on these vessels had not yet com- 
menced. It was thought best that these enormous 
fourteen-Inch 50 calibre guns be made to serve some 
purpose In the War. Contracts were placed with the 
Baldwin Locomotive Works and the Standard Steel 
Car Company for the construction of the train, and 
by April, one complete unit was ready for testing. In 
the meantime the Navy Department had Issued orders 
to all large Naval Training Stations to select a certain 
number of picked men to serve on a mission of special 
importance and desirability. The selection of these 
men was one of the most Interesting features of the 
development of the batteries. Each battery train was 
to have a complement of forty-one men, who. In order 
to be of the most use, had to be " jacks-of-all-trades.'* 
On May 15, General Pershing was informed that 
the railway batteries were completed and they were 
shipped to St. Nazaire; by the middle of August 
they were In use at the Front. Their first duty 
was to fire at the famous German long-range gun, 
which had been shelling Paris, but the long-range 
gun moved its position shortly before operations 
could be begun. Nevertheless, they served at the 
Front during the remaining months of hostilities and 
fired a total of 646 rounds. The extreme range of 
these guns was a little over 42,500 yards, or about 



OTHER ACTIVITIES 93 

twenty-eight miles. The last round was fired on No- 
vember II, at 10:59 A. M., one minute before the 
cessation of hostilities. After the Armistice, Admiral 
Plunkett, U. S. N., who had commanded the batteries, 
investigated some of the targets at which the guns 
had fired and it was discovered that the accuracy at- 
tained was equal to any attained during the War. 



VIII 

THE SUBMARINES OFF THE AMERICAN 
COAST 

ON May 2, 19 18, Admiral Sims sent a cable to the 
Navy Department with the information that the 
U-151 was en route to America and might be ex- 
pected to reach the Coast about May 24. It will 
be recalled, that in a previous discussion, as to 
the advisability of sending the majority of patrol 
boats on the American Coast to Europe in the Sum- 
mer of 19 17, it was pointed out that there was no 
likelihood that submarines would attempt a trip to 
the American Coast for some time to come. This 
statement was based on the argument that it was 
much more profitable for submarines to operate 
around the British Isles where shipping was congested, 
than along an extensive coastline, such as that be- 
tween Newfoundland and Florida. In the latter part 
of April, Admiral von Capelle, Chief of the Ger- 
man Admiralty, apparently decided to send sub- 
marines to the American Coast. The significance of 
this new submarine policy will be discussed at the 
end of the chapter. 

On May 15 the U-151 was in 34° 00' North, and 56** 

cx)' West,* and ten days later the news was spread 

broadcast throughout the United States that a sub- 

*About 900 miles from Cape Cod. 

94 



SUBMARINES OFF THE AMERICAN COAST 95 

marine was off the Eastern Coast, and so it was. 
From then on until September ist, submarines were 
operating off our Coast. There were four of them in 
all; the UK-156 arrived on July 1st, the U-140 was 
the third, arriving on July 26, and the U-117 arrived 
on August 8. 

The UK-156 first revealed itself not far from Nan- 
tucket Light, and on the night of July 3d off Long 
Island, laid mines which sank the U. S. S. ''San 
Diego" the following day. It then proceeded North 
by way of Chatham and Cape Cod to the shores of 
Nova Scotia; from here it turned South, and then 
turned North again towards Newfoundland and 
started for home July 31. 

The UK-140 arrived on July 26, and spent exactly 
one month in American waters. It cruised up and 
down the Coast twice, from the Delaware Capes to 
Chatham, about 300 miles from shore, but was dis- 
tinctly unfortunate and unsuccessful in its "kills." 

The U-117, a large mine-layer, arrived on August 8 
off Chatham, laid mines off New York, proceeded 
South to Barnegat, where it laid more, and then con- 
tinued South to the mouth of Chesapeake Bay and 
there deposited the rest of its mines. The total 
complement of mines carried by the U-I17 was 36, 
all of which were eventually swept up. On Septem- 
ber 2, it was 400 miles out to sea, homeward bound. 

During the period that these submarines were off 
our Coast, there was apparently considerable ex- 
citement over spies. Involving the flashing of lights 
from the shore, mysterious boats seen at sea, and 



96 SIMSADUS 

the danger of a raid from aeroplanes. There Is 
no evidence that any of these submarines wished 
to have, or ever did have, any communication 
with the shore, and still less was there ever any 
chance that aeroplanes could have been launched 
from the submarines and have raided New York 
City. Just how the fear of such an event ever got 
started I do not know, for why should aeroplanes 
have been launched from submarines to raid the 
American Coast, when they had never been launched 
from submarines to raid the European Coast? It 
would have been absolutely Impossible for these sub- 
marines to carry on board an aeroplane, for such 
an article would have required too much room Inside 
the submarine; and even If a submarine had been 
made expressly for this purpose, In order to launch It, 
It would have been necessary to completely assemble 
it on the high seas. 

The success of the cruises of these submarines Is 
undisputed. During July and August they sank off 
the American Coast about 20% of the total tonnage 
sunk In the two months. However, the mere fact 
that they ventured over here was an admission of 
failure on the part of the German Naval Authorities, 
for It meant that they knew that their U-boats could 
not keep the sinkings up to a high mark by operating 
in the Eastern Atlantic alone. In other words, it 
showed that the convoy system in Europe had been 
successful, for these submarines could have spent the 
amount of time lost In transit to and from America, 
five weeks each way, far more profitably In the waters 



SUBMARINES OFF THE AMERICAN COAST 97 

about Great Britain, had not the convoy system 
protected the shipping so well. One reason, perhaps, 
for these submarines coming to America was to sat- 
isfy the German people, or more probably give the 
authorities the chance to inform the German people 
that German submarines, in their might and prow- 
ess, were still winning the War, as could be proved 
by their operations on the American Coast. Never- 
theless, whatever the German Authorities may have 
claimed, the sending of submarines to America 
was an admission of failure. 



IX 

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 

THERE probably has been no more misunder- 
stood phase of the past conflict than that of 
submarine operations. A submarine campaign, such 
as Germany carried on, was a new departure In 
Naval Warfare, and the citizen had nothing but im- 
agination upon which to draw in his version of its 
execution. I do not by this mean to Imply that the 
submarine war was less cruel than commonly sup- 
posed, for that would not be a fair statement. What 
I do mean, however, Is that with no history upon 
which to base a comprehension of the U-boat war, 
one's only sources of Information were the tales of 
those who came in contact with it. Stories of those 
crossing to France, relating how their ship was at- 
tacked by seven submarines and missed by four tor- 
pedoes, how four of the submarines were sunk and 
the remainder put to flight, were common. From 
such accounts one gathered that hundreds of submar- 
ines were at sea at one time, and their deportment 
not unlike that of porpoises. Now all such tales were 
grossly exaggerated, and I can say with assurance 
that very few of our soldiers ever saw a submarine. 
A short study of submarine operations Is Interesting, 
and should dispel all doubt or misconceptions as to the 
true facts. Let us take for example the situation on 

98 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 99 

August I, 19 1 8. This of course was more than a year 
after we had come into the War, but the fundamentals 
of operation and statistics were practically the same. 

On August I, 19 1 8, Germany had constructed 335 
submarines, of which 171 had been sunk; 164 were 
still operating.* There were four different types of 
submarines, and each was particularly adapted to 
certain services. Of the 164! remaining for service, 
nine were of the large UK-type, fifty were of the 
U-type, sixty-five of the UB-type, and 20 of the UC- 
type; another twenty were used as school ships; twenty 
of these German boats and twenty-seven Austrian 
were based in the Adriatic. Deducting the twenty 
submarines which were in the Mediterranean, Ger- 
many had a total of 144 submarines J available for 
service in the Atlantic. 

The largest German submarines constructed were 
those of the UK-type, and these in size were sur- 
passed only by the British K-class, which were 
driven by steam. All German submarines were 
driven by Diesel engines on the surface, and by elec- 
tric batteries and motors when submerged. These 
UK-boats were 360 feet in length, 36 feet from keel 
to conning tower, and had a displacement of four 
thousand tons when submerged. A fairly good idea 

* Admiral Von Capelle recently said that Germany constructed 817 
submarines during the War. His statement is not true. 

t Exclusive of the school ships. 

i The origin of the term U-boat is from the German "Unterseeboot." 
Thus the U-type was the first constructed. The later types were called 
UB and UC, and UK, the "B" and the "C" and " K " being merely 
the designation of type. 



loo SIMSADUS 

of their size can be gained by comparing them with a 
cargo ship, the average displacement of which is 
about five thousand tons. The armament consisted 
of twenty torpedoes, thirty-six mines, eight torpedo 
tubes, and a six-inch gun fore and aft. On the surface 
they could make speed of fourteen knots and when 
submerged only seven or eight. Their complement of 
personnel was twelve officers and eighty-eight men. 
This type was designed and used for long cruises in 
the Atlantic (two of them visited the American coast) ; 
they could stay at sea, if a slow speed was maintained, 
for three or four months. 

The U-class was similar to but smaller than the UK- 
class; boats of this class varied in size according to 
date of construction. The early U-types were only 
of 800 tons displacement, the later were of 1200 tons. 
The speed of both was about eleven knots on the 
surface and six knots submerged. The smaller boats 
carried only eight torpedoes, the larger twelve, the 
armament of both was a three or four-inch gun fore and 
aft. The complement of these vessels was thirty-two 
or thirty-seven officers and men. Both types had a 
cruising radius of about six thousand miles, and were 
usually employed in the waters West of England and 
of France. The U-58, which was sunk by the U. S. S. 
"Fanning" and "Nicholson," was one of the smaller 
types of the U-class. 

The UB-boats were smaller than the U-boats, and 
had a displacement varying from 500 to 750 tons. 
They were armed with a thirty-two-pounder forward 
of the conning tower, and carried four to ten torpedoes. 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS loi 

Their cruising radius varied between four thousand 
and six thousand miles; they were usually employed 
in the waters about Great Britain, and were not de- 
signed or constructed for deep-sea duty. The third 
type, the UC-boats, were mine-layers, and of less 
displacement than the UB-type. They were armed 
with a twenty-two-pounder forward of the conning 
tower, and carried eighteen mines, which they would 
usually lay in the entrance of some harbor and then 
return to their base. 

The average number of submarines in the waters 
about Great Britain and France, per day during 
iQiyand 1918, was about twenty-one or twenty-two, 
though this average sometimes reached as high as 
twenty-eight and other times as low as sixteen. It 
would seem that twenty-two submarines, operating 
with a total of 144 In commission, was a very low per- 
centage but as a matter of fact it was not. The wear 
and strain on the submarine's machinery and person- 
nel was so great that it was usually necessary to keep a 
submarine In port for repairs, overhauling, and rest, 
two or three times as long as the average cruise.* It 
speaks well for the machinery and efficiency of the sub- 
marine flotilla that the operating number remained as 
high and as steady as it did. The average twenty-two 
boats thus operating would be located generally as fol- 
lows. There were usually three operating in the North 
Sea, preying upon the English and Scandinavian 

* In September, 1 91 7, Germany made a great effort to send twice as 
many boats to sea as usual. The result was that half of them returned 
in a few days, because they were not really in good condition. 



102 SIMSADUS 

traffic; one of them would be a mine-layer en route to, 
or returning from, a mine-laying cruise to the mouth of 
the Thames or to the Firth of Forth or to a similar 
point; the other two would probably be UB-boats. 
Two more submarines, one probably bound for its 
base, the other for a cruise, would be in the North 
Sea; both of these would probably be U-boats. 
North of Scotland and Ireland another two, perhaps 
both U-boats or one a UK-boat, would be bound 
in or out. There was usually one of the UB-type in 
the Irish Sea and the Bristol Channel. South- 
west of the English Channel, where all lanes of ship- 
ping converge, there were always at least three 
U-boats and perhaps more. On July 8, 191 8, there 
were as many as six in this area. Southwest of 
Brest and along the coast of France a U-boat and a 
UC-boat might be operating, the latter laying mines 
outside the harbors of the West coast of France. Off 
the coast of Spain, or further West, a UK was usu- 
ally outward or inward bound from the middle At- 
lantic or the waters about the Azores. The accom- 
panying chart gives a graphic location of the daily 
positions of submarines as might have been seen 
on a large map at Admiral Sims' headquarters in 
London. 

I know that the reader is now wondering how 
submarine positions were known, how their move- 
ments were followed from day to day, and how 
the different types of submarines were recognized 
as being in this or that area. The answer is, 
by the splendid work of the British Admiralty In- 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 103 

telligence Service, under Rear-Admiral Sir Regi- 
nald Hall. This department of the Admiralty had 
three sources of information about submarines. 
First, by radio direction finders, the meaning of 
which will be explained in a moment; secondly, by 
an elaborate system of agents in Germany and neu- 
tral countries, and thirdly by the cross-examination 
of the survivors of submarines sunk. 

The presence and exact position of the majority 
of submarines at sea was learned every night by 
an elaborate system of radio stations along the coast. 
It was the custom of submarines to communi- 
cate with their headquarters in Germany almost 
nightly by wireless. The messages were always 
in a highly secret code, and might, or might not, 
be eventually deciphered by the Admiralty. The 
chief interest in them was the opportunity they 
afforded to locate the submarine which sent the mes- 
sage. Every time a submarine wirelessed to Ger- 
many, English radio stations would pick up the mes- 
sage. The wireless instruments at the stations were 
equipped with an apparatus known as a radio-direc- 
tion-finder by which the direction or bearing of the 
origin of the message could be determined to a frac- 
tion of a degree. Each station, upon receipt of such 
a message, would immediately telegraph to the Ad- 
miralty in London the exact bearing of its origin 
from that station. In order to illustrate how the 
submarine's position was then determined, let us 
take an imaginary example. 

Wireless stations at Land's End, Milford Haven, 



104 SIMSADUS 

and Queenstown, have all sent telegrams to the 
Admiralty stating that a submarine at eleven o'clock 
at night communicated with Berlin, and that this 
submarine was in a position bearing due West 
from Land's End, Southwest from Milford Haven, 
and due South from Queenstown; these bearings 
naturally would be given in degrees rather than in 
terms of West and Southwest. When this Informa- 
tion was received by the Admiralty, the officers 
there on duty would draw lines West from Land's 
End, Southwest from Milford Haven, and due 
South from Queenstown, and where those lines 
crossed, there would be the submarine. In this way, 
practically every submarine could be followed from 
day to day; I say practically every submarine, be- 
cause sometimes they did not communicate with 
Germany at night. Of course there were other re- 
ports of submarine movements, from the sightings 
of submarines at sea, but many of these were false. 
The striking or sinking of a ship by a torpedo was a 
positive proof of a submarine's presence in a certain 
position; a report of a ship being missed by a torpedo, 
or the sighting of a periscope, was not. Almost 
without fail, the positions of submarines, as es- 
tablished by the radio-direction-finder, were the 
same as the proofs of their positions established by 
the sinking of a ship. 

I remember one very interesting occasion to show 
the reliability of the direction finder; it occurred on 
the night of October 17, 191 8. When I arrived at 
the office the following morning, I found a tele- 




A graphic illustration of the positions of enemy submarines as 
represented on the daily charts. A pin with a flag attached was 
used to represent the submarine's location, and each morning 
each pin was moved according to the submarine's movements of 
the night before. From this map, the reader will understand why 
Admiral Sims informed the Navy Department that the place to 
fight the submarine was in Europe, and that anti-submarine 
vessels in American waters were of no strategical value. 




The "tracks'" or movements of submarines during the fir: 
to date daily, and as each new position of each submarin 
Each position is shown by a small circle, the date, and hou 
time. The majority of the positions were established by m 
chart by the hour and date, but without vessel's name. S 
were rather famous : notably, those of the "Mt. Vernon," 
zance, the U. S. S. "Chester" narrowly missed running int 
In the Irish Sea may be seen the location in which five Q 
gow out of convoy. From this chart my statements that t 
more about submarine operations than was generally sur 




weeks of September, 1918. This chart was kept up 
s definitely established, it was plotted on the chart, 
fording to the twenty-four hour method of reckoning 
of the radio direction finder; these are shown on the 

of the losses, represented by the vessels' names, 
Ellington," "Kendel Castle,"" etc. Just south of Pen- 

1 U-53 on the night of September 5th, in a thick fog. 
j;town destroyers lost the "Mesaba" and City of Glas- 
Iritish Admiralty and Admiral Sims' staff knew far 
I. are proved. 




/ ? 



7 ', 




SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 105 

gram on my desk stating that the U. S. S. "Klm- 
berly," a destroyer at Queenstown, during the 
previous night had located a submarine off Bantry 
Bay, had hunted it down by means of listening 
devices, and finally attacked it with depth charges 
at eight minutes of twelve. In the telegram, the 
exact position of the attack was given. Later that 
morning I learned from the Admiralty that the 
submarine attacked by the *'Kimberley " had commu- 
nicated with Germany by wireless at three minutes of 
twelve, or five minutes after the attack. The posi- 
tion of the attack — which was of course the position 
of the submarine at eight minutes of twelve — was 
exactly the same as the position of the submarine, as 
established by the radio direction finder at three min- 
utes of twelve. 

As soon as the position of each submarine had 
been worked out on the charts, such information 
was sent to the different bases or wirelessed to those 
ships to which the information might be of use. The 
Admiralty took the greatest care that this method of 
locating submarines should not be discovered by the 
enemy, for the authorities regarded it as the great- 
est secret in their possession; and there is no evidence 
to show that the Germans ever did discover it. 

The second manner in which the Admiralty kept 
itself informed was by a very efficient system of agents 
in Germany and neutral countries. The organiza- 
tion of this system commenced after the Declaration 
of War in 19 14 (and the agents themselves were 
sent to Germany and neutral countries), for previous 



io6 SIMSADUS 

to 19 14 the British Secret Service was of little im- 
portance. These agents, some of whom were English 
women, apparently found many sources of informa- 
tion, not the least of which were deserters from the 
German Army or Navy. As time went on Germany 
apparently discovered this and employed men to play 
the role of deserters, not only in order to catch the 
British agents, but also to give these agents all 
sorts of misinformation. Some of their reports 
were very heterogeneous and erratic and often the 
opposite to the true facts; on the other hand, a 
vast amount of them were good sound truths, which 
proved to be of inestimable value. The greater 
part of them dealt with data on the new construction 
of submarines, assignment of commands (a very 
important factor in calculating the submarines' prob- 
able movements) and much technical Information 
concerning submarine machinery and the construc- 
tion of torpedoes. The aid which these agents ren- 
dered the Allied Cause can never be too highly rec- 
ognized; the submarine campaign was the vital issue 
in this war and these men and women, at the risk 
of their lives as spies, rendered a great and patriotic 
service In helping to defeat it. 

The third method of gaining Information about the 
submarine was by questioning and cross-examining 
the survivors of submarines destroyed. Previous 
to 19 1 7, in this country, we all heard that the Eng- 
lish Navy refused to take German submarine officers 
and men prisoners when their boats were sunk. No 
more fabulous story was ever circulated. The 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 107 

British made all survivors prisoners, and they spared 
no eflfort rescuing them; their services as Inform- 
ants of the activities of the submarine flotillas were 
valuable; to have let them drown would have been 
a military error. When survivors of a sinking sub- 
marine had been rescued, they were immediately 
taken to a detention camp, and from there, after 
three or four days of good food and rest, and enough 
whiskey to make them see the right side of life, 
brought up to London to be interrogated. Some of 
these men were very affable and In return for the 
kind treatment they had received, gave the Interro- 
gators much valuable information; others, through 
patriotism or hate, would disguise their statements 
very cleverly, mistating facts just enough to make 
the sifting out of the truth very difficult. And then 
there were others who would relate the most dread- 
ful yarns Imaginable; but such stories were always 
recognized as false. The Information sought In 
these seances dealt with the value of various forms 
of offence and defence In the anti-submarine war, 
such as the value of depth charges, mines, and nets; 
and with conditions In Germany In general. As 
several survivors were taken prisoners each month, 
and Information came in regularly from the agents 
in neutral countries and Germany Itself, the task of 
learning the trend of events within the borders of the 
enemy was rendered possible. 

It will be seen from what has now been said that 
the Admiralty Intelligence Service was in a position 
to keep itself Informed at all times. We heard a great 



io8 SIMSADUS 

deal in England and America as to the efficiency of 
the German spy system; there were undoubtedly 
a great many German agents at large in this coun- 
try, and in Europe. The German spy system was 
well organized, but it was inferior to the Brit- 
ish Admiralty Intelligence Service. Even though 
the German system was organized many years 
previous to the war and gained strength by probing 
into the 'secrets of, and plotting against, the un- 
suspecting and trusting nature of the world at 
peace. 

In comparing the Information which the Germans 
had about the Allies, with the information the Ad- 
miralty had about Germany, it is easily seen that 
the calm and practical British mind was far better 
adapted to picking up true facts, than the bombastic 
German mind which too often allowed the wish to act 
as father to the thought. This was proven many 
times during the war, and the following is an ex- 
cellent example of the errors made. On July 19, 
1918, the H. M. S. ^' Justicia " was torpedoed and sunk 
North of Ireland by a German submarine. The 
*' Justicia " was a vessel of 33,000 tons and very similar 
to the U. S. S. "Leviathan," formerly the "Vaterland," 
in that both vessels were among the largest afloat, 
and each had three funnels. The German Admiralty 
sincerely believed that the "Leviathan" had been 
sunk. Now if the German Admiralty Intelligence 
had been on to its job, it would have known that 
the "Leviathan," since April, had been running 
only to Brest and accordingly could not have been 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 109 

anywhere near the Northern coast of Ireland. It 
may be argued that to learn to what port the ''Le- 
viathan " was sailing would be expecting a great deal of 
any Intelligence Service, but for such purposes an In- 
telligence Service exists. In this case the Germans 
had the wrong information, and wrong information is 
of less use to a military organization than no informa- 
tion at all. The British Admiralty Intelligence, on 
the other hand, to my recollection anyway, never 
had the wrong and always had the right information. 
There are many other cases in which the German 
Intelligence Service showed itself inferior to that of 
the British, a fact which gave the British Navy a 
tremendous advantage in the submarine war. It Is 
only proper to mention here the courtesy and trust 
shown by the Admiralty in allowing Admiral Sims 
and his Staff the use of secret information. 

But to return to the discussion of the operations 
of submarines. I said that the average number operat- 
ing on any given day would be about twenty-two, 
not Including those in the Mediterranean where the 
average would be about six or seven. The average 
length of a cruise, excluding the cruises of UK-boats, 
which would be about three months, was about three 
or four weeks. This means that one submarine left 
its base in Germany and one returned about every 
day. The bases of the submarines were at Kiel, 
Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven, Brundesbuttel, and In 
Flanders, at Zeebrugge, and Ostend. From these 
bases they would set out, pass through the Dover 
Straits, or more likely, particularly in 19 18 after 



no SIMSADUS 

the Dover Straits had practically been closed by 
mines, pass North by way of Scotland, and out Into 
waters West of the British Isles. No submarine 
officer when he set out ever knew how long his 
cruise would be; he would have on board food and 
fuel enough for five or six weeks, but the chances 
were that he would not have to stay out that 
long. The factor which determined the length of 
the cruise, was the rapidity with which the tor- 
pedoes were used. The number of torpedoes carried, 
of course, was varied and limited, some of the smaller 
boats carrying only eight and the larger ones sixteen 
or twenty. Thus a submarine would stay at sea 
until all of its torpedoes had been spent in sinking 
or injuring vessels; this would usually take two or 
three weeks, and the remaining week or so of the 
average cruise would be consumed in passage to and 
from the various theatres of operations. The cruises 
of mine-layer submarines were usually shorter than 
those of the other types, for these boats would pro- 
ceed to the point where the mines were to be laid, lay 
them and return to the base Immediately. Sub- 
marine commanders usually received but few Instruc- 
tions from their flotilla commander at the base; the 
Individual officer aboard the submarine was a better 
judge of his own abilities under various conditions 
than the Admiral at the base. The only orders 
usually given dealt with the areas of operations, 
and the vicinity in which the submarine was to op- 
erate; and this was only done to the extent of in- 
suring against the super-concentration in one area 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS iii 

and the total absence of submarines in another. In- 
telligence information showed that the same com- 
manding officers, regardless of the submarine they 
commanded, usually visited the same area on each 
cruise. This was natural enough, for without the 
use of many of the former coastal lights, navigation 
at night was extremely difficult, and the better ac- 
quainted an officer became with a certain region 
the more efficient his operations were. This was 
particularly true of the officers of the mine-layers. 
An officer had to know his ground well to lay mines 
effectively in the entrance to harbors ; he was allowed 
to deposit them where he saw fit, and naturally he 
would choose a locality with which he was familiar. 

Quite contrary to the general impression of the 
submarine campaign, there is absolutely no evidence 
to show that U-boats ever had any bases except 
in the enemy countries. There was much fear ex- 
pressed in many quarters, upon our entry into the 
war, that submarines would establish bases in Mexico, 
or in the West Indies; but they never did. The only 
place which might have been used as a base, if 
there was any advantage in having one, would have 
been the Azores, and Admiral Sims established a 
base there himself. The Azores, however, would 
probably have been used as a base for raiders, 
rather than for submarines. After all, what would 
have been the benefits to be derived from having 
a base for submarines anywhere except where the 
services of a Navy Yard were available.'' I have 
shown that the length of a submarine's cruise was 



112 



SIMSADUS 



dependent upon the rapidity with which the tor- 
pedoes were consumed, for more supplies and fuel 
were carried than usually were required. If a sub- 
marine wanted food it would merely have to stop a 
few sailing vessels and help itself. The only use then 
of a base would be as a place in which repairs could 
be effected and torpedoes provided, and I question 
whether either repairs or torpedoes could be made 
along the Western Coast of Ireland, or at the Azores, 
or in the West Indies, or Mexico. It is true that occa- 
sionally a submarine would put into a Spanish port 
for minor repairs or a brief rest, but if the Spanish 
authorities allowed it to stay more than twenty-four 
hours without interning it, as provided in Interna- 
tional Law, the British, American, and French Con- 
suls soon saw to it that the submarine was either or- 
dered out of the port, or interned. It is also known 
that in one case a submarine stopped at an island 
on the Northwest Coast of Ireland and that there 
the crew went ashore and shot some wild sheep for 
fresh meat. But outside of this there are no cases, 
with proofs to back them, in which submarines ever 
even tried to make use of any locality as a base. 
The German submarine bases and Navy yards had 
a sufficiently difficult task to keep the submarines in 
good condition, without trusting to the facilities pro- 
vided by a barren island or cove, or in the Naval 
genius of Mexico. 

Whenever we used to hear of an attack on a ship 
or transport, there were always at least two sub- 
marines present and sometimes four or five or more. 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 113 

These tales were invariably exaggerated and false, 
for it was not the policy of the submarines to oper- 
ate together. In the first place, one torpedo was 
sufficient to sink almost any vessel; if a second sub- 
marine stood by and watched the other submarine 
fire the torpedo and do the sinking, its presence was 
useless. If it took part In the attack and fired a tor- 
pedo, its efforts were wasted, ^ for one submarine 
would be very nearly as sure of getting Its prey as 
two of them together. The story of the U. S. S. 
AL-4 on July 10, 19 18, will be recalled. In which 
two submarines accidentally became mutually in- 
terested in the AL-4 and before they had finished, 
the one had sunk the other. There are other cases 
on record In which the presence of two submarines 
was only a hindrance or serious menace to both 
of them. 

Attacks on ships were of two kinds : those in which 
the submarine would stop a sailing vessel or steam- 
ship by gun-fire, and sink her by placing bombs in the 
hold, and those in which the submarine would fire a 
torpedo at the vessel, submerge, and try to effect an 
escape. The former sort became less numerous as 
more ships were armed, and after a few submarines 
had encountered British mystery ships, the torpedo 
attack became prevalent. Imagine a steamship on 
the horizon. The commanding officer of the waiting 
submarine would approach nearer to the vessel to 
ascertain her course and speed, which, of course, 
he must know In order to be able to fire a torpedo 
accurately. Dazzle painting or camouflage was used 



114 SIMSADUS 

on ships to make them less visible. This applica- 
tion of protective coloration was good in theory, but 
on the open sea with the vessel's mast and hull stand- 
ing out above the horizon, streaky painting of lights 
and shadows had little effect. There were cases, I 
suppose, in which, because of camouflage, a sub- 
marine officer found It difficult to make out the 
exact types of ship he was to attack. For instance 
I remember when I was attached to the U. S. S. 
"Leviathan," in March, 1918, that one of the de- 
stroyers, escorting us into Liverpool, appeared to have 
only two funnels,* and that several of us remarked 
upon it at the time. A few moments later, the sun 
came out from behind a cloud and we saw the third 
stack. This destroyer was camouflaged, and under 
certain conditions of light we had been deceived in 
her appearance. The submarine Commander, how- 
ever, did not care to definitely make out the sort 
of ship his prey was; what he wanted to know was 
what course he should steer in order to intercept her, 
or in other words, in what direction was the ship 
going. In order to determine this, he would look at 
the masts and funnel. (If the ship were running par- 
allel to him, he could determine this immediately.) 
The closer together the two masts and funnel were 
in his periscope picture, the nearer directly towards 
him the ship would be coming. If the mast on the 
left was higher than the one on the right, he would 
know that the left mast was the forward mast and 
hence the ship was approaching him on a course to 
* All American destroyers have either three or four funnels. 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 115 

his left; and if the right mast was the higher mast, he 
would know that the ship was approaching to his 
right. If the masts and funnels had a "rake" to 
them, that is if they slanted a trifle aft, his estimate 
of the course of the ship would be made much eas- 
ier. For this reason, camouflage, according to ex- 
perience and statistics, did not prove of value in 
preventing his gaining this information. It only- 
continued to be applied throughout the war because 
merchant crews gathered a certain sense of confi- 
dence from having their ships painted in this way. 
What did help out though, was the erection of 
straight masts and funnels, all as short as possible, 
with the after mast a little higher than the forward 
one. This arrangement gave no information one 
way or the other to the submarine oflicer as to 
the ship's direction, for with the masts short and 
stubby, and practically no funnel at all, his chief 
source of Information was gone. With the intro- 
duction of the convoy system, camouflage of any 
sort became entirely useless. 

But to return to the attacking submarine. When 
the submarine had ascertained the speed and course 
of the merchant ship. It would submerge, periscope 
and all, and by dead reckoning — which means steer- 
ing by compass — proceed to a point very near from 
which It had been estimated a torpedo could be 
fired. Submarines had to be within one thousand 
yards or less of a ship to be sure of the torpedo strik- 
ing its mark. The captain of the submarine would 
then bring his boat within ten or fifteen feet of the 



ii6 SIMSADUS 

surface, and stick his periscope up to see how mat- 
ters stood. If all were well, that is if he were 
within a thousand yards of his prey, a torpedo 
would be fired and if it hit its mark, he would 
look around hurriedly to see if any patrol boats 
might attack him, and then submerge to a depth 
varying from 30 to 200 feet, and try to make good 
an escape. 

After this attack, some of the survivors would re- 
late that no submarine was seen at any time, while 
others would tell how the ship was attacked by 
three submarines, two of which were rammed and 
sunk. The former tale would, of course, be the cor- 
rect one, but the latter tale would be the one more 
popularly told, and in this way much misinforma- 
tion was spread. There were many cases where 
ships were sunk and the submarine never seen, 
even though destroyers were present. The most 
Ideal conditions under which a submarine could 
attack a ship, was from a position between the ship 
and the sun. 

When a submarine attacked a convoy under the 
escort of destroyers, the submarine officer's task 
was more difficult. A convoy was always zig- 
zagging, which meant that the submarine, if it came 
too close to the convoy, would always run the chance 
of being rammed. To avoid getting too close it was 
necessary to keep the periscope above the water, and 
this might be seen by one of the watchful destroyers. 
Often It was believed that a submarine, because of 
the difficulties Involved In an attack upon a convoy. 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 117 

would fire a torpedo at the middle of the convoy and 
trust to good fortune that it would hit something. As 
soon as a ship in convoy had been torpedoed, the ex- 
citement for the submarine began. A torpedo leaves 
a wake behind it, and though the destroyers did not 
see the submarine or its periscope, its general vicinity 
could always be found by following the wake to its 
origin, where depth charges would be dropped; and 
though these might not sink it, the submarine and 
its crew could expect no good from such under water 
explosions. 

During the hours of daylight, and at night, sub- 
marines used to run alternately on their Diesel en- 
gines and storage batteries: on the surface the en- 
gines were used, and when submerged, the batteries 
and motors. By running on their engines for a few 
hours, the batteries were charged; they were kept 
almost fully charged, in order to have enough 
current to allow for a long submerged run, should 
anti-submarine vessels be on the trail of the sub- 
marine. The crews of course preferred running 
on the surface for at such times they were allowed 
to go up on the conning tower and smoke and en- 
joy the air. Sometimes, when attacked by anti- 
submarine vessels, or in storms when operations were 
impossible, if the bottom was sandy and the water 
shallow, submarines would rest there for several 
hours. However, as the waters In which they 
could rest on the bottom were necessarily shallow, 
a seaplane overhead could distinguish the shadow' 
of the boat beneath the waves, and call anti-sub- 



ii8 SIMSADUS 

marine craft to attack it. Resting on the bottom was 
not generally a safe practice. The safest method of 
procedure for a submarine was to stay on the sur- 
face as much as possible, and maintain a good 
watch; in this way ships could be more easily sighted, 
and by submerging, approaching destroyers could 
be avoided. 

A good idea of the life on the submarine is gained 
by the following extracts from the report of Lieu- 
tenant Isaacs, U. S. N., who was taken prisoner on 
the U-90 when the "President Lincoln" was sunk 
on May 30th, 1918. 

"The U-90 was built In 1916; it Is about 160 ft. 
long, and carries two six-inch guns, one forward and 
one aft of the conning tower. The captain of the U-90, 
Captain Remy, boasted that he could make sixteen 
knots speed on the surface and that he had demon- 
strated the superiority of the speed of German sub- 
marines, as compared with the speed of American 
submarines, sometime previously when he had a 
* run-in' with the U. S. Submarine AL-4.* He said 
that both submarines had manoeuvered to fire a tor- 
pedo at each other and that in so doing both had sub- 
merged two or three times and that finally he was able 
to fire the torpedo at the American submarine after 
getting into position, which he was able to do be- 
cause of his superior speed. Just as he fired the AL-4 
dove and his torpedo passed a few feet over her. Cap- 
tain Remy never submerged to a depth greater than 
200 ft., though he claimed to be able to submerge 
* At Berehaven. 




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SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 119 

300 ft. The last day out, on the way back to Kiel 
while passing through the Kattegat, he travelled sub- 
merged for over ten hours at a depth of 200 ft. I 
doubt if he could make more than eight knots when 
submerged. He carried a crew of forty-two men and 
officers. One officer, Kapitan-Leutnant Kahn was 
aboard for the purposes of instruction, having had his 
request granted by the German Admiralty to com- 
mand a submarine of his own. While I was at Wil- 
helmshaven Kapitan-Leutnant Kahn came to see me 
in prison and told me that he had just received orders 
to take command of a new submarine. 

"Of the crew of forty-two men, two were warrant 
officers, one a navigator and the other the machinist. 
The captain's three assistants were lieutenants, corres- 
ponding to our grade of ensign. One was a German 
Naval Academy man, who entered the Navy in 1913 ; 
he was a deck officer. Another was a Reserve en- 
sign from the Merchant Fleet, who spoke English 
very well, having been in America and England in 
j>eace time on various steamers. The other officer 
was a regular, who had gone to a special school for 
engineers and he was responsible for the efficiency 
of the machinery; he did not stand a deck watch. 
The deck watch was stood by the navigator and the 
two ensigns. Captain Remy took the wheel when 
ships were sighted and when passing through dan- 
gerous waters. He had entered the Navy in 1905 
and had travelled considerably, having been in Amer- 
ica in 191 1 on a German crusier which had put in 
at Charleston, S. C, and Into New York, at both of 



I20 SIMSADUS 

which places he had been hospitably entertained. He 
liked America but could not understand why America 
had entered the war. He believed, as all Germans are 
taught to believe by Governmental propaganda, that 
our entry Into the war must have had as its motive 
the rendering safe of the millions we loaned to France 
and England early In the war. 

"The U-90 carried eight torpedoes. On this cruise 
she had sunk only two ships of about 2000 tons 
apiece. Captain Remy said that they seldom fired 
torpedoes at a range greater than 1000 yards and if 
possible he approached to within 500 yards of his 
prey. 

"The submarine rolled a little In the Atlantic, 
though we had no very rough weather. In the North 
Sea the choppy seas seemed hardly to affect it and 
under the surface there was no sensation of being in 
motion. The air inside the submarine when we were 
submerged on the last day out for ten hours became 
very disagreeable. However, several tanks of oxy- 
gen were carried which could have been used in case 
of necessity. The water-tight doors between the 
different compartments were kept closed at all times 
after entering the North Sea. The officers and crew 
smoked in the coming tower or on deck, but nowhere 
else. The wardroom was about six feet wide and 
seven feet long and here we ate at a table; the food 
was kept In lockers In the wardroom. Here also they 
put In hammock hooks and swung a hammock for 
me to sleep in, alongside two bunks used by Kahn 
and one of the other officers. Just forward of this 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 121 

room was a smaller compartment, known as the Cap- 
tain's cabin, in which he had his desk and bunk, with 
scarcely room for either. Forward of this cabin was 
a sleeping compartment for the men and forward of 
this was the forward torpedo room; I was never al- 
lowed to enter the torpedo rooms. Aft of the ward- 
room on the starboard side was a small cabin, about 
four feet wide and six feet long, occupied by the other 
two officers. Across a passage on the port side was 
the radio room and aft of this was the control room; 
here there were always two men on watch. Aft of 
the control room was the other living compartment 
for the men, and here the food was cooked and meals 
served. Aft of this was the engine room and the 
after-torpedo room. The men slept in hammocks and 
on the decks; they were very dirty for there was no 
water with which to wash. In the wardroom we had 
enough to wash our hands and faces once every day, 
but that was all. A little wine was carried for the 
officers. The food consisted chiefly of sausage, which 
was served at every meal, and canned bread and lard, 
which they called marmalade. Remy told me, how- 
ever, that the crews on the submarines were the only 
people in Germany who had an unlimited amount 
of meat and other foods. We had practically four 
meals every day: breakfast at 8 A. M., dinner at noon, 
and at 4 P. M. what they called 'kaifee'; at 8 P. M. 
we had supper but practically every meal was the 
same. KafFee at 4 P. M. apparently corresponded to 
our tea, but the sausage, or as they called it *wurst' 
was placed on the table at every meal. After supper 



122 SIMSADUS 

we played cards, sometimes bridge and sometimes a 
new game which I was taught. 

"Captain Remy tried in every possible way to 
make things pleasant for me and whenever I asked 
him an impossible question, that is a question which 
he thought he ought not to answer, he invariably 
said so, so that I have great confidence that what he 
told me was the truth. 

'*The U-90 and most of the German Submarines 
were out usually not more than four or five weeks 
and then in port about six or seven weeks. The 
service was not severe, for Remy got leave as often 
as he cared to have it and indeed it was deemed the 
height of good fortune by the regular ofiicers to be 
assigned to a submarine. After making three round 
trips they were entitled to the Iron Cross and to 
leave, which leave covered the duration of the stay 
of the submarine in port. They received extra money 
and they got the best food In Germany, besides 
which for every day which they submerged both 
officers and men received extra money. For all these 
reasons the submarine service was very popular." 

Lieutenant Isaacs had many interesting and har- 
rowing experiences In German prison camps. Shortly 
after he had been taken oif" the submarine and 
placed in prison, he was summoned before the Com- 
mander of the base, who immediately asked him 
why America had declared war. This under ordi- 
nary conditions is a rather difficult question to an- 
swer, not because there was a lack of reasons, but 
because in order to answer it well, a certain amount 



SUBMARINE OPERATIONS 123 

of thought is necessary. Lieutenant Isaacs appar- 
ently believed that any thought on the matter 
would be wasted and so Informed the German Ad- 
miral that America had declared war because the 
American people thought the German people so 
many swine. From then on things did not go very 
well with Lieutenant Isaacs. He was transferred to 
a prison camp from which he escaped, and was ar- 
rested. While en route to another prison camp he 
jumped out of the train window and landed on his 
head on the railroad bed. The train stopped and 
though he had regained consciousness from his fall, 
he was forced to surrender to the German soldiers 
when they began shooting at him. He was then 
kicked all the way to the next town, a distance of 
about nine miles. He planned another escape from 
the next camp and so was transferred again. Here, 
in making plans for a third attempt to escape, he 
found that Russian prisoners were acting as inform- 
ants for the camp authorities. He confided in a 
few English and Americans, and according to pre- 
arranged plans, one night, a good many of them 
escaped by shortcircuiting the lighting system of the 
camp. He then walked for three nights, hiding dur- 
ing the day, to the Swiss border, and swam the 
Rhine. In Switzerland he reported to the American 
Consul, who informed Admiral Sims and Isaacs was or- 
dered to Paris and then to London. He arrived in 
London about ten days later, very much undaunted in 
spirit and apparently not much the worse for the treat- 
ment he had received In the German prison camps. 



X 

THE DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES 

ONE phase of the submarine war, which was 
very much misunderstood by the civilian, was 
the destruction of submarines. The many unreliable 
stories of the sinkings of submarines by merchant 
ships and patrol vessels have given people the 
idea that submarines were comparatively easy vessels 
to sink. As a matter of fact, in this war the sub- 
marine was the most difficult of any vessel to sink, 
and statistics show that only one submarine was 
sunk in every thirty-nine attempts to destroy it. 
One reason for this was the construction of the sub- 
marine itself; it was made in such a way that it had 
an outer and an inner hull, the space between which 
was used for carrying fuel. These fuel tanks served 
as buffers against any shock or force with which the 
submarine might come in contact, and though the hull 
might be tortioned slightly, the average submarine 
seemed capable of surviving all sorts of difficulties. 

Shortly after America declared war, we read in 
the newspapers that the S. S. ^'Mongolia" had 
destroyed a submarine on the first shot; and a 
little later we read that the first troop convoy to 
France, when attacked by seven submarines, had 
managed to demolish most of them. On neither 
occasion was a sinking effected. There were two 

124 



THE DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES 125 

things in encounters with submarines which led the 
uninitiated erroneously to believe that a submarine 
had been destroyed: one was a large cloud of smoke, 
which would be seen rising from the water where the 
U-boat had submerged; the other was the oil and 
bubbles which would come to the surface after an 
attack. Both phenomena are easily explained. 

I have said that when a submarine was on the sur- 
face, the Diesel oil engines were used as means of 
propulsion. These oil engines had an exhaust pipe 
and manifold not unlike that of an automobile. 
When a shell was fired at a submarine on the surface, 
it would immediately submerge, and as it did so 
cold water would rush into the hot exhaust pipe. 
In a moment steam would be formed inside the ex- 
haust pipe, and as soon as a sufficiently powerful 
pocket of this had been generated, the water would 
be blown out of the manifold with great force, and 
with it would go all sorts of carbon gases, causing 
a small geyser of steam, water, and smoke. Thus 
the gunner who had fired a shell at a submarine was 
led to believe that his shell, if it came anywhere near 
the submarine, had damaged it as proved by the 
smoke and water jet. 

*'Oil and bubbles" was taken at first as another 
proof that a submarine had been destroyed; it was in 
reality nothing of the sort. A submarine is an oily 
affair anywhere, and when it submerged it often 
left an oil patch on the surface. This might be caused 
by the exhaust explosion already mentioned, or by 
a small leak in a fuel tank; or it might be due to 



126 SIMSADUS 

the fact that the commanding officer had dehber- 
ately discharged some oil out through the side of the 
submarine to make the attackers think that their work 
was finished, and so leave it alone. 

There were three excellent ways of knowing when 
a submarine had been sunk. The surest way and 
most satisfactory to all concerned was by rescuing 
a few half-drowned survivors, who had managed to 
crawl out of the submarine through the conning 
tower, or through the torpedo tubes, when it was far 
below the surface, and going down rapidly. The 
capture of survivors under any circumstances was 
good proof that a submarine had been destroyed. 
Another method was by observing on the charts, as 
kept by the radio direction finder, whether a sub- 
marine after an attack continued to operate or not. 
If a vessel attacked a submarine, and during the 
following night that submarine communicated with 
Germany by wireless, there was excellent proof that 
the submarine had not been sunk. On the other 
hand, if a patrol vessel attacked a submarine and no 
further movements were observed, it might be sup- 
posed that it had been sunk. Whether it had been 
sunk or not remained to be seen, and this intro- 
duces the third way, namely, whether it ever returned 
to its base. This information would be supplied 
by the English secret agents in Germany and neutral 
countries, although it was often weeks and months 
before definite word could be obtained. For ex- 
ample, the U. S. S. "Lydonia" and H. M. S. "Basi- 
lisk" dropped depth charges on a submarine in the 



THE DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES 127 

Mediterranean on May 8, 191 8, and in submitting 
their reports the commanding officers of these ves- 
sels did not even claim to have destroyed it. No 
further movements of this submarine were recorded, 
but credit for its destruction was not awarded until 
August, when the Admiralty, by checking up all 
information from their agents and charts learned 
that it had not returned to its base at Pola, classi- 
fied it as "sunk." 

This aversion on the part of the Admiralty and 
later on the part of Admiral Sims and his associates, 
to consider a submarine sunk when absolute proof 
thereof was lacking, was warranted. I have said 
that the German Intelligence Service often allowed 
the wish to father the thought, and showed how 
such methods were detrimental. In order to com- 
bat the submarine, all operations had to be based 
upon a knowledge of facts; therefore, marking off a 
submarine as sunk before its destruction was def- 
initely proven, was misleading and not a good policy. 
If as many submarines had been sunk as were 
claimed, Germany would have had to have built 
about five thousand of them. As it was, the Ad- 
miralty, knew from day to day and from week to 
week, because of the conservative policy in estimat- 
ing submarine losses, exactly how many German 
submarines were available for service at all times, 
and at future dates. As great as was the desire on 
the part of the officials to classify these as sunk, a 
false representation of their destruction would have 
helped nobody but the Germans themselves. 



128 SIMSADUS 

Statistics show that the most effective method of 
sinking submarines was by depth charges. These 
explosive weapons were a new invention in Naval 
Warfare, and were first used in the Autumn of 19 16. 
Previous to that time the anti-submarine vessel had 
had no offensive weapon against a submerged sub- 
marine. The introduction of the depth charge al- 
tered and improved the situation. The depth charge 
was similar in appearance and size to a hogshead, 
and was filled with explosives. At one end of these 
"cans," as they were affectionately called by the 
members of the destroyer Force, there was a mech- 
anism similar to that of a time fuse on a shell. This 
mechanism was so delicate that at various depths, 
according to the adjustment, the water pressure 
on it would cause the explosion. Depth charges 
were carried on the stern of the vessel on an oiled 
track or runway, from which they could be easily 
launched into the water. There was also a depth- 
charge thrower, known as the "Y" gun, by which 
they could be heaved 200 yards to either side of 
the vessel. The force of the explosion under water 
was so great that it was absolutely imperative for 
the destroyer to be going at full speed when they 
were being dropped, to avoid being herself injured. 
A depth charge, exploding within 50 yards of a 
submarine, would have the effect of pushing al- 
most a solid mass (water under sudden impact acts 
practically as a solid), against the side of the sub- 
marine, tending to crush it. Should the explosion 
occur beneath the submarine, it would find itself 



THE DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES 129 

pushed toward the surface, or tilted up on end, 
all of which would probably be injurious to it. It 
often happened that the explosion would injure the 
diving or elevating apparatus, corresponding to a 
horizontal rudder on the submarine, and in such 
cases it would either find itself rapidly rising to the 
surface or rapidly going down. 

When a destroyer sighted a submarine, she would 
steam at full speed towards the point where it was 
seen, or as near to such a position as could be de- 
termined, and the "cans" would be dropped. When 
they were first used, and during 19 17, it was the cus- 
tom to drop only two or three and some very ex- 
cellent results were obtained; notably the sinking of 
a submarine by the "Fanning" and the injuring of 
a submarine by the "Christabel." But though sub- 
marines had been sunk and injured in this way, a few 
of the authorities, and Admiral Sims in particular, 
advocated a change in tactics. Admiral Sims rightly 
believed that the greater the number of depth charges 
dropped, the better the chances of success. He 
also believed that the occurrence of many severe 
explosions would tend to frighten the crew of a 
submarine, and demoralize them. In March, 19 18, 
he sent instructions to all his Forces that five depth 
charges were to be dropped in the future for every 
one dropped in the past. This system proved very 
effective, and although the destruction of submarines 
thereby was not materially Increased, it undoubtedly 
wrought havoc with the personnel of the submarines. 
When a submarine was attacked, and the terrible 



I30 SIMSADUS 

explosions began to occur all around It, the crew at 
times became almost panic stricken; lights would go 
out, sometimes leaks would occur, all storage bat- 
teries be upset, and in general, the crew would ex- 
perience a few very exasperating moments, all of 
which tended towards killing their "nerve" and in- 
creasing their fear of destroyers. In this way the 
U-boats became more cautious in revealing them- 
selves; and more caution on the part of the sub- 
marines meant fewer Allied losses. 

According to this new method, fifteen or twenty, 
or sometimes as many as thirty depth charges were 
dropped at the slighest provocation. Dropping them 
was easy enough; the question was where to drop 
them. A submarine sighted at a given point, 
would be able to move only a certain distance 
within a given time; in other words, it would be In- 
side a circle, the size of which would be determined 
by the length of time intervening between the 
sighting of the submarine and the arrival of the 
destroyer at the point where it was seen. As the 
speed of a submerged U-boat was known, it could 
be calculated within what area it must be. When 
the destroyer arrived at the position where the sub- 
marine was seen, she would commence to drop 
depth charges in a circle having a radius In pro- 
portion to the time consumed In describing It. 
Thus, if a destroyer started to describe a circle 
towards the right, as she continued the circle, the 
rudder would be eased, and the radius would be In- 
creased until it overlapped at the point from which it 



THE DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES 131 

was started. In dropping these charges the destroyer 
was confronted with the problem as to the depth at 
which they should be set to explode. Some sub- 
marines submerged to thirty feet when attacked, 
others to 200, and the destroyer's officer had no 
means of knowing which. It was anybody's guess. 

In spite of the best possible mathematical and 
scientific calculations hundreds of depth charges were 
dropped without results, except for the usual oil and 
bubbles which meant nothing, and the nerve rack- 
ing explosions which the submarine crews experienced. 
As Commander Cook, U. S. N., Commanding Officer 
of the U. S. Destroyer ''Allen," once said, "You can 
give me all the science in the world, but when you 
have sighted a submarine and steamed a mile to reach 
the point where it submerged, I defy you to know when 
or where to begin to drop your depth charges and 
at what depth to set them. The submarine may be 
anywhere inside an area of several hundred yards 
and may be 30 feet or 200 feet below the surface. 
Nevertheless I throw as many 'cans' overboard, as 
I dare, at the slightest provocation; and though I 
have not bagged one yet I have made things un- 
pleasant for many." 

The American forces delivered 286 attacks on 
submarines or on suspicious objects; in 197 of these, 
it was definitely proved that a submarine was pres- 
ent. The remaining attacks were carried out upon 
oil slicks on the water, or tide rips, or some other 
form of disturbance. The reports of attacks were 
sent by the Commanding Officer of the vessels in- 



132 SIMSADUS . 

volved to Admiral Sims' office In London, and, upon 
the receipt of these, a comparison of the position in 
which the attack was delivered with the current 
charts of submarine movements was made. In this 
way it was known how effective and successful the 
attacks had been. 

Four submarines were sunk by the American forces, 
one on November 27, 1917, by the U. S. S. "Fan- 
ning" and "Nicholson"; another on May 11, 19 18, 
by the U. S. S. "Lydonia," in the Mediterranean; 
a third on June 18 by the submarine chasers at 
Corfu; and the fourth on October 2, 19 18, by the 
chasers at Corfu in their raid on Durazzo Harbor. 
A fifth was possibly sunk by the U. S. S. "Tucker" 
on August 8, 19 1 8, a hundred miles off Brest, and 
on May 31st the "Christabel" attacked the UC-56 
and forced it to intern at Santander, Spain. It 
is possible and probable that the American forces 
sank other submarines also, but as the same thing 
is true of the British, French, and Italian Forces, 
it was decided that, in order to avoid any argu- 
ment over the crediting of these sinkings to various 
nations, it would be better to classify those cases 
where the time and cause of destruction were not 
definitely proven, as "means of sinking unknown." 

In 17 other attacks, American vessels were success- 
ful to the extent that in these encounters submarines 
were slightly or seriously damaged, and forced, be- 
cause of injuries, to return to their bases immediately. 
^The vessels participating in these attacks were as 
follows : 



THE DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES 133 



Trippe 

July 9, 1917 
Wadsworth 

July 21, 1917 
Benham 

July 30, 1917 
McDougal 

September 9, 1917 
Noma ] 

Waklva [ Nov. 28, 191 7 
Kanawha 
Patterson 
Beale 
Burrows 
Allen 
Warrington 

July 13, 1917 
Wilkes 

July 26, 1917 



May 19, 1918 



Parker 

August 3, 1917 
Davis 

September 21, 19 17 
Allen 

February 2, 191 8 
Jenkins 

July 17, 1917 
Wadsworth & Trippe 

July 29, 1917 
Jacob Jones 

September 5, 1917 

Porter 

April 28, 1918 
Sterrett 

June I, 1918 
Sub-Chasers, Plymouth 

July 10, 1918 



XI 

WHY AA4ERICAN TROOPSHIPS WERE 
NOT SUNK 

WHEN America declared War In 191 7 the 
thought Immediately occurred to us, ''How- 
are we going to send troops to France with submarines 
blocking the path?" While we were pondering over 
this, the Germans were gloating and saying, "Amer- 
icans will never get to France; our submarines will 
stop them." The long and short of our wondering 
and Germany's gloating was that our troops did get 
to France, with but few casualties. Why were 
there no serious losses of transports and men.^ To 
this question I am going to undertake an answer 
on my own responsibility. I believe that the Ger- 
mans did not make a determined effort to sink Amer- 
ican transports. This statement may seem start- 
ling at first, but a closer study of the matter will 
show that from a military point of view It was a 
better policy for submarines not to try to stop Amer- 
can troops coming to France. 

The original conception of the submarine War 
involved primarily the blockade of Great Britain, 
and thereby the subsequent starvation of the Allies 
by sinking British cargo vessels. Sinking American 
troops was not starving England, and every time a 
torpedo was fired at a transport, there was one tor- 

134 



SUBMARINES AND TROOPSHIPS 135 

pedo less to be used in the destruction of ships carry- 
ing food to England. The Germans knew that we 
had limitless numbers of men whom we could send to 
France; what was to be gained by sinking a few of 
these when there were just as many more to come? 
In order to prevent American troops landing in Eu- 
rope, the submarines would have had to devote their 
entire attention, energy, and practically all their tor- 
pedoes to sinking transports. Such a policy would 
not have been in accord with the original doctrine of 
the U-boat campaign, which was, as stated, to starve 
England by sinking cargo vessels. They could not 
sink both; their efforts had to be concentrated on one 
or on the other. There were excellent reasons for not 
concentrating their efforts on transports. 

I have already shown how the sinking of a fast 
ship on a zigzag course, protected by destroyers, was 
an exceedingly difficult task for a submarine. A sub- 
marine, in manoeuvering to get close enough to a 
fast zigzagging vessel to fire a torpedo at her, was 
putting itself in a very dangerous position; and at 
that, the chances of a torpedo striking its mark, be- 
cause of the speed and irregular course of the target, 
were not too good. And after the torpedo had been 
fired, there were half a dozen destroyers ready to 
pounce upon the submarine with depth charges, and 
if it was not destroyed or injured, the submarine itself 
and its crew would spend a very dangerous and un- 
comfortable fifteen minutes. In other words, at- 
tacking fast ships, such as troopships, when well 
protected by destroyers, was almost too dangeroua 



136 SIMSADUS 

to the submarine to be worth while. The Command- 
ing Officer undoubtedly appreciated the pleasures 
of being alive, and though his superior back in Ger- 
many probably did not care what his sentiments 
were on this matter, he nevertheless did not want to 
lose the use of the submarine — which meant the 
saving of 20,000 tons per month to the Allies. It 
is only natural that the Officer in command of the 
flotillas did not want to lose the use of a submarine 
by its endeavoring to sink a transport, when sink- 
ing a transport would be of little military value, and 
not in accord with the primary doctrine of the sub- 
marine campaign. Admiral von Capelle, who was 
Chief of the Submarine Service, undoubtedly realized 
this, and apparently did not order his submarines 
to devote their efforts towards sinking American 
troops. His good sense cost him his position, for in 
July, 1918, when It became known that many Ameri- 
can troops had reached France, he was forced to re- 
sign. Nevertheless, his successor. Admiral von 
Mann, probably realized that Von Capelle was 
right, for only one transport was sunk after the first 
of August. 

The next question Is how many transports were 
sunk, and do their losses prove or disaprove my 
theory? Six were sunk, and two more were defi- 
nitely attacked. The vessels sunk were the U. S. Army 
Transport "Antilles," the British S. S. "Moldavia," 
the H. M. S. "Tuscania," and the U. S. S. "Pres- 
ident Lincoln"; also the H. M. S. "Justicia" and 
the U. S. S. "Covington." The U. S. S. "Mt. Ver- 



SUBMARINES AND TROOPSHIPS 137 

non" was torpedoed, but she made port, and the 
^'Olympic" accidentally rammed a submarine which 
was contemplating an attack. The first four of these 
cases, in that these ships resembled cargo vessels in 
general appearance, cannot be regarded in the same 
category as the others. Let us take each case In- 
dividually. 

The "Antilles" was sunk In the Summer of 1917, 
while proceeding back to this country. She was an 
old coastwise vessel of small tonnage with but one 
stack and not much deck structure; In other words, 
she was not a liner in appearance. The "Tuscania" 
was torpedoed and sunk off the North Coast of 
Ireland In February, 1918. At the time of her de- 
struction, she was lagging behind a slow merchant 
convoy at dusk, and in her general appearance she 
was not unlike the vessels she was following. In- 
variably experience has shown that the vessel which 
lagged behind has been the one selected for de- 
struction by the submarine. The third case is that 
of the "Moldavia," which was sunk In the English 
Channel while carrying American troops from Eng- 
land to France. This vessel was originally a cargo 
carrier, and during the War had been converted into 
a refrigerator ship. She was fundamentally a cargo 
vessel, and It was merely a coincidence that she had 
American troops on board when destroyed. The 
fourth case was that of the "President Lincoln," 
which was sunk on May 30, 191 8, three hundred miles 
West of Brest. This ship was an old German com- 
bination cargo and passenger (second class only) car- 



138 SIMSADUS 

rler; she had one stack and six masts, with many 
hoists and derricks for loading purposes. To all ap- 
pearances she was a cargo vessel. In fact, all four 
of these ships were either cargo vessels or very sim- 
ilar to them, the only exception perhaps being the 
^^Tuscania," but she was torpedoed at dusk when 
lagging behind a cargo convoy. The loss of these 
vessels, does not prove that the Germans were mak- 
ing a determined effort to sink transports. 

Two transports which could not be taken for 
cargo vessels, the ^'Justicia"* and the "Coving- 
ton," were sunk, and two more, the "Mt. Vernon" 
and the "Olympic" were attacked. The reason for 
torpedoing these vessels was probably the same as 
that for sinking hospital ships. It is a well-known 
fact that submarines sank hospital ships in order to 
make the Allies use destroyers in escorting them. I 
believe that the same is true in these cases, for as 
long as but few transports were being sunk, the Ger- 
mans probably thought that the Allies might see fit 
to let them be unescorted. This would mean that 
.an extra number of destroyers would be available 
:for escorting cargo ships, which were the real prey of 
the submarine. By sinking an occasional transport 
or hospital ship, they could force the Allies to supply 

* Incidentally, the Press claimed that the " Justicia" had been sunk 
by four submarines, which was not true. On July 19, 1918, on the North 
Coast of Ireland at dusk, she was hit by a torpedo from a submarine, 
which was Northward bound. She remained afloat all night, and was 
being towed back to port when the following morning, another sub- 
marine Southward bound discovered her in this condition, and sank 
her. 



SUBMARINES AND TROOPSHIPS 139 

escorts to these vessels, and thereby have less de- 
stroyers available to protect cargo ships. 

Now to sum up. I first showed that the sinking of 
transports was not the real object of the submarine 
war, and that attempts at their destruction in large 
numbers would have meant the abandonment of the 
real objective of the campaign, namely, the starva- 
tion of England by sinking cargo vessels. I then 
showed that because of the convoy system, at- 
tempts to sink transports were not worth the risk 
the submarine Incurred In so doing. And then fi- 
nally, I showed that those eight cases. In which trans- 
ports were sunk or attached, did not prove that the 
enemy was making a determined effort to sink troop- 
ships; because, four of them were not transports In 
general appearance and because the other four, 
though unmistakably transports, were attacked In 
order to force the Allies to escort all troopships very 
heavily, and thereby leave fewer destroyers available 
for escort duty with cargo convoys. 

This may lead the reader to conclude that our Navy 
did not do such a great deal after all. Such a con- 
clusion would be far from true, for Insurance against 
Allied defeat lay not In making It possible to trans- 
port American soldiers to France, but in checking 
the submarines sufficiently to allow all Allied Eu- 
ropeans three good meals a day, and occasionally a 
lump of sugar. It has often been said that even If 
the German army had overrun France, Germany 
would not have been victorious so long as the Allies 
commanded the sea. While submarines were on the 



HO SIMSADUS 

high-road to starving England, Germany, though she 
did not control the surface of the seas, possessed 
sufficient power under the surface to accomplish her 
desires. The Allies' salvation and gateway to success 
lay in feeding their peoples and armies. The slogan 
the "Navy brought 'em over" is of minor import- 
ance. What the Navy did do was to keep the Allies 
and their armies from starving. 



XII 

THE END OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN 

DURING the Spring and Summer of 191 8, the 
sinkings by submarines steadily decreased; the 
Allied Navies had the situation well in hand. Of 
course ships were sunk, and always would be, as 
long as there were submarines at sea, but the situa- 
tion looked better, and the anti-submarine struggle 
promised greater success than at any other previous 
date. The British dockyards were launching greater 
numbers of new anti-submarine vessels, and every 
month brought more American destroyers to the 
theatre of War. The construction of German submar- 
ines was going on as before, and though their total was 
gradually Increasing, their successes at sea were being 
steadily checked. Another great factor, which gave 
encouragement to the Allied Naval Authorities, was 
the monthly construction of American Merchant ton- 
nage, which, added to British new construction, sur- 
passed the monthly losses. These facts produced the 
" handwriting on the wall " for the German submarine. 
The submarine became a weapon of power to Ger- 
many shortly after the outbreak of the War In 1914, 
and grew in danger as the War progressed. The 
British Navy kept the ravages on tonnage low as 
long as Germany carried on her submarine War ac- 
cording to International Law, which Germany offi- 

141 



142 SIMSADUS 

dally violated In February, 1917, when she informed 
the world that the waters East of the British Isles 
and France were "blockaded." 

It is provided in International Law that a nation 
at War may declare the enemy's ports blockaded, if 
such a blockade is effective. This means that war- 
ships of one nation may prevent the entrance of 
ships to the ports of the enemy by the right of search 
and seizure. Thus if they stop an enemy merchant 
ship on the high seas, that vessel can be taken 
captive and made to return to its enemy's port. Or 
when the blockading vessel so decides, if the mer- 
chant ship is carrying contraband, the cargo can be 
seized and the vessel sunk or captured. In the case 
of a neutral, the cargo, if determined contraband, can 
be seized or destroyed, but the vessel cannot be cap- 
tured or sunk. Thus, England's blockade of Ger- 
many in this War was permissible according to 
International Law, for it could be enforced accord- 
ing to International Law. English warships could, 
and did, prevent American vessels carrying contra- 
band into Germany, directly or indirectly, through 
neutral countries. British War vessels would stop 
American vessels, which were neutral, remove the 
contraband, and allow the vessel to proceed. Eng- 
land's blockade of Germany was effective. When 
Germany declared all waters three hundred miles 
East of England and France "blockaded," her dec- 
laration and its execution were illegal because it could 
not be effectively carried out according to Interna- 
tional Law. Germany, to blockade England, could 



END OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN 143 

only use submarines. If submarines had stopped 
neutral vessels, seized or destroyed the cargo and 
then allowed the ship to proceed, their actions would 
have been legitimate; but as submarines in Eng- 
lish waters could not stop and search ships without 
encountering British warships, this was impossible. 
Also, if a submarine had been able to stop British 
ships and take them back to Germany as captures, 
or after search, have sunk them, their actions would 
have been legitimate. But because submarines could 
not, and did not, do these two things, Germany vio- 
lated International Law, both in her declaration of 
a blockade because it was not totally effective and 
because in its execution her submarines sank the 
vessels of England and neutral countries on sight 
without warning. This violation of International 
Law, and the high-handed disregard with which Ger- 
many treated the vessels of neutrals, brought Amer- 
ica at last Into the great struggle. 

At the time of America's entry into the War, Eng- 
land's tonnage losses through submarines were greater 
than that nation could long stand, and her auxili- 
ary naval vessels — viz., destroyers, gun-boats etc., 
were not sufficient in numbers to serve with the Grand 
Fleet which had the German Fleet bottled up in the 
North Sea and at the same time combat the sub- 
marine In all areas. The American Navy, under the 
command of Admiral Sims, upon its arrival in Euro- 
pean waters, extended a willing and helping hand in 
a spirit of unprecedented cooperation to the hard- 
pressed British and other Allied Navies. Thirty de- 



144 SIMSADUS 

stroyers joined the British Forces at Queenstown and 
were employed in protecting shipping to and from 
England in the waters South of Ireland. At Brest, 
forty-one destroyers, some yachts, and mine-sweep- 
ers cooperated with the French and undertook what- 
ever duty arose. At Gibraltar, thirty-five American 
vessels joined with the British vessels in escorting 
local Mediterranean convoys and convoys between 
Gibraltar and Great Britain. Five American dread- 
naughts joined the British Fleet in the North Sea 
and three others made their base at Berehaven in the 
role of an offensive squadron against possible enemy 
raiders. The American Mine Force in Scotland laid 
80%, or 56,000 mines, of the Northern Mine Barrage 
from Scotland to Norway, the greatest mining opera- 
tion in history. American chasers operated around 
the Island of Corfu and maintained a constant 
watch at the mouth of the Adriatic where all enemy 
submarines in the Mediterranean had their base. 
Another detachment of chasers was stationed at 
Plymouth, and remained on constant patrol in the 
English Channel. A third squadron of chasers 
arrived at Queenstown, but the Armistice cut short 
their activities. An American cruiser was dispatched 
to Archangel; seventy-three American cargo ves- 
sels, manned by Naval personnel, carried coal from 
Cardiff, Wales, to France for the use of the American 
Expeditionary Force. The American Naval Avia- 
tion Service established twenty-nine stations and 
schools along the Coasts of France, England, Ireland, 
and Italy. Thus with 374 vessels, which steamed an 




The shaded areas show the areas in which our forces operated ; the 
borders of the shaded parts are general, and they do not mean that 
American forces remained inside them. The figures show the per- 
centages of traffic, escorted by American naval vessels. The lines 
running in all directions show how Admiral Sims was in communica- 
tion with all of his bases. 



^ 



NAVY 
DEPI. 



Commander 
U.S. All. Fleet 



Ad. W. S. Sims 



U.S NAVAL PORT OFFICES, 
Liverpoul 
Southampton 
Le Havre 
Genoa 
Marseilles 
Bizerta 



COMMANDER 
A. E. F. 



ARMY COAL TRADE 

CARDIFF 
Rear Ad. Andrews 



MURMANSK 
U. S. S. OLYMPIA 
Capl.McCully US.N 



f.LRtHAVEN 

3 U.b UREADNAUGHTS 

Rear Ad.Rugeis US N 

SUBMARINE FLOT. 



SUPREME ALLIED 
NAVAL COUNCIL 



OUEENSTOWN 

Ad. Payly R. N. 

Capt.Pringle U.SN. 



BREST AND 
COAST OF FRANCE 
Vice Ad. Wilson U b N 



PLYMOUTH 
CHASERS 
m.Cotlcn U.S.N. 



GIbRALTAK 

Rear Ad. Grant R.N. 

Rear Ad.NiljIack U S N 



CORFU 

CHASERS 

Capt. Nelson U S N. 




5 DREADNAUGHIS 

NORTH SEA 

Rear Ad'.Rodmai:U, S.N 



COMMANDER 

BRITISH GRAND FLEET 

Ad. Beatty R.N. 



ALL U.S. NAVAL 
AVIATION EAt.ES 
Capt. Cone US.N. 



US MINE FORCE 

SCOTLAND 

Rear Ad, Strauss Ij. S. 



A graphic rcjjresentation of Admiral Sims' version of "Unity of 

Command." The joining lines show the cooperation between the 

high anthnrities and the bases. 



END OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN 145 

average of 626,000 miles per month, with a comple- 
ment of 78,000 men, the American Naval Forces 
shouldered a good proportion of the War against the 
submarine. In the Eastern Atlantic, our destroyers 
provided about 27% of the escorts to convoys.* 

The acute stage of the submarine campaign passed 
with the Introduction of the convoy system In July, 
19 17. By January, 19 18, It was made clear to all, 
except the propaganda-nourished German popula- 
tion, that the submarine was not to bring defeat to 
the Allies. Perhaps by 191 8 the German Naval 
Officials realized that their submarines could not 
bring their country victory, but in order to defend 
themselves for their acts, which cost Germany the 
price of active American participation in the War, 
and in order to hamper the Allies as much as possible, 
the Submarine War was continued. Great yarns were 
given out in Germany about the success of the sub- 
marine campaign, but these coincided with the sto- 
ries of what the submarines would do, rather than 
with what they really did. But there is no denying 
that the submarine, until September, 191 8, remained 
a strong weapon In the hands of Germany and that 
the U-boat war was pressed with great virulence until 
almost the very end. 

* The British Navy provided 70% of the escorts, the American 27%, 
and the French 3%. The actual number of Allied war vessels em- 
ployed in the War was over 4000; of these we furnished but 374. It 
will be well for the American people to recognize in this way the great 
ability of Admiral Sims. His Forces were the fewest in number of 
any great Power in this War, and yet look at what he accom- 
plished with them. 



146 SIMSADUS 

The beginning of the end of the Submarine War 
made Itself apparent In September, 1918. During 
that month the sinkings amounted to only 180,000 
tons, a fact occasioned through the loss of morale of 
the submarine crews, perhaps partially the result of 
a clever move by the British Admiralty. In August, 
the Admiralty made public a list of the names of 
150 submarine commanders who had been lost, and 
all of whose submarines had been destroyed. This 
Information showed the existing submarine com- 
manders that the British Admiralty knew consider- 
ably more of their activities than was supposed. 
How the British and Admiral Sims kept themselves 
Informed of submarine activities, the Germans never 
discovered, for the Kaiser's Intelligence Office never 
learned the secret of locating submarines by wireless. 
When It became evident to the submarine officers and 
crews that their every movement was watched by the 
British Admiralty, greater caution on their part was 
manifested, and the daring which had characterized 
their operations disappeared. 

The proof that the British Admiralty knew a 
great deal more about submarine operations than 
was commonly supposed came to the German sub- 
marine personnel as a letter does to a man Inform- 
ing him that his bank-account has been overdrawn. 
The men and officers began to think, and soon prob- 
ably appreciated the following facts. The German 
Admiralty had said In February, 1917, that the War 
would be over by the Autumn. This statement had 
not come true. The American Navy had come Into 




The little dots represent the Allied vessels sunk by submarines in 
September, 1918; iive or six dots in place of each of these would 
represent the losses of April, 1917. The two ships sunk off our 
coast (see insert) were destroyed by the U-117, the last of the four 
German submarines to visit our coasts. 



END OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN 147 

the War, and by efficient cooperation with the Brit- 
ish, for many a submarine officer had seen English 
and American destroyers with the same convoy, had 
increased the difficulty of the submarine's task. Also 
the convoy system had made the destruction of a 
ship by a submarine an extremely difficult and haz- 
ardous task. And every time they went to sea 
they had to encounter a great danger, the Northern 
Mine Barrage, because the still greater danger, the 
Dover mine-fields, had closed the Straits to them. 
And when at sea, their encounters with Allied patrol 
craft were ever growing more numerous. Their 
mortal enemy had sunk over 150 submarines and 
apparently watched the activities of every subma- 
rine commander with intelligence and interest. And, 
finally, in spite of their efforts, the Allied tonnage 
losses were being more than replaced by new construc- 
tion, although there were more submarines ready 
for operations than ever before. To what hopes 
could they now turn.? Or what could they accom- 
plish by continuing to play a game in which they had 
no hopes and In which their comrades In arms, the 
German Armies were playing a losing part.'* 

Such sentiments on the part of the submarine 
crews were not revealed to the Allied Naval au- 
thorities except by the actions of the submarines 
themselves. During the last week of September sub- 
marine operations became confused, and the follow- 
ing of each submarine difficult; activities seemed to 
lack proper guidance. The sinkings decreased no- 
tably during that month, and by October, the im- 



148 SIMSADUS 

pression was gathered that the submarines were 
trying to conceal themselves as much as possible. 
By the middle of October, after the commencement 
of rumors of an Armistice, many submarines started 
for home, and attacks on merchant ships became 
scarce. By the end of October, only half a dozen 
were still operating. This sudden collapse of the 
submarine war served as an excellent barometer of 
the coming debacle. 

By the first week in November, the seas were 
practically cleared of submarines. The efforts of the 
British Naval authorities and Admiral Sims had 
been successful. The U-boat war, by their efforts, 
had failed. But these men, in their hour of success, 
gave way to no jubilation. They continued the 
anti-submarine tactics, as if the submarines were 
operating as in past months. Who knew but that 
Germany, in her death-rattle, might send her 174 
submarines, the greatest number she had ever had, 
to sea, with orders to sink everything afloat? Who 
knew but that this might be her last effort, in her 
dying gasp ? The dying gasp came a few days later, 
but in another form, when the High Seas Fleet was 
ordered to sea. Mutiny followed, and no German 
warship left its anchorage. 

Two weeks later, the High Seas Fleet and the sub- 
marines surrendered. After an examination of the 
German warships, it was learned that for two and a 
half years, the German Navy had been in no con- 
dition to meet the British. The German Naval 
authorities had apparently decided, after the Battle 



END OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN 149 

of Jutland, In June, 19 16, that their Navy was no 
match for the English Navy in open combat. 
They then had turned to the submarine to fulfill their 
ambition for Naval supremacy. In this, too, they had 
failed, and Germany was beaten at a game of her own 
choosing. When the first group of German sub- 
marines surrendered, Germany unwillingly admit- 
ted before the World that England and America 
ruled not only the surface of the sea, but also con- 
trolled what Germany had seen fit to stage beneath it. 



XIII 

THE MAN ON THE BRIDGE 
(In Homage) 

IN 1775 John Paul Jones, the Father of the Amer- 
ican Navy, in a letter to Congress, described at 
length the requirements of intellect and character 
necessary to a Naval Officer of the highest order. 
Among other things he said: "It is by no means 
enough that an Officer of the Navy should be a capa- 
ble mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a 
great deal more. He should be as well, a gentleman 
of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious cour- 
tesy, and have the nicest sense of personal honor. 
He should also be conversant with the uses of di- 
plomacy, and capable of maintaining, if called upon, 
a dignified and judicious correspondence (which 
means position) ; because it often happens that sud- 
den emergencies in Foreign Waters make him the 
diplomatic as well as the Military representative of 
his country. — ^These are the general qualifications, 
and the nearer the Officer approaches the full pos- 
session of them, the more likely he will be to serve 
our country well, and win fame and honor for him- 
self." 

The extracts in this summary are brief but satis- 
factory and we all agree that John Paul Jones had a 
splendid vision of the duties of a Naval Officer. 

ISO 



THE MAN ON THE BRIDGE 151 

When standards of this sort are set, it is not often 
that we find them fulfilled, for they are beyond the 
grasp of most men. Standards and ideals are human 
institutions to be constantly striven after, but sel- 
dom attained. They owe their origin to the accom- 
plishments and character of one man whose life, or 
life's work, is passed along as the goal towards which 
other men should strive. John Paul Jones probably 
realized that his version of the ideal Naval Officer 
was not to be attained by many, but some day might 
be reached by a few. Admirals Farragut and Dewey 
have lived up to his standards in the past, and to-day 
the same may be said of Rear-Admiral William Snow- 
den Sims. 

This officer, because of his absence in Europe for 
two years and his besetting sin, modesty, is not so 
well known to the American people as Is his due. 
This Is to a large extent his own fault, for his modesty 
and dislike of ceremony have deprived him of that 
fame which others less modest have attained. At 
our Naval offices in London, there was a newspaper 
man attached to the Staff as the central correspon- 
dent of our Forces In Europe. This Officer saw that 
as much information, as could be made public about 
the American Naval activities abroad was sent back 
to this country. Information of every sort except 
that concerning Admiral Sims was given out. All 
material for the American Press had to be passed 
upon by the Admiral, and whenever articles dealing 
with himself were submitted for approval, they were 
rejected. Again and again this newspaper corre- 



152 SIMSADUS 

spondent went to the Admiral, personally, and asked 
him to allow stories of himself to be sent to the Amer- 
ican Press; and as often as this was asked, just so often 
would Admiral Sims reply: "Let's cut out this talk, 
and get on with the War; after the War there will be 
lots of time for talking." This was his method of 
doing things, and it permeated his whole character. 

Very nearly every Staff Officer in this War, above 
the rank of Major, was allowed the use of a Staff 
automobile. American Generals in this country and 
in France and the General commanding our troops 
in England, all had their own Staff cars, marked with 
insignia of their rank. This was not the case with 
Admiral Sims. At his headquarters in London there 
were 196 Officers, who had at their disposal five Staff 
cars and each one was modestly marked "U. S. N." 
One of these cars was reserved for the Admiral's use 
during the day, but if he was not going to use it for an 
hour or two, it was at the disposal of any Officer. At 
night all cars were dismissed shortly after six o'clock, 
and the Admiral, as an ordinary citizen, would walk 
or take a bus back to his room at the Carlton Hotel. 

Of course he was entertained officially on many 
occasions, and at all of these functions he was usu- 
ally the principal speaker. He is the possessor of a 
ready wit and is full of humorous stories gained by 
extensive reading on all subjects. He is exceedingly 
well informed, and because his comprehension of 
facts and his interpretations of cause and result are 
very keen, he never fails to see the humorous side of 
life and history. Socially he was also entertained, but 




ADMIRAL WILLIAM SNOWDEN SIMS. 

Commander United States Naval Forces Operating in 

European Waters. 



THE MAN ON THE BRIDGE 153 

he considered generally that such affairs could wait. 
He limited his social activities as much as possible 
to small dinners in private houses where the at- 
mosphere was one of friendliness and congeniality 
rather than that of a social affair. He believed that 
as long as there was a War on, the great task with 
which he was confronted should in no way be inter- 
rupted by matters not pertinent to his work. He 
was always on the bridge. 

Because of his ** liberal education, refined man- 
ners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of 
personal honor," he soon was looked upon as a dip- 
lomatic representative of America, as well as the Com- 
mander of our Forces. His ability as a speaker, his 
gentle voice and dignity, all went to make him un- 
consciously diplomatically important. It will be re- 
called that in the Spring of 19 18, Mr. Page, our Am- 
bassador to the Court of St. James, returned to this 
country because of ill health, and for several months 
thereafter his position was vacant. In the Fall of 
that year, talk concerning the choice of the new Am- 
bassador being prevalent, a Member of Parliament 
made the remark; "As long as Admiral Sims is 
here, your country does not need an Ambassador." 
This remark was to the point, and though the Admiral 
of course did not become involved in state affairs, 
nevertheless to the layman and citizen of London, 
America and Admiral Sims were synonymous. His 
cooperation and diplomatic conduct in dealings 
with the Admiralty and Chiefs of other Allied or- 
ganizations, made a deep impression on British 



1 54 SIMSADUS 

public opinion. The tale was popularly told that he 
came to loggerheads with the Admiralty one day 
when, after the King had bestowed upon him the 
honorary title of "Knight Commander of the most 
holy Order of St. Michael and St. George," a British 
officer at the Admiralty greeted him as " Sir William." 

Admiral Sims did a great deal to cement that 
much desired * ^Anglo-American Unity." I recall one 
day in January when our recently appointed Am- 
bassador, Mr. Davis, was being entertained at the 
American Luncheon Club. The Right Hon. Mr. 
Balfour gave a little talk, in the course of which he 
said: '*I know that the Englishman has little pecu- 
liarities all his own; for instance, an Englishman al- 
ways walks into a drawing room as if it belonged to 
him." The Admiral was the next speaker, and thus 
he began: "In connection with what the Right Hon. 
Mr. Balfour has just said, I have a few words to say, 
for the American also has little peculiarities of his 
own, for whereas the Englishman walks into a room 
as if it belonged to him, the American usually walks 
in as if it belonged to nobody^ Quips such as these 
from the Admiral at a time when ill winds bore to 
European ears the cry (in poor taste,) "America 
won the War," were usual, and time and time again, 
he would tactfully crash through the atmosphere 
of formality, and send everybody home with a firm 
conviction that if Admiral Sims represented the 
typical American, England and America were at 
heart similar. 

Perhaps the incident which shows his great and 



THE MAN ON THE BRIDGE 155 

sincere spirit most cleariy, was his return to this 
country. I have tried to show the position he held 
in Europe. He had come to England at a very criti- 
cal time. He had been received, respected, and 
praised for his services, and his position in London 
had been such as few foreigners have attained. He 
had ably commanded our Navy in European Waters, 
and had sat as a conspicuous figure in the Su- 
preme Allied Naval Council, and was the first Al- 
lied Chief to establish real cooperation and unity 
of Command. In view of this, the Navy Depart- 
ment had promoted him to the rank of temporary 
Admiral; but according to Naval regulations, an 
Admiral, unless his rank is permanent, becomes a 
Rear-Admiral when he relinquishes his Command. 
Accordingly, Admiral Sims was a full Admiral up to 
the time he left England. As the ^'Mauretania," 
on which he returned, came up the harbor, amidst 
the waving of flags, blowing of whistles, and other 
emblems of welcome, the great hatches or doors in 
the side of the ship swung open, and there stood the 
man who had commanded our Navy so capably, in 
the uniform of a Rear-Admiral. 

To-day his rank is still that of a Rear-Admiral, 
The President, and the Secretary of the Navy, have 
both recommended to Congress that he be promoted 
to the rank of permanent Admiral; up to the present 
writing this has not been done. In Europe, men 
who in this War played a lesser part than Admiral 
Sims have been rewarded for their services by their 
Governments. Rear-Admiral Sims, U. S. N., a 



156 SIMSADUS 

Naval officer, a diplomat, a gentleman, and a ser- 
vant of his country, deserves the best his govern- 
ment can give him. His country has already given 
him the affection and that admiration he so richly 
deserves. 



APPENDIX 



APPENDIX 

The total number of submarines destroyed during the 
War was 203 ; this figure includes eight which were forced 
to intern because of injuries received in encounters with 
patrol vessels. The following table gives the methods 
by which they were destroyed : 

Rammed by Man of War 4 

" " Destroyer and Patrol Vessels 9 

" " Merchant Vessels 4 

Sunk by gunfire — Destroyer and Patrol Vessels 12 

" " " Decoy Ship (Mystery Ship) il 

" " " Armed Smack i 

" " Depth Charges from Destroyer & Patrol 

Vessels 35 

" " Allied mine-fields 34 

" " Allied Submarines 17 

" " Allied Submarine cooperating with a decoy 

ship 2 

" " Aircraft 7 

Blown up 14 

Sunk by Accident 4 

" " Collision with Enemy vessels 2 

Stranded 3 

Sunk by Mine-nets — moored i 

" " " " towed 8 

" " Mines laid by Germany 5 

" " Collision with paravane on Destroyer 3 

" " Modified sweep i 

" " Bomb I 

Interned 8 

Method of sinking unidentified 17 

Total 203 

159 



i6o APPENDIX 

It will be noted from this list that depth charges were 
the most effective weapon against the submarine; also 
attention is called to the fact that 17 submarines were 
sunk by Allied submarines, and that none were sunk by 
Merchant Ship gunfire. Probably half of those sunk by 
unknown methods destroyed themselves through internal 
explosives or by getting caught on the bottom. 

If we classify this list according to nationalities, we have: 

Sunk by British Vessels or British Mines 137 

" " U. S. Vessels 4 

" " French Vessels 3 

" " Russian Vessels 2 

Total 146 

The remaining boats were sunk by means other than 
a deliberate attack by Allied vessels, or by Allied opera- 
tions. 

The classification of this list according to the areas in 
which the submarines were sunk is interesting. 

Sunk in the North Sea 86 

" " Dover Barrage 17 

" " English Channel 20 

" "Irish Sea 7 

" Southwest of Ireland 7 

" West of Ireland i 

" North of Ireland 5 

" Northwest of Scotland i 

" in the Arctic Sea 3 

" " " Baltic " 2 

" " " Atlantic 4 

" " " Black Sea 3 

" " " Mediterranean 15 

" " " Dardanelles i 

Interned in Spain 5 

" Holland 2 

" " Norway i 



APPENDIX i6i 

Blown up at bases — Flanders 4 

" " " Pola and Cattaro 10 

Unidentified 6 

Total 200 

It may seem strange that 17 submarines were destroyed 
by unknown means, and only 6 were destroyed in unknown 
places. This is easily explained, for submarines lying on 
the bottom have been found when the cause of their de- 
struction was unknown. The reader must not forget that 
practically all this information was in the hands of the 
authorities during the War. The accumulation of it was 
of great importance to the Allies while the War was in 
progress, and its attainment extremely difficult. 

SUBMARINE LOSSES 
Chronological 

North Sea N.— North of 58°; North Sea— 58° to 53°; 
North Sea S.— South of 53°. Channel E.— East of o""; 
Channel— 0° to 3° W.; Channel West— 3° to 5° W. 

1914 



1915 



(10) 



Aug. 


9 


U 


15 


North Sea N. 


Sept. 


12 


u 


13 


North Sea 


Nov. 


23 


u 


18 


North Sea N. 


Dec. 




u 


5 


North Sea S. 


Dec. 




u 


II 


North Sea S. 


Jan. 




u 


7 


North Sea 


Jan. 




u 


31 


Unknown 


Mar. 


4 


u 


8 


Dover Area 


Mar. 


10 


u 


12 


North Sea 


Mar. 


18 


u 


29 


North Sea 


June 


5 


u 


14 


North Sea 


June 


23 


u 


40 


North Sea 


June 


(ca.) 


u 


37 


North Sea 


July 


2 


uc 


2 


North Sea S. 


July 


20 


u 


23 


North Sea N. 


July 


24 


u 


36 


Scotland NW. 


Aug. 


II 


UB 


4 


North Sea S. 



i62 APPENDIX 

Aug. 19 U 27 Irish Chan. Appr. 

Aug. (ca.) UB I Medit. 

(20) Aug. U 26 Baltic 

Sept. 15 U 6 North Sea N. 

Sept. 24 U 41 Chan. Approach 

Oct. 6 (ca.) UC 9 North Sea S. 

Nov. 4 UC 8 North Sea 

1916 Mar. 17 UC 12 Medit. E. 
Mar. 22 U 68 Ireland SW. 
Mar. (ca.) UB 13 Unknown 
Apr. 5 UB 26 Channel 
Apr. 23 UC 3 North Sea S. 

(30) Apr. 24 UB 3 North Sea S. 

Apr. 27 UC 5 North Sea S. 

May 27 U 74 North Sea 

May (ca.) UB 15 Medit. 

May (or June) U 10 North Sea S. 

July 6 UC 10 North Sea S. 

July 7 U 77 North Sea 

July 14 U 51 North Sea 

July 30 UB 44 Medit. E. 

Aug. 21 UC 7 North Sea S. 

(40) Oct. 30 UB 45 Black Sea 

Oct. UB 7 Black Sea 

Nov. 2 U 56 Arctic 

Nov. 4 U 20 North Sea, Jutland 

Nov. 30 UB 19 Channel 

Nov. UC 15 Black Sea 

Nov. (ca.) UC 13 Medit. 

Dec. 4 UC 19 North Sea S. 

Dec. 6 UB 29 Channel Approach 

Dec. 16 UB 46 Dardanelles 

1917 Jan. 14 UB 37 Channel 
(51) Jan. 26 U "jd Arctic 

Feb. 8 UC 39 North Sea 

Feb. 8 UC 46 North Sea S. 

Feb. 17 U 83 Ireland SW. 

Feb. 23 UC 32 North Sea 

Mar. 10 UC 43 North Sea N. 

Mar. 12 UC 18 North Sea 

Mar. 12 U 85 Channel W. 

Mar. 13 UB 6 Dutch Coast (Interned) 

(60) Apr. 5 UC 68 North Sea S. 

Apr. 19 UC 30 North Sea 



APPENDIX 



163 



(70) 



(80) 



(90) 



(100) 



May I 
May 9 
May 14 
May 17 
May 20 
May 24 
June 7 
June 12 
June 20 
June 
July 12 
July 24 
July 26 
July 29 



July 

July 

Aug. 

Aug. 

Aug. 

Aug. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Sept. 

Oct. 

Oct. 

Oct. 

Oct. 

Oct. 

Oct. 

Oct. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Nov. 

Nov. 

Nov. 

Nov. 

Nov. 

Nov. 



U 81 
UC 26 

U 59 
UB 39 
UC 36 
UC 24 
UC 29 
UC 66 

u 

UB 
U 
UC 
UC 61 
UB 23 



99 

36 

69 

I 



29 
29 

4 
12 

18 
21 
2 
10 
II 
12 

17 

22 

26 

27 

28 

29 

i-ii 

i-ii 

5 

5^ 

19 

23 

(ca.) 

(ca.) 

I 

3 

13 
17 
17 
18 
19-22 



UB 27 
UB 20 
UC 44 
U 44 
UB 32 
UC 41 
U 28 
UC 42 
U 49 
U 45 
U 88 
UC 72 

UC33 

UC 21 

UC 6 

UC55 
U 50 
U 66 
UB 41 
U 106 

UC79 
UC 16 
UC 62 
UC 14 
UC 63 
UC 65 
UC 51 
U 58 
UB 18 

UC47 

UC57 



Atlantic 

North Sea S. 

North Sea 

Channel 

North Sea S. 

Medit. E. 

Ireland SW. 

Channel W. 

Ireland W. 

Unknown 

North Sea N. 

North Sea S. 

Dover Area 

Channel W. (then interned, Co- 

runna) 
North Sea S. 
North Sea S. 
Ireland S. (Waterford) 
North Sea N. 
Channel 

North Sea (Tay) 
Arctic 
Ireland S. 
Atlantic 
Ireland N. 
Atlantic 
North Sea S. 
Irish Channel 
North Sea S. 
North Sea S. 
North Sea N. (Lerwick) 
North Sea 
North Sea 
North Sea 
North Sea 
North Sea S. 
Channel 
North Sea 
North Sea S. 
North Sea S. 
Channel 
North Sea S. 
Ireland S. 
Channel 
North Sea 
Baltic 



164 




APPENDIX 




Nov. 24 


U 48 


Dover Area 




Nov. 29 


UB 61 


North Sea S. 




Dec. 2 


UB 81 


Channel 


(no) 


Dec. 6 


UC 69 


Channel 




Dec. 10 


UB 75 


North Sea 




Dec. 13 


U 75 


North Sea 




Dec. 14 


UC 38 


Medit. E. 




Dec. 19 


UB 56 


Dover Area 




Dec. 25 


U 87 


Irish Channel 


1918 


Jan. 7 


U 93 


Channel Approach 




Jan. 8 


UB 69 


Medit. W. 




Jan. 18 


UB 66 


Medit. W. 




Jan. 19 


UB 22 


North Sea 


(120) 


Jan. 26 


U 84 


Irish Channel 




Jan. 26 


UB 35 


Dover Area 




Jan. 26 


U 109 


Dover Area 




Jan. 28 


UB 63 


North Sea N. 




Jan. (ca.) 


u 95 


Unknown 




Feb. 4 


UC so 


Dover Area 




Feb. 8 


UB 38 


Dover Area 




Feb. 12 


U 89 


Ireland N. 




Feb. 25 


UB 17 


Channel 




Mar. 10 


UB 58 


Dover Area 


(130) 


Mar. II 


UB 54 


North Sea 




Mar. 15 


U no 


Ireland N. 




Mar. 23 


UC 48 


Interned, Ferrol 




Mar. 26 


U 61 


Irish Channel 




Apr. II 


UB 33 


Dover Area 




Apr. 17 


UB 82 


Ireland N. 




Apr. 21 


UB 71 


Medit. W. 




Apr. 22 


UB 55 


Dover Area 




Apr. 25 


U 104 


Irish Channel 




Apr. 30 


UB 85 


Irish Channel 


(140) 


May 2 


UB 31 


Dover Area 




May 2 


UC 78 


Dover Area 




May 8 


UB 70 


Medit. W. 




May 8 


U 32 


Medit. W. 




May 9 


UB 78 


Channel 




May 10 


UB 16 


North Sea S. 




May II 


U 154 


Atlantic 




May 12 


U 103 


Channel W. 




May 12 


UB 72 


Channel 




May 16 


UC35 


Medit. W. 


(ISO) 


May 18 


U 39 


Interned, Cartagena 




May 23 


UB 52 


Medit. E. 



(i6o) 



(170) 



(180) 



(190) 



May 24 
May 26 
Mar 31 
May 31 
May (ca.) 
June 17 
June 20 
June 26 
July 10 
July 10 
July 19 
July 20 
July 27 
July (ca.) 
Aug. 3 
Aug. 13 
Aug. 14 
Aug. 28 
Aug. 29 
Aug. (ca.) 
Sept. 9 
Sept. 10 
Sept. 16 
Sept. 19 
Sept. 25 
Sept. 29 
Sept. 
Sept. 
Sept. 
Oct. 4 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 
Oct. 



16 

19 

28 

28 



APPENDIX 

UC 56 Interned, Santander 

UB 74 Channel 

UC 75 North Sea 

UC 49 North Sea 

UB119 Unknown 

U 64 Medit. W. 

UC 64 Dover Area 

UC II North SeaS. 

UC 'jf Dover Area 

UB 65 Ireland SW. 

UBiio North Sea 

UB124 Ireland N. 

UB107 North SeaS.' 

UB108 Unknown 

UB 53 Medit. E. 

UB 30 North Sea 

UB sj North Sea S. ^ 

UC 70 North Sea 

UB109 Dover Area 

UB 12 North Sea S. 

U 92 North Sea N. 

UB 83 North Sea N. 

UB103 Dover Area 

UB104 North Sea N. 

U 156 North Sea N. 

UB115 North Sea N. 

U 102 prob. North Sea N. 

UB113 prob. North Sea 

UB127 prob. North Sea N. 

UB 68 Medit. E. 

UB 90 North Sea 

UB123 North Sea N. 

U 78 North Sea 

UB116 North Sea N. 

*U 47 Medit. 

*U 65 Medit. 

*U 72 Medit. 

*U 73 Medit. 

*UB 10 North Sea S. 

*UB 40 North Sea S. 

*UB 48 Medit. 

*UB 59 North Sea S. 

*UBi29 Medit. 

*UC 4 North SeaS. 

*UC 25 Medit. 

*UC 34 Medit. 



16s 



i66 



APPENDIX 



Oct. 
Oct. 

(200) Nov. 9 



*UC 53 Medlt. 
*UC 54 Medit. 
U 34 Medit. W. 



Losses after signing of Armistice 

Nov. II U 157 Interned, Norway 

Nov. 21 U 97 North Sea 

Nov. 21 UC 74 Interned, Barcelona 

* Destroyed by the Germans on evacuation of Flanders and 

the Adriatic. 



LIST OF GERMAN SUBMARINES SUNK 









Name of 




Dale of 


Commander's Name 




Rank 


Sub. 


Place 


Sinking 


Albrecht, Kurt 


Dead 


K-i 










Albrecht, Werner 


" 


O-L 


UC-53 








Amberger, Gustav 


P.W. 


K-L 


UB-S8 


5o:58N oi:i4E 


Mar. 


10, 1918 


Amberger, Wilhelm 


Dead 


O-L 


UB-108 








Arnold, Alfred 


P.W. 


O-L 










Bachmann, Gunther 


Dead 


O-L 


UB-38 


5o:56N oi:2sW 


Feb. 


8, 1918 


Barten, Wilhelm 


" 


O-L 










Bauck, W. 


" 


K-L 


U-89 




Feb. 


1918 


Bauer, Casar 


« 


K-L 










Bender, Waldemar Ei 


5caped, 


K-L 


U-69 


North Sea (N) 


July 


12, 1917 


returned to 












Germany 












Berekhelm, Egewolf 














Freiherr von 


Dead 


K-L 










Berger, Gerardt 


<( 


K-L 


U-so 


Near German 
Coast 


Oct. 


1917 


Bermis, Kurt 


" 


K-L 


U-104 


5i:59W o6:26W April 26, 1918 


Branchied, Albert 


" 


O-L 


UB-17 


Channel 


Feb. 


25, 1918 


Braun, Charles 


" 


O-L 










Brever, Herbert 


P.W. 


O-L 










Buck, Gustav 


Dead 


K-L 










Degetau, Hans 


" 


O-L 


U-68 




Mar. 


22, 


Dieckmann, Victor 


" 


K-L 


U-62 








Ditfurth, Benno von 


" 


O-L 


UB-32 


North Sea 


Sept. 


I7» 


idling, Karl 


" 


K-L 


U-48 


Goodwins 


Nov. 


24, 1917 


Ehrentraut, Otto 


" 


O-L 


UC-39 


54:03N 00:03 


Feb. 


8, 1918 


Eltester, Max 


li 


K-L 










Feddersen, Adolf 




L- 


UC-14 








Fircks, Wilhelm 














Frieherr von 


Dead 


K-L 










Fischer, Karl-Hanno 


" 


L- 










Frohner, Eherhardt 


" 


L- 










Furbringer, Gerhardt 


P.W. 


K-L 










Furbringer, Werner 


P.W. 


K-L 


UB-iio 








Galster, Hans 


Dead 


O-L 


UC-si 




Dec. 


1917 


Gebeschus, Rudolf 


" 


K-L 


UB-63 


56:17 02:2SW 
In Atlantic 


Jan. 


28, 1918 


Gercke, Herman 


« 


K-L 


U-IS4 


May 


II, 1918 










Azores 







APPENDIX 



167 



Commander's Name 



Name of 
Rank Sub. 



Place 



Date of 
Sinking 



Gerlach, Helmut 
Gerth, George 



P. W. 



K-L 
K-L 



Glimpf, Herman Dead 0-L 

GraefF, Ernst P. W. K-L 

Gregor, Fritz Dead 0-L 

Gross, Karl " O-L 

Gunther, Paul " 0-L 

Guntzel, Ludwig " K-L 

Gunzel, Erich " K-L 

Haag, George " L- 

Hansen, Klaus " K-L 

Hartman, Richard " K-L 

Hecht, Erich " 0-L 

Heinke, Curt " 0-L 

Heller, Bruno " O-L 

Hennig, Heinrich von P. W. K-L 
Heydebreck, Karsten 

V. Dead O-L 

Hirzel, Alfred " 0-L 

Hoppe, Bruno " K-L 

Hufnagel, Hans " K-L 

Kesserlingk, Harold V. " 0-L 

Kiel, Wilhelm " 0-L 

Kiesewetter, Wilhelm Interned K-L 

Klatt, Alfred Dead 0-L 



Kolbe, Walther 

Konig, Gerog " 
Korsch, Hans Paul 

Kratzsch " 

Krech, Gunther P. W. 

Krevsern, Gunther Dead 
Kroil, Karl 

Kustner, Heinrich " 

Lafrenze, Claus P. P. W. 

Launburg, Otto P. W. 

Lammer, Johannes Dead 

Lepsius, Rienhald " 

Lilienstern, Ruhler " 
Lorenze, Hellmuth Interned 

Lorenze, Herman Dead 

Lowe, Werner " 
Luhe, Vicco von der P. W. 

Menzel, Bernhard Dead 

Metz, Artur " 
Metzger, Heinrich Interned 

Mey, Karj Dead 
Mildenstein, Christian " 

Moecke, Fritz " 

Mohrbutter, Urich P. W. 

Moraht Robert P. W. 

Muhlan, Helmut P. W. 

Muhle, Gerhardt Dead 



0-L 

K-L 

0-L 

K-L 

K-L 

0-L 

K-K 

0-L 

K-L 

0-L 

K-L 

0-L 

0-L 

0-L 

K-L 

0-L 

0-L 

O-L 

0-L 

K-L 

O-L 

O-L 

O-L 

O-L 

K-L 

K-L 

K-L 



U-93 49:59 05:i2W Jan. 7, 191 8 

UC-61 Wissant Shoal July 26, 1917 

near Gris Nez 

UB-20 North Hinder July 29, 1917 

UB-33 Channel April 14, 1918 

UC-2 Off Yarmouth July 2, 1915 

UB-37 5o:o7N oi:47W Jan. 14, 1917 



U-75 
UB-13 



Dec. 17, 
Mar. 1916 



U-49 46:i7N I4:42W Sept. 11, 1917 
UB-54 Channel Mar. 11, 1918 



UC-63 SI-23N 02-ooE Nov. I, 1917 



U-106 North Sea 
UB-36 North Sea 

UC-18 54:38N oo-5sN Mar. 12, 1917 
UC-s6 Santander May 26, 1918 

UC-38 Medit. 38:32N ~ 

2o:34E 
UC-103 40 miles South 
of Lizard Point 



Oct. 10, 1917 
June, 1917 



Dec. 14, 1917 
May II, 1918 



UC-35 Sardinia 



May 16, 1918 



UB-Bs N. Channel April 30, 1918 

UC-3 S2:24N 02:24E April 23, 1916 

U-iio 55:49N o8:o6W Mar. 15, 1918 

UB-39 so:o5N oi:25W May 17, 1917 

UC-6s 5o:28N oo:i7E Nov. 3, 1917 

UB-52 Adriatic May 23, 1918 

UC-55 6o:ooN oi:ooW Sept. 29, 1917 

UC-48 so:22N oi:47W Mar. 23, 1918 

UB-s8 So:s8N oi:i4E Mar. 10, 1918 

UB-16 North Sea May 10, 1918 



U-39 Carthagena May 18, 1918 

UC-I July, 1917 

U-64 Bizerta, Medit. June 21, 1918 



i68 



APPENDIX 









Name of 




Date 


of 


Commander's Name 




Rank 


Siib. 


Place 


Sinki 


ng 


Muller, Hans Albrechl 


c " 


0-L 










Neumann, Friedrich 


p. W. 


0-L 


UB-s 








Niemer, Hans Interned 


0-L 


UB-23 




July 26, 


1917 


Niemeyer, Georg 


Dead 


0-L 










Nitzsche, Alfred 


" 


0-L 










Noodt, Erich 


P.W. 


0-L 










Petz, Willy 


Dead 


K-L 


U-85 


49:S2N 03:2oW 


Mar. 12, 


1917 


Platsch, Erich 


« 


0-L 










Pohle, Richard 


« 


K-L 










Prinz, Athalwin 


<( 


K-L 










Pustkuchen, Herbert 


" 


0-L 


UC-66 


49:S6N o5:ioW 


June 12, 


1917 


Reichenback, Gottfried " 


0-L 


UC-6 


5i:37N 02:5iE 


Sept. 28, 


1917 


Reimarus, Georg 


" 


0-L 


UC-21 


Si:3oN oi:34E 


Sept. 20, 


1917 


Remy, Johannes 


" 


K-L 










Roehr, Walter 


" 


K-L 


U-84 


SS-S3N 05:44W Jan. 25, 


1918 


Rosenow, Ernest 


" 


K-L 


UC-29 


5i:47N ii:4oW June 7, 


1917 


Rumpel, Walther 


" 


K-L 










Rucker, Claus 


<c 


K-L 


U-103 


5i:03N 01-38E 


Jan. 26, 


1918 


Saltzwedel, Rudolf 


" 


0-L 


UB-81 


30:27N 00:53 


Dec. 2, 


1917 


Sebelin, Erwin 


" 


K-L 










SeufFer, Rudolf 


" 


K-L 


UC-so 


5o:47N oo:s9E 


Feb. 4, 


1918 


Schmettow, Graf von 


(( 


K-L 


UC-26 


Si:3N i:4oE 


May 9, 


1917 


Schmidt, Georg 


(( 












Schmidt, Siegfried 


(t 


0-L 


U-45 


SS-48N 7:3oW 


Sept. 12, 


1917 


Schmidt, Walther G. I 


nterned 0-L 


UC-S6 


Santander 


May 5, 


1918 


Schmitz, Max 


Dead 


O-L 


UC-62 








Schmitz, Walther 


P.W. 


0-L 


UC-7S 


OfFTyne 


May 31, 


1918 


Schneider, Rudolf 


Dead 


K-L 


U-87 


S2:s6N os:o7W 


Dec. 27, 


1917 


Schultz, Theodor 


" 


O-L 


UB-61 




Dec. 


1917 


Schurmann, Paul 


" 


0-L 


UC-4 




Oct. IS, 


1917 


Schwartz, Ferdinand 


« 


0-L 


UB-64 








Schweinitz und Krain 














Graf von 


(C 


K-L 










Schwieger 


<( 


K-L 


U-88 


49:42N i3:i8W 


Sept. 14, 


1917 


Sittenfield, Erich 


" 


K-L 


U-4S 


SS-48N 7:3oW 


Sept. 12, 


1917 


Smith, Wilhelm 


P.W. 


0-L 










Soergel, Hans 


Dead 


0-L 










Sprenger 


P.W. 


K-L 


UC-34 








Steckelberg, Oscar Interned 


0-L 


UB-6 


Dutch Coast 


Mar. 13, 


1917 


Stein Zu Lausnitz 














Freiherr von 


Dead 


0-L 


UB-27 


52:47N 02:24E 


July 29, 


1917 


SteindofF, Ernest 




0-L 


UB-74 


5 miles S. Port- 
land Bill 


May 26, 


1918 


Stenzler, Heinrich 


« 


0-L 


UB-78 


Off Cherbourg 


May 9, 


1918 


Stosberg, Arthur 


P.W. 


0-L 


UB-78 








Stoss, Alfred 


P.W. 


K-L 










Stoter, Karl 


Dead 


0-L 


UB-3S 


Si:03N oi:38E 


Jan. 26, 


1918 


Stuhr, Fritz 


" 


K-L 


U-io 


Si:26N 2o:5oE 


May 19, 


1916 


Suchodoletz, Ferdi- 














nand V. 


" 


K-L 










Tebbenjohannes, Kurt 


P.W. 


K-L 


UC-44 


S2:o7N 6:59W 


Aug. 4, 


1917 


Trager, Friedrich 


Dead 


0-L 


UB-72 


26 miles SSW 
Portland Bill 


May 12, 


1918 


Utke, Kurt 


P.W. 


0-L 


UC-ii 


E. Harwich 


June 26, 


1918 







APPENDIX 




169 








Name of 




Date 


of 


Commander's Name 




Rank 


Sub. 


Place 


Sinki 


ng 


Valentiner, Hans 


Dead 


O-L 


U-IS6 














or U-IS7 


So:s8N oi:28E 


Dec. 


1917 


Voigt, Ernest 


« 


0-L 


UC-72 


Stranded in 














Dover Sept. or Oct. 


1917 


WachendorfF, Seigfried 




O-L 










Wacker, Karl 




O-L 


UB-22 




Jan. 


1918 


Wagenfuhr, Paul 




O-L 


U-44 


58-5 iN 4-40E 


Aug. 12, 


1917 


Walther, Franz 




O-L 


UB-7S 








Weddigan, Otto 




K-L 










Wegener, Bernhard 




K-L 










Weisbach, Erwin 




K-L 


U-32 


Mediterranean 


May I, 


1918 


Weisbach, Raimund 


P. W. 


K-L 


U-81 


51N 13W 
Medit. 38:32N 


May I, 


1917 


Wendlandt, Hans H. 


P. W. 


O-L 


UC-38 


Dec. 14, 


1917 










20:34E 






Wenninger, Ralph 


P. W. 


K-L 


UB-SS 


Channel E. 


April 22, 


1918 


Wigankow, Gunther 


Dead 


O-L 










Wilcke, Erich 


" 


K-L 










Wilhelms, Ernest 


" 


K-L 










Willich, Kurt 


" 


K-L 


UC-24 


Off Cattaro 


May 24, 


1917 


WutsdorfF, Hans Oskei 


" 


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